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THE ASBURY THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL provides a scholarly
forum for thorough discussion of issues relevant to Christian thought
and faith, and to the nature and mission of the church. The Journal
addresses those concerns and ideas across the curriculum which interface
with Christian thought, life and ministry.
The primary resource for contributions to The Journal is the Asbury
Seminary faculty who engage in dialogue with both the roots of our
religious heritage and contemporary thought. Scholars from other
academic disciplines and various backgrounds are invited to submit
articles for publication.
The positions espoused in articles in The Journal do not necessarily
represent the views of the editors or of Asbury Theological Seminary.
Books for review and articles for consideration should be mailed to:
Eric H. Johnson, Asbury Theological Seminary, Wilmore, KY 403901199. Telephone (606) 858-3581. Manuscripts should be in English and
typed double-spaced on white bond paper, 81/2 x 11 inches, with an
accompanying computer disk copy when that is possible. - Sermons,
poetry and devotional materials are not used. Unsolicited manuscripts
will not be returned unless a self-addressed envelope with sufficient
postage is provided. Queries are welcome, and a style sheet is available
upon request. Modest honorarium payments to authors follow
acceptance.
Articles in The Journal are indexed in The Christian Periodical Index
and Religion Index One: Periodicals (RIO); book reviews are indexed in
Index to Book Reviews in Religion (IBRR). Both RIO and IBRR are
published by the American Theological Library Association, 5600 South
Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637, and are available online through
BRS Information Technologies and DIALOG Information Services.
Volumes in microfilm of The Asbury Theological Journal (Vol. 41-)
and The Asbury Seminarian (Vol. 1-40) are available from University
Microfilms International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106.
Articles and reviews may be copied for personal or internal use, and
permission to reprint all or portions of any of the contents may be
granted upon request to the managing editor.
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Editorial Note
This issue of The Asbury Theological Journal is dedicated to two highly
significant professors whose lives have made a lasting contribution to Asbury
Theological Seminary and whose writings have been prolific and influential
among students, teachers, pastors and the Church in general. I speak of Dr. John
T. Seamands and Dr. Herbert W. Byrne, who retire at the end of this academic
year.
Dr. Seamands joined the faculty of Asbury Theological Seminary in 1961 as the
John Wesley Beeson Professor of Christian Missions. He was the founding
director of the E. Stanley Jones School of World Mission and Evangelism at
Asbury in 1981. Dr. Seamands served as a missionary to India from 1940 until
1961 under the board of missions of The Methodist Church. After a highly
successful ministry as a missionary, Dr. Seamands came to Asbury where he has
served with distinction for twenty-seven years. He has preached the gospel around
the world in numerous mission retreats, conferences, universities and churches of
all denominations. He is particularly noted for his close relationship in working
with Dr. E. Stanley Jones in the United Christian Ashram movement. His writings
include eight books in English on various themes as Christian mission, the Holy
Spirit, daily devotions and Christian biography: The Supreme Task of the Church,
On Tiptoe with Joy, Pioneers of the Younger Churches, On Tiptoe with Love,
Around the World for Christ, Power for the Day, The GO of the Spirit is Yours
and Tell It Well: Communicating The Gospel Across Cultures. Many of these

books have been translated into German, Spanish and Korean. Dr. Seamands has
four books published in the Kanarese language of India. His writings also include
numerous articles and chapters written in edited books. Dr. Seamands has served
well as a model of a missionary and scholar. His professional career has been more
than a career; it has been a testimony of conviction and commitment to the
academic and spiritual dimensions of a divine calling.
Dr. Byrne came to Asbury Theological Seminary in 1967 as professor of
Christian education. Prior to that time, Dr. Byrne had served as academic dean at
Fort Wayne Bible College and Huntington College, and also served as chairman of
the division of religion and philosophy at Asbury College. His writings are
numerous, including A Christian Approach to Education, Christian Education
for the Local Church, Improving Church Education and Motivating Church
Workers. As an ordained minister of The United Methodist Church, Dr. Byrne
has been active in the ongoing life of the church in preaching missions, retreats and
in advancing the educational ministry of local churches. For twenty years, he has
served Asbury Theological Seminary with distinction. His scholarship and
personal commitment to the gospel have helped to form the academic and
spiritual life of many seminarians. His involvement in administrative responsibilities has helped to form the character of several institutions, including Asbury
Theological Seminary. Dr. Byrne has not only been a professor of Christian
education; his teaching and life serve as a model to the Church.
We offer this issue of The Asbury Theological Journal as a festschrift to Dr.
Seamands and Dr. Byrne. The variety of articles covers apologetical issues and
missionary-pastoral themes. Some of these essays are written by former students
and admirers of Dr. Seamands and Dr. Byrne.
LAURENCE W. WOOD
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Miracles and Physics
STANLEY L. JAKI

The most incredible thing about miracles is that they happen.
—G. K. Chesterton*
PRIOR TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
In writing about miracles it is hardly possible not to think first of David Hume.
In many quarters he is remembered as the one who had once and for all divested
miracles of intellectual respectability. Such a reputation is part of the awe in which
Hume as a man of intellect is still held. Yet, as far as intellectual construction goes,
Hume himself admitted that his theory of understanding resembled not so much
an edifice as a heap of bricks.' To his credit he also perceived that his premises
provided only for one kind of glue, plain sentiment or mere habit, to make those
bricks stick together into some sort of intellectual framework. About such an
outcome Hume was both very despondent in his truly philosophical moments and
also very outspoken. Already his first major philosophical work, The Treatise on
Human Nature, contains the unabashed declaration, "Reason is, or ought only to
be, the slave of passions."2 That a leader of the Enlightenment did not rather speak
of the enslavement of passions to reason may tell something of the true nature of
the light generated by that much glorified movement. To be sure, by "passions"
Hume meant a dignified, quiet, urbane comportment, a foremost existential
commodity in his eyes. Indeed all of Hume's philosophy was meant to be a shield
against harsh, disturbing truths, especially the ones that bespeak of man's subordination to transcendental dimensions. He correctly perceived that none of
those dimensions were a potential threat to a tensionless lifestyle if the idea of God
were a matter of mere wishful thinking.
Hume's relentless effort to justify intellectually a Weltanschauung free of
transcendental constraints was in part a reaction to Calvinist tenets, zealously
preached in the Edinburgh of his youth, about God's wrath on those He had
positively predestined to hell. Another source was Hume's own personal make-up
in which Epicurean traits, as amply revealed by his classic portraits, clearly
dominated. Epicurus, who figures prominently in the closing section of Hume's
*The Innocence of Father Brown (1911: Penguin Books, 1950) p. 11.
Dr. Stanley L. Jaki, a Hungarian-born Catholic priest of the Benedictine order,
with doctorates in physics and systematic theology, is distinguished university
professor at Seton Hall University (South Orange, NJ) and the 1987 recipient of
the Templeton Prize.
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Enquiry, was certainly Hume's model in seeking the intellectual grounds for a
peace of mind which consisted in being left alone by the gods. 3
Nothing has, of course, ever been so much a threat to that ideal of splendid
isolation as the One for whom the "Hound of Heaven" is still the psychologically
most expressive name. 4 Awareness of Him has three main sources of which one,
moral consciousness or the sense of the holy, affected Hume little if at all. In a
sense, however civilized, he was a counter image of a Bunyan, a Wesley, let alone of
John Henry Newman. 5 He did not pretend indifference toward the two other
sources, one philosophical, the other historical. This is not to suggest that his style
showed emotional overtones as he went about dissecting the classical proofs of the
existence of God: the cosmological and the teleological. He skillfully played the
role of uninterested bystander intent only on incontrovertible verities. He could
not, however, mask his sarcastic contentment as he completed his picking apart the
cosmological argument with a celebration of the idea of aborted, incoherent,
botched-up universes. 6
That such an outcome was destructive of the notion of universally valid laws did
not seem to bother him. Nor did he seem to be mindful of the fact that years earlier
his attack on miracles 7 assumed the notion of immutable laws of nature. He also
failed to come to grips with the fact that on the basis of the bare inductionism he
advocated one could never establish the existence of such laws. An inductionism
severed from metaphysics could not yield that completeness which was meant by
universally and permanently valid laws. Most importantly, Hume did not offer
satisfactory explanation of the role he accorded in his philosophy to the
recognition'of facts. As far as he was a sensationist or empiricist philosopher he
had to grant equal credibility to the recognition of any fact, usual or unusual. That
recognition had to be certain, if the philosophy built on it was to give assurance of
certainty. But as far as he was a genuinely Humean philosopher, who subordinated
reason to sentiments, he had to part with his professed impartiality vis-à-vis any
kind of fact, usual or unusual. But partiality for some facts, which meant distrust
for others, invited uncertainty about all facts. This is why when arguing against
miracles Hume switched grounds. 8 From a mere probability argument against
miracles (the trustworthy witnessing of regular recurrences far outweighed that of
exceptional events) he went on dismissing entirely the credibility of witnesses
(whatever their number, learnedness, and integrity) on behalf of exceptional or
"miraculous" events. Behind such a tactical shift there had to be a fundamental
consideration at play. Hume gave a glimpse of it as in the same context he declared,
"If the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of common
sense."9 Hume's philosophy in general and his arguments against miracles in
particular, are pivoted on the meaning he gave to common sense.
In Hume's century common sense had many champions, the first of them being
the Jesuit Claude Buffier, today almost completely forgotten. They all believed
that common sense was the best assurance for certainty about the existence of
external reality, that is, of objective facts, things, and events. ) 0 That Father
Bailer's contention had no less an admirer than Voltaire," was not without a
common though least noted instructiveness. The praises of an unsound philosophe
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were not the clue toward the best philosophical meaning which an expression, be it
common sense, was susceptible of. Insofar as it became equated with mere
common opinion, it certainly had no chance in securing, and certainly not among
philosophers, a certainty about the reality of objective facts. That a commonly
shared opinion is a most variable commodity was implied in the phrase, "climate of
opinion," made popular early in this century by Whitehead, who borrowed it from
a "seventeenth-century writer" (Joseph Glanvill) without naming him. 12
A recall of the times which witnessed the coining of that phrase should not
appear useless for Christian theologians. They all, of course, know that defense of
miracles has from those times on been an increasingly uphill battle against the
climate of opinion taken for common sense. But perhaps not all of them are aware
of the unsoundness of a defense of miracles that seeks an ally in the successive
climates of opinion, philosophical and scientific. As will be clear later, the present
status of that defense provides much for a new chapter in a now old story. That
there will be no end to it may be surmised by those mindful of a biblical phrase with
a sceptical touch, "There is nothing new under the sun" (Ecclesiastes 1:9). In respect
to controversies about miracles, history turns out to be once more the past written
in that present tense in which grammarians have long ago recognized the
beckoning of the future.
But there is an additional reason in a paper on miracles and science to go back to
the past in order to understand the present and be prepared at least for the
immediate future. The reason relates to the measure to which science contributed
to the formation of climate of thought--as difficult to escape as the air one
breathes-:ever since the days of Glanvill. Those days saw the rise of Newtonian
science with all its dazzling successes that opened unsuspected vistas in man's
understanding of nature. No less dazzling, though in an opposite or blinding sense,
were some philosophical presuppositions grafted on that science by men of science,
Newton included, dabbling in philosophy, and by philosophers with little if any
expertise in science.
The chief and strictly scientific lure in that dubious game was the inverse square
law. Had the seventeenth century not been the age of scientific genius, it might have
witnessed serious interest in its own immediate intellectual past. As that past was in
good part a matter of printed record, disregard for it could not be excused with a
reference to the difficulty of gathering manuscript material, a task difficult even in
this age of instant copies and tele-copying. Even a cursory reading of the printed
record in question, say of the works of Kepler, Horrocks, and Hooke, would have
shown that the inverse square law was not a generalized statement derived from
individual observations or experiments. Such an interpretation of the provenance
of the inverse square law would have fitted only the empiricist-inductionist straitjacket tailored by Bacon for science as its foolproof method. For that garment,
which only some foolhardy amateurs cared to don, no scientific genius of the
century of genius had any use. Certainly not Newton. But Newton was also a
genius in that he was most unwilling to credit other geniuses. Because of his
jealousy of Hooke, Newton did not give enough credit to Hooke's ideas on the
inverse square law of gravitation. 13 To anyone familiar with Leibniz's work,
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equally suspect would appear Newton's claims about his having been the sole
discoverer of infinitesimal calculus.
Newton certainly belied his own overbearing self-centeredness when he voiced a
twelfth-century statement (resurrected in the seventeenth-century debate concerning old and new learning) that the moderns saw farther because they were sitting on
the shoulders of giant forebears. 14 Newton certainly had such a giant to help him
see the inverse square law loom large on his mental horizon. The giant was none
other than Kepler whose three laws of planetary motion were mediated to Newton
through a little-appreciated mid-seventeenth-century English astronomer, Jeremiah Horrocks. Those three laws and Huygens' law of centrifugal force could
easily be combined in such a way as to yield the inverse square law.
Whether Newton had performed early enough that elementary algebraic
operation is disputed. 15 But he did not need to do so in order to convince himself
about the validity of the inverse square law. As one with keen interest in optics,
Newton was certainly familiar with Kepler's explicit statements on the decrease of
light intensity with the square of distance from a point source. 16 Nor could Newton
be ignorant of the fact that Kepler's own certainty about that law of optics was not
based at all on observations. Reliable photometry was still two centuries away.
Kepler's certainty rested on an a priori philosophical assumption about nature.
According to that assumption space was homogeneous. The spreading of any
physical effect—optical, thermal or gravitational—in such a space could only follow
the inverse square law. Those aware of the influence of the Cambridge Neoplatonists on young Newton, with their markedly a priori speculations, and of old
Newton's divinization of homogeneous Euclidean space as God's sensorium," will
easily perceive the irresistible attractiveness which Kepler's train of thought had to
have on Newton. The latter had been fully convinced about the inverse square law
of gravitation long before he compared the fall of the moon in its orbit with the fall
of an object on the earth and before he had elegantly derived that law from the
notion of a central field of force.
The first important thing to note here is the a priori certainty as the source of
Newtonian science pivoted on the inverse square law of gravitation. This source
was duly and quickly overlooked as Newtonian science proved ever more
successful, but it did not fail to act less potently. Newton could lull himself into
believing that he was really a "Newtonian" natural philosopher, starting from facts,
experiments, and observations and never from hypotheses or postulates. Few
leading men of science have ever indulged in so many a priori hypotheses as the one
who boasted: hypotheses non fingo. 18
These historical details about seventeenth-century science will reveal their
bearing on our topic as soon as one notes the second important point. It is implied
in the first about the certainty felt on a priori grounds about the inverse square law.
This chief and spectacularly fruitful law of Newtonian science could easily create a
most portentous illusion about the status of the laws of nature. Was it not tempting
to assume that the laws of nature were not only accessible to the human mind on an
a priori basis but were also ontologically necessary in the form in which they were
unveiled by a priori reasoning? And, if such was the case, could there be any real
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need for experimentation? More importantly, could there be any need for a
Creator if nature necessarily had to be what it appeared to be through that very
same a priori reasoning?
Such questions about science as well as natural theology could hardly be
answered in a clear-cut way in the seventeenth century, a transition from Christian
to secularized thought. Ambivalence, hesitation, and confusion about these
questions were everywhere in the utterances of Galileo, Descartes, Newton, to say
nothing of lesser figures with quite a few divines among them, eager to explore the
new science for the purposes of theology. 19 As to science, the potential pitfalls were
in full evidence when Galileo slighted Kepler's discovery of the elliptical orbits of
planets. He did so on the patently a priori ground that the heavenly motions had to
be perfectly circular, a position which allied Galileo with Aristotle, the cosmologistscientist, whom he wanted to vanquish above al1. 20 Descartes could never warm up
to the indispensability of experiments. 21 Had Newton not been the scientific genius
he was, his philosophical a priorism (with strong Cartesian touches) would have
weakened his attention to observational evidence on more than a few occasions. 22
Hewasnotivleryspcfqutionadbyhevc.Ift
latter was the ultimate truth about the law of nature, what was the true heuristic
value of the a priori approach?
This question might have been definitively answered in the seventeenth century
had its scientific geniuses not represented a transition between Christian and
secular thought. The minds of Galileo, Descartes, and Newton were not
sufficiently Christian to perceive the pseudo-deity (be it pantheism or materialism
or deism) lurking behind a priori thinking. They were, however, sufficiently
Christian to give no serious consideration to a world without a Creator. Belief in
creation thoroughly conditioned their minds to think of nature as suffused by
reason and law even in that sublunary realm which was a realm of disorder for
pagan minds such as Plato and Aristotle, whatever their intention to celebrate
cosmic rationality. But if one was to consider in all its consequences the denial of
an infinitely rational Creator, could the inference be avoided that in such a case no
rationality whatever could appear in nature?
This inference was not broadly recognized even when in the nineteenth century
the secularization of Western thought began to unfold its full logic. Even such a
master logician as John Stuart Mill failed to recognize the full implications of his
own speculation about other worlds where two and two would not necessarily
make four. 23 For in that case there beckoned the specter of absolute contingentism
against which Mill's 'god' (half good, half evil) was hardly a logical shield. Mill was,
however, logical to the point of admitting that Hume's notion of the invariability
of nature's laws as a refutation of miracles rested on the presupposition that God
does not exist. For as Mill put it, a "miracle is a new effect supposed to be produced
by the introduction of new cause...; of the adequacy of that cause, if present, there
can be no doubt." 24 Even less recognition was given during the nineteenth century
to the fact that absolute contingentism was but a replay of the occasionalism
advocated by al-Ashari and Ockham.
At any rate, was the order of nature provided by absolute contingentism or
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occasionalism different from that radical form of positivism according to which
the laws of nature are mere commodious devices created by the mind for its own
convenience to deal with facts? 25 Scientists, who endorsed that theory, did not do
so to the logical extent of advocating a closure of laboratories. But this conflict of
their theory with their practice provided no answer to the question as to why there
was order in nature, that is, why nature obeyed specific laws. Refusal to anchor
that order in the Creator could but leave one with the fearful prospect of a radically
random state of affairs. There stones would not regularly fall, but just as likely
hang in mid-air or take off unexpectedly in any direction. There it would be most
unlikely that the hatching of a chicken egg would yield a chick. There a flower
would perpetuate its own kind only as an exceptional case. In other words, in a
world severed from its Creator, lawfulness would be the miracle, that is, a most
unexpected event.
The foregoing examples are a mere paraphrase of the most incisive pages written
on the laws of nature. The time, 1908, was the high water mark of the worst
misrepresentation of science once cast in the mold of scientistic ideology. The
book, not surprisingly, had Orthodoxy for its title. Its author, Gilbert Keith
Chesterton, was not a scientist, not even a philosopher of science. 26 But he was
certainly a thinker most independent of the climate of thought of his time if there
ever was such a thinker. No such independence was evident in the geniuses of the
seventeenth century, with Pascal being a major exception. A famous remark of his
portrayed Descartes as the one who really had no need of God. 27 Pascal could have
just as well stated the same about Galileo, who could exalt the human mind and
debase the divine mind in the same breath. As he stated that the human mind was
the greatest marvel of creation, Galileo also equated human knowledge of
geometry with that of the Creator. 28 From there it was but a step to deriving
nature's geometrical structure from the mind. Such a nature soon was seen to be in
no need either of mind or of God. The perception was achieved just a decade or so
before science came of age through Newton's Principia. In that perception of
Spinoza, nature and God were made identical which simply excluded the
possibility of miracles. 29 Much less noted was the most devastating consequence of
the Spinozian position. It consisted in Spinoza's thorough perplexity about the
existence of concrete, specific, limited things making up nature and providing
science with its subject matter. 30
To be sure, few at that time, and certainly not the scientists, became Spinozians.
But whereas there was no pressing need for following Spinoza, the question of
miracles pressed itself on in the measure in which the laws of nature began to
appear as subtly ultimate entities. Undoubtedly, Newton was sincere as he assigned
to God's direct action certain arrangements in the physical realm for which his
science contained no answer. One such arrangement was, according to Newton,
the separation of fiery from cold matter, or the separation of celestial bodies into
stars and planets. 31 His other example, the periodic intervention of God to secure
the stability of the solar system, made a better known intellectual history through
Laplace's scientific solution to that problem. 32 It was the history of holes in which
divines, ready to jump on the bandwagon of science without seriously studying it
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and unwilling to probe an essentially philosophical question to its very bottom,
were eagerly locating Almighty God as one busy doing what science could not do.
Many divines, in fact, lost their faith in miracles as they saw those holes being
filled up with the relentless progress of science. They turned to an increasingly
radical reinterpretation of biblical miracles culminating in the exegesis of
Bultmann and in the philosophy of Ernst Bloch. 33 They might have saved
themselves from this intellectual and spiritual debacle had they pondered Newton's
own position vis-a-vis miracles. Newton's unwillingness to admit the reality of
biblical miracles never cut ice with unbelievers. It was quite possibly a tactic on
Newton's part to cover up his Unitarianism, which, if discovered, would have cost
him the Lucasian chair in Cambridge and, later, the Directorship of the Mint.
Unbelievers could, of course, be but reassured by Newton's categorical denial of
Christian miracles postdating New Testament times. 34 Clearly, Newton believed
less in Christianity than he should have and believed more than a Christian should
in the laws of science and nature. One wonders whether Newton had ever as much
as suspected the miracle of creation in the beginning that lurked behind each and
every law of nature, or the miracle of a nature stable in its orderliness. For only
with an eye on that miracle can the possibility of miracle be raised meaningfully.
The miracle of creation in the beginning implies, of course, the Creator's
sovereign freedom to create or not to create. No less importantly, his creative
freedom is divine also in the sense that the actual universality of things created by
him is only one of an infinite number of possibilities at His disposal. Such a
Creator is not contradicting the rationality and consistency of His creation if it
includes an intellectual and moral realm which the physical realm is to support and
serve. With such a notion, and only with such a notion of Creator and creation in
focus, it was natural to say, as did George G. Stokes, a prominent physicist of the
late nineteenth-century, "Admit the existence of a God, of a personal God, and the
possibility of miracle follows at once." 35 The contrast could not have been greater
with Voltaire's often quoted utterance that "to suppose that God will work
miracles is to insult Him with impunity." 36 The ground for that insult was,
according to Voltaire, that a miracle meant the inability on God's part to
accomplish any particular end by immutable laws. The fallacy of Voltaire's
reasoning lay in his own inability to see in the realm of existence anything but a
mere clockwork in which there was no room for free beings. Of human freedom, a
most immediately evident factual experience, he could speak only with the gravest
perplexity. 37
Voltaire was not the first or last worshiper of the laws of nature for whom the
freedom of the will was a source of continual nightmare. One wonders what
latter-day Voltaires felt on hearing no less a physicist than Arthur H. Compton
declare that the evidence on behalf of man's conviction to move his little finger at
will was immensely greater than all the evidence on behalf of Newton's laws. From
this it followed, according to Compton, that should a conflict arise between our
sense of freedom and Newton's physics, it is the latter that needed to be revised. 38
Recognitfma'srden,ofcusthrginofamlder
which alone is to be served by miracles. That they were never for entertaining the
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curious was called to the attention of the Pharisees and Sadducees of all ages by
none other than the greatest miracle worker of all times, Jesus of Nazareth. 39
In 1934, when Compton spoke, Newtonian physics had for some time been
superseded. The mathematical tools of the new physics—quantum mechanics—
were statistical. They were very different, nay irreducible to pure differential
equations, which are the backbone of Newtonian physics. Those equations are all
translatable into geometry in which the lines or curves representing various
parameters are always continuous. (It may be worth recalling that the Principia's
mathematics were invariably given in geometrical figures equivalent to what later
became known as differential geometry.) The geometrical continuity implied, in
principle at least, the possibility of measuring with perfect accuracy the physical
processes described by those figures. It was at that point that an elementary error in
reasoning gained currency among physicists who were then readily echoed by
philosophers overawed by the success of a field they did not really know. The
possibility of perfectly accurate measurements became quickly taken as the justification of ontological causality in physical interactions. The inference was
equivalent to putting the cart before the horse. Worse, that mistaken philosophical
maneuver began to function as the exact foundation of the ideology of immutable
laws of nature, of absolute physical determinism, and of the absurdity of miracles.
Spokesmen of that ideology were a dime a dozen. Ironically, their selfconfidence and public acceptance reached its peak just in the decades when the
handwriting became increasingly visible on the superb edifice of Newtonian
physics. The decades were the ones saddling the turn of the century. 40 The
moderately comforting aspect of that intellectual debacle was that some prominent
men of science had not lent their voice to a chorus wholly out of tune with science.
Henri Poincare, the foremost mathematical physicist of the time, had for all his
agnosticism the presence of mind to warn that "it is with freedom that one
demonstrates complete determinism." 41 Philosophers and divines lacking that
modicum of common sense were all too numerous. Thus E. Goblot, professor of
logic at the Sorbonne, wrote "All induction rests on the confidence we have in
determinism. There is therefore in nature neither contingency nor caprice, nor
miracle, nor free will; any of these hypotheses ruin our mental ability to reason
about things."42 The only logical merit in that statement was the juxtaposition of
miracles and free will. A most glaring fault from the logical viewpoint was Goblot's
reference to confidence, hardly a matter for rigorous logic. Last but not least, was
Goblot entitled to praise—and to royalties—for his book if in terms of his
declaration it was a necessary result of his brain mechanism, or more rudely, of his
nourishment and lodgings?
Unintended instructiveness is no less glaring in the declaration of the
philosopher of religion, A. Sabatier, "Miracles have no basis in modern
philosophy. The method inaugurated by Galileo, Bacon and Descartes gives to our
thinking a turn which necessarily excludes it." 43 Such a turn could come about only
through a very selective reading of those three and of others with whose names
Newtonian science became synonymous. Whatever the inadequacies of their dicta
on scientific method, those three certainly wanted no part in an ideology restricted
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to matter and motion. They would have undoubtedly rejected the declaration of G.
Seailles, a chief late-nineteenth-century spokesman of empiricist and scientistic
secularism, "By its principles as well as by its conclusions science excludes
miracles."" The empiricist Bacon's dismissal of miracles as means never used by
God "to convert the heathen," was still balanced by his emphasis on the evidence
which an orderly nature brings to its Creator, 45 a position unacceptable to Seailles
and his cohorts among empiricists. Seailles could hardly be ignorant of Descartes'
often quoted dictum "God performed three miracles: the creation of things out of
nothing, the freedom of the will, and the Incarnation." 46 The point, which the
scientistic antagonists of miracles might have most profited from and which they
would have most resented, was also already made in Descartes' century and by no
less a scientist than Leibnitz: "If geometry were as much opposed to our passions
and present interests as is ethics, we would contest it and violate it but little less
notwithstanding the demonstrations of Euclid." 47 The pseudointellectual's sneering at miracles grew into a crescendo in the decades straddling the turn of the
century when Christian morals, private and public, which Christian miracles were
to support above all, became for the first time a major target of secularism.
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
But to return to physics, or rather to the momentous turn it took about that
time. Of the two new branches of physics representing that turn, one, the theory of
relativity, offered no direct handle on the question of miracles. It has, however, an
important indirect bearing on it which is worth recalling in a few words and all the
more so because it is generally overlooked or simply ignored when set forth. The
theory of relativity was born out of young Einstein's awe for the intellectual beauty
of Maxwell's equations. 48 Since beauty is inseparable from form, it was all too
natural for him to be concerned about the distortion of the simple form of those
equations as they applied to a reference system moving with respect to the
observer. Einstein's great insight consisted in perceiving that the transformation of
those equations from one reference system to another would leave intact their form
provided the speed of light is taken for something absolute, independent even of
the speed of its source. A quick recall of the fact that the speed of sound is never
independent of the motion of its source may help one realize the enormity of the
departure which the Einsteinian postulate of the absoluteness of the speed of light
represents with respect to Newtonian physics. In the latter, which is rightly spoken
of as mechanistic physics, the speed of the propagation of any mechanical or
physical effect is always a function of the speed of its source. That Einsteinian
relativity is based on the unconditionally absolute value of the speed of light may
also help one perceive the measure of skullduggery whereby the relativization of all
ethical and social values is asserted on the basis of Einstein's relativistic physics.
The latter is the most absolutist physical theory ever proposed. 49
The foregoing considerations relate to the theory of special relativity which, with
its uniformly moving reference systems, is a particular case of the theory of general
relativity. The latter deals with accelerated frames of reference. Since the most

14

Jaki

obvious case of acceleration is gravitational motion, it was almost a foregone
conclusion that Einstein should make an effort to deal with the gravitational
interaction of all matter. He did so as he presented in 1917 the last of his memoirs
on general relativity. That memoir was a great first in physics in that it contained
the first, contradiction-free scientific account of a gravitational universe. 50 The
importance of this can easily be seen with a recall of the point on which Kant
staked his critique of the cosmological argument. The point was that science (the
science of Kant's time as he poorly knew it) provided no contradiction-free account
of the universe. This is why Kant felt entitled to call the notion of the universe a
bastard product of the metaphysical cravings of the intellect and, therefore,
unsuitable to serve as the final and crucial jumping board in the intellectual
recognition of the existence of the Creator. 51 This objection of Kant continues to
command credibility only on the part of those unmindful of Einstein's achievement. The latter should, however, loom large in the eyes of those hopeful about a
genuine harmony between science and miracles. The latter can rationally be
discoursed about only if the existence of the Creator and of a moral order
(inconceivable without Him) are assumed. Einstein's contribution to the scientific
grasp of the universe should seem therefore of greatest importance. In fact he
perceived late in his life that his cosmology may be an unintended pointer to the
One beyond the totality of consistently interacting things which is the universe. 52
While the indirect support which the theory of relativity brings to miracles
remains unexploited, quite a vast literature has arisen about the alleged support
which the other main branch of modern physics, quantum theory, allegedly has for
miracles. 53 That literature certainly proves the naivete with which theologians try
to cash in on science even when they are not properly trained in it, or appraise it
with false philosophical premises. They still have to learn that a wrong starting
point can only lead to blind alleys regardless of the subject, be it as lofty as theology
or as down-to-earth as physics. In following up philosophical blind alleys
theologians have no excuse just because prominent scientists give them the lead.
Theologians staking their fate and fortunes on the divinity of the Logos, which
alone makes Christian miracles reasonable and meaningful, should view most
seriously any misstep in logic, in particular, and philosophy in general. It should
seem most un-Christian to espouse mental somersaults or plain verbal tricks that
abound in the literature of the philosophy of quantum mechanics as well as of the
demythologization of miracles. 54
As to the philosophy of quantum mechanics, the pattern for somersaulting was
provided by none other than Heisenberg, one of the architects of quantum
mechanics and the first to unfold a principal consequence of it. Since its
formulation in 1927 that consequence has made intellectual history (not
necessarily coextensive with the history of truth) under the label of the principle of
indeterminacy or uncertainty principle. A much less misleading label would have
been the principle of imprecision. For what Heisenberg found was simply that
measurements of physical interactions involving conjugate variables, such as
momentum and position, time and energy, will always contain a margin of
imprecision, which can be significant on the atomic level. (On the level of ordinary
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perception or macroscopic level, the quantum mechanical imprecision can be
safely ignored because it is many magnitudes smaller than the probable error
acceptable for laboratory or industrial practice on that level.) Heisenberg,
however, jumped to the conclusion that because of the significance of inevitably
imprecise measurements on the atomic level, the principle of causality should be
considered as overthrown. 55
This inference, a sheer non sequitur, was not without an important though often
overlooked merit. If, indeed, the imprecision in question meant the overthrow of
causality, the latter could not be salvaged on the ground that the imprecision in
question is wholly negligible on the macroscopic level of ordinary existence and
operations. The absence of the ontological factor, causality, in the foundations
cannot issue in its presence in a superstructure which is their extension. At any rate,
was Heisenberg right in claiming that there was no causality because of the
inevitable imprecision of measurements of physical interactions? That question
should have been answered in the negative. Instead, it was given an affirmative
answer and to the extent as to become a climate of thought. 56 It was largely
overlooked that Heisenberg's principle states only the inevitable imprecision of
measurements on the atomic level. From that principle one can proceed only by an
elementary disregard of logic to the inference that an interaction that cannot be
measured exactly, cannot take place exactly. 57 The fallacy of that inference consists
in the two different meanings given in it to the word exactly. In the first case it has a
purely operational meaning, whereas in the second case the meaning is decidedly
ontological. The inference therefore belongs in the class of plain non sequiturs that,
as a rule, are severely strictured in better-grade courses on introductory logic.
The alleged demise of ontological causality should have called for a general
sounding of alarms. For that demise could mean but the opening of a chaotic abyss
with neither a bottom nor with safe perimeters limiting its extent. A recognition of
this, coupled with a consistent attention to it, could not be expected either on the
part of prominent physicists or on the part of those in excessive awe of their mental
prowess. Einstein's admission that the man of science is a poor philosopher has
much more to it than meets the eye. He himself failed to suspect this as he lead a
very small group of physicists who refused to accept the counter-casual twist which
Heisenberg gave to his principle and which later became the cornerstone of the
Copenhagen philosophy of quantum mechanics with Niels Bohr and Max Born as
its chief articulators. Einstein never came to realize fully that his disagreement with
those two was not so much about causality, which he too equated with the
possibility of perfectly precise measurements, 58 but with the ontology implied in
causality, physical or other. It was left for W. Pauli, another prominent physicist,
to call to this point the attention of Born who grew as much dismayed by his
inability to convince Einstein as by the cooling of Einstein's feelings toward him.
But Born could hardly desire much enlightenment from Pauli's scornful remark
that Einstein's concern for physical reality was not worth more than the medievals'
debate about the number of angels that could be accommodated on a pinhead. 59
The inability to articulate the question of ontology underlying the debate on the
status of causality in the perspective of quantum mechanics took monumental
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proportion in some lengthy essays of Planck on causality, world order, and
freedom. 6° Ontology and the consequent distinction of it from the merely
operational level could hardly emerge on the mental horizon of Planck, a
professed Neo-Kantian. For him causality was a mental category which did not
depend at all on the observation of the external world. Within the iron grip of that
category were, according to Planck, all events, including all mental operations,
even those of the greatest geniuses. Consequently the freedom of the will as a
mental decision could be but a practical convenience resulting from the fact that
our introspection did not permit a fully objective, that is, completely accurate
evaluation of our motivations. It was that practical impossibility that, according to
Planck, made even Laplace's superior spirit a free agent. As to the Supreme
Wisdom or God, Planck refused to discuss whether He too was free only in that
practical sense, or whether He was not free at all because His nature implied a
perfectly accurate introspection.
The word accurate is worth noting because the possibility of accurate, that is,
quantitatively exact measurements was an integral part of Planck's notion of
causality. He borrowed it from the physicists' world in which he lived and worked.
There the notion of causality had been as widely based on the notion of exact
measurements prior to the advent of quantum mechanics as was the denial of
causality following the overthrow by quantum mechanics of their practical
possibility. In a broader cultural consciousness the foregoing shift appeared as a
departure from a deterministic notion of nature to a non-deterministic one. The
inference that thereby belief in the freedom of the will received a scientific approval
was quickly made, and by no less a scientist than Eddington. 61 Much less attention
was given to his reconsideration of the matter, a few years later, in 1939 to be
specific, when he declared that his earlier arguments on behalf of the freedom of
the will on the basis of the uncertainty principle were wholly mistaken. 62
Refrncstoaw"iflyprovedachtfomewil
kept popping up in the philosophical and theological literature, a story that may be
worthy of detailed documentation. Philosophers and theologians may not be less
inclined to learn from the errors of the past than are politicians and scientists.
That the origins of scientifically-coated rescue operations on behalf of the
freedom of the will antedate the advent of quantum mechanics shows that
theologians can be quite naive in trying to cash in on some glittering straws in the
wind. The simile may seem all the more appropriate because it relates to the
development of statistical methods in gas theory during the closing decades of the
nineteenth century. That this development was often appraised well outside
theological circles as a departure from the deterministic world view is, of course,
true, but this is not necessarily a guarantee of reliability. As a matter of fact, the
statistical gas theory was based on a strictly deterministic application of the
Newtonian laws of motion about the collision of gas molecules taken for perfectly
elastic and spherical bodies. In such a situation the initial conditions determine
with complete accuracy any subsequent state, however far removed from the initial
state. A rigorous interpretation of gas theory did not therefore justify the inference
that most out-of-the-ordinary configurations were only most improbable but not
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inherently impossible. They were impossible in the measure in which the initial
conditions were ordinary or fairly symmetrical configurations or not. When some
early twentieth-century defenders of miracles reported that "the old rigid system of
the laws of nature is being broken up by modern science," 63 they were very far from
reliable scientific grounds which are always very different from current fashionable
appraisals of the latest in science. The same is true of some scientists who tried to
discredit miracles by calculating the enormous improbabilities of deviations from
the ordinary course of nature. The figure 10 1010 given by J. Perrin, a French
Nobel-laureate physicist, to illustrate the improbability of a tile to deviate from its
vertical fal1, 64 may impress even the layman by its being incomparably larger than
all the atoms in the universe and all the microseconds that have elapsed since its
expansion got under way sixteen billion years ago.
The super-astronomical improbability of this happening does, however, in no
way weaken the certainty of that outcome provided the initial conditions are in
exact conformity with it. But about those initial conditions the scientist could only
admit his ignorance, although he should have kept in mind that it was that very
ignorance that prompted him to calculate mere averages. Since the latter were
useful only for the gaseous state, in which the motion of molecules is extremely
restricted, the application to miracles was in fact tantamount to specious blowing
of mere hot air, worthy only of less than average intellects.
The grafting of scientific respectability on miracles had a far greater appeal with
the advent of quantum mechanics as it was taken to be equivalent to the
breakdown.of strict physical determinism. Here again a detailed account of what
actually happened is still to be written. That there was an early rush of divines to a
terrain which, as it will be clear later, was a ground where angels would have feared
to tread, may be gathered from a book of Bernhard Bavink, published in 1933 and
immediately translated from German into English under the title, Science and
God. 65 The book was the substance of lectures which Bavink had given in various
parts of Germany on science and religion. A graduate of the University of
GOttingen, where he majored in physics, Bavink had a deep interest in theological
questions. This was almost natural on the part of one who had among his paternal
forebears Dutch Mennonites and was converted to Lutheranism by his wife, the
daughter of a pastor. By the early 1930s Bavink had for some years been looked
upon as a leading Christian interpreter of the relation between science and religion.
This was due to the half a dozen editions, between 1913 and 1929, of his magnum
opus that appeared in English translation in 1932 under the title, The Anatomy of
Modern Science. 66 That miracles and science are not discussed in those editions
(and in that translation) is an indication of the fresh interest created in that topic by
the uncertainty principle, still a novelty around 1930 or so.
In recalling Perrin's calculation of the enormous improbability of a macroscopic
object, such as a tile, from deviating randomly from its vertical fall, Bavink noted
that miracles, such as Peter's walking on the water, were macroscopic events where
the laws of classical mechanics were, with their strict determinism, invariably valid.
Such was the immediate background for Bavink's warning, "The theological world
cannot be too strongly warned against attempting to make capital in this way of
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the new discoveries." 67
By new discoveries Bavink meant those aspects of modern physics according to
which the microscopic or atomic level was ruled by chance alone. That chance
meant for Bavink the absence of physical causality, and not merely our ignorance
of causes, was suggested by his admission that a world steeped in the haphazard
may seem much less in keeping with the traditional Christian view of the world as
thoroughly ordered. Would a world of chance evoke, Bavink raised his typically
German question, the recognition of the Creator in the same way in which the
starry realm bespoke to Kant of a cosmic lawgiver? Bavink answered this question
in the affirmative. His reason was that, after all, nothing happens or exists unless
God directly brings it about. This meant, in Bavink's resolution of the theological
question raised by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, that the difference between
classical physics and the physics of quantum mechanics was very simple. Within
the former God created the original initial conditions in the Beginning; in the latter
God keeps creating the initial conditions at every instant and for all events:
In the literal sense, not a single quantum of action exists in the world
which does not proceed directly and immediately from God. No
natural law, not even a statistical one, compels its existence. Such a
notion is just as meaningless as if we were to imagine that the statistics
of railway accidents or marriages made one year compel those
accidents or marriages taking place the next year, to occur. I think that
the enormous liberation which this insight brings to religious thought
makes it worth while to accept the apparent chance which it requires.
For in truth, believers have always hitherto regarded chance as God's
direct will (Matthew x. 29). This now becomes an evident fact for the
chance in the final elementary actions of existence is nothing other
than the completely free decision by God. 68
None of this should have surprised anyone who had carefully read the first line
of the paragraph out of which this passage has been taken. There Bavink endorsed
the "nominalist protests" against classical physics and against the inference that it
was enough for the regular sequence of physical processes that their initial
conditions be provided by God. That protest seemed to Bavink so well founded as
to dispense of the need for going into "any great philosophical trouble of getting rid
of objections to it." 69 It was, of course, another matter whether it was unreasonable
to assume that God was capable of creating a physical realm with stable laws which
He did not have to re-create at every moment but only had to conserve in its
existence. This age-old Christian distinction between the erstwhile creation of
things out of nothing and the conservation of the existence of things already
created did not arise on Bavink's mental horizon. His claim that in the viewpoint
endorsed by him chance was only apparent, rested on a theology harking back to
Ockham who sought answer in miraculous interventions by God at every moment
to essentially philosophical questions. That theology was eager in resorting to
biblical phrases, such as the one (Matthew 10:21) invoked by Bavink about
sparrows none of which falls to the ground without the Heavenly Father's willing
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it. The fact that in many biblical passages the world is spoken of as firmly
established and that even the endurance of God's covenant is asserted in terms of
the endurance, stability, and unfailing regularity of his physical creation, 70 did not
seem to have any relevance for Bavink.
The problems--scientific, philosophical, and theological--that transpire from the
few pages Bavink devoted to miracles reappear in one way or another in all the
subsequent discussions of miracles with an eye on modern physics. That the
remaining pages will be mostly concerned with two books entirely devoted to
miracles and modern physics is in part due to their wide availability to English
readership. Another reason is that their respective authors are both professional
physicists. One of them, William G. Pollard, is also an Anglican clergyman. The
other, Donald M. MacKay, showed more than a passing interest in matters
theological. Most importantly, their discussions are detailed and therefore provide
their instructiveness in their own terms.
Pollard would have done better justice to his book had he called it not Chance
and Providence but "chance is providence" or, perhaps, "chance is your providence," though not "Providence is your chance." This is not to suggest that by
Providence he did not mean most emphatically the one portrayed in the Bible. By
chance he meant the randomness associated with quantum mechanics. He called it
the "very task" or "primary thesis" of his book to show the full harmony of these
two viewpoints. 72 It should therefore be no surprise that for Pollard quantum
mechanics is the last word in physics. Conclusive for him had to be the failures,
rather numerous by the mid-1950s, of efforts aimed at constructing a quantum
mechanics with hidden variables, that is, a quantum mechanics which would rest
on a mathematical formalism allowing for absolute precise measurements in
principle at least. He undoubtedly found further proof of the statistical character
of scientific explanation when in the mid-1960s J. S. Bell set forth his famous
theorem on the impossibility of hidden variable theories. Pollard may have derived
further assurance when the early 1980s witnessed the completion of experiments
verifying some consequences of Bell's theorem. 73 Yet, no such theorem or
experiments would ever dispose of the question whether an operational restriction
on the precision of measurements is equivalent to an ontological incompleteness of
the interactions to be measured. To anyone, such as Pollard, not facing up to this
question, it is natural to state, as he does, that "the world is so constituted that the
ultimate as well as present characteristic mode of scientific explanation in all fields
is statistical." 74 (Italics added.)
Of the three words italicized (above) the first clearly carries an ontological
meaning. Furthermore, if that meaning is valid, and only then, that is, if the world
really embodies a basic randomness, the use of the two other italicized words is
unobjectionable. To Pollard's credit, he is very conscious both of that logical
connection and of the burden of proof it entails. "In order to establish my primary
thesis that this is a necessary characteristic of scientific knowledge dictated by the
nature of things rather than a merely temporary result of inadequate information,
it is clearly necessary for us to probe much deeper than we have so far."
Unfortunately, he does not fathom philosophical depths. In the same breath, and
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elsewhere too, he reasserts the fundamental ontological status of chance in the
actual world "in which indeterminacy, alternative, and chance are real aspects of
the fundamental nature of things, and not merely the consequence of our
inadequate and provisional understanding."
Ironically, this statement of Pollard is preceded by his dismissal of Einstein's
disagreement with the celebration of chance on the basis of quantum mechanics.
Pollard does so with the characterization of that disagreement as a "philosophical
conviction." Philosophy fares indeed poorly in Pollard's book. Even elementary
consistency is in short supply in connection with pivotal terms he uses. Thus he
states about chance not only that "it cannot be the cause or reason for anything
happening," but also that "chance and probability in modern physics are...real and
essential elements of the world which it describes." The last statement implies, of
course, the question of the value of scientific explanation. This crucial, philosophical problem is never met head-on by Pollard as if he had not heard of the
countless books written on the subject both prior to and after the advent of
quantum mechanics. Nor is the question, already aired in this paper, about the
legitimacy of inference from the operational to the ontological, so much as hinted
at by him.
As one living in the physicists' world, he should not be too severely judged. The
scientific community ignored countless warnings concerning that inference. if not
the very first, certainly the most concise of those warnings was carried to the four
corners of the scientific world through a letter that appeared in the December 29,
1930, issueof Nature, the leading scientific weekly. The concluding sentence of that
letter written by J. E. Turner, of the University of Liverpool, in connection with a
prominent physicist's popularization of the chance world of atoms, contained
more depth than much of the literature celebrating quantum mechanical chance,
"Every argument that since some change cannot be 'determined' in the absolutely
different sense of 'caused,' is a fallacy of equivocation." 77
Whether Pollard perceived something of the sadly inadequate character of his
reasoning on behalf of universal chance is a secondary matter. Nor is one to be
appalled by the fact that as a scientist he fell completely under the sway of the
extraordinary successes of quantum mechanical techniques and took them for
basic and ultimate explanation. The same happened to countless colleagues of his,
from the most outstanding to the most ordinary. What should seem to be
especially instructive within the perspective of this paper is that he failed to perceive
the devastating consequences devolving for Christian miracles from the very
method he offered as their only safeguard. For underlying that method there seems
to be a measure of respect for science as it actually is that may undermine science as
well as miracles (Providence) by the same stroke. Such undue measure of respect
lurks between the lines as he states about his stated purpose of showing the full
harmony of providence (Bible) and science (quantum mechanics). It is "to be
accomplished in such a way that the essential integrity and unity of science, both as
it is now and as in principle it may become, is fully preserved."
Undoubtedly a God who created human reason and is Reason himself deserves
in full that logike latreia which Saint Paul enjoined (Romans 12:1) on Christians
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and Pollard may have had in mind. Such worship is incompatible with the
slighting of anything that human reason can safely ascertain. By the same token
that same kind of worship assumes as verity that there can be no contradiction
between the historical revelation (be it in words or in deeds) of such God and His
self-revelation through nature which according to the same Saint Paul (Romans
1:20) is irrefutably clear, regardless of the resolve of some to ignore it. But the
non-existence of contradiction between revelation and reason can only be
established if careful attention is given to the possible sources of a misrepresentation of either or both. Contradictions are again bound to loom large if reason is
limited to science, and even more so if the science of the day is taken for Science in
its ultimate form. Neither science nor Revelation was served whenever God's basic
way of action was taken to be equivalent to the workings attributed by that science
to nature.
The story, several centuries old by now, is replayed with a new twist in Pollard's
book. The great success of mechanistic or Newtonian science was a powerful
motivation for casting God in the role of a clockmaker. But those theologians,
whom Voltaire merely echoed in celebrating such a God, 79 were not eager to
project him into the Bible. Pollard, however, is most emphatic in saying two things:
One is that the idea of a God who suspends now and then the workings of the
machinery of the world is "almost wholly unbiblical." The other is that only the
notion of a God continually casting dice (that is doing what the chance of quantum
mechanics is supposed to represent) is wholly and alone biblical. After taking issue
with those who speak disparagingly of "mere" chance, Pollard waxes dogmatic:
To Einstein's famous question expressing his abhorrence of quantum
mechanics, "Does God throw dicer the Judeo-Christian answer is
not, as so many have wrongly supposed, a denial, but a very positive
affirmative. For only in a world in which the laws of nature govern
events in accordance with the casting of dice can the Biblical view of a
world whose history is responsive to God's will prevail."
Before considering the allegedly biblical character of a dice-throwing God it
should be worth considering the dice in question. Nothing would be more
mistaken than to think of an ordinary die. The latter has six faces, eight corners,
twelve edges, all definite parameters with such others as specific weight, elasticity,
temperature, and so forth. Were God to be using such a die He would have to
throw it but once. Its first and all subsequent bouncings off from a specific ground
would strictly follow from the initial conditions of the first throw that could be
known to God with complete accuracy. Nor would the case be any different were
the various parameters of the die subject to statistical variations. What had already
been said about statistical gas theory would apply here too. There one would still
be within the framework of classical or deterministic physics. While we humans
can only start from an average value of the parameters, to God all the individual
cases of possible variations would be equally known and also their actual sequence
as fully determined by the initial conditions.
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Quite different would be the case of God throwing a quantum mechanical die.
The latter, radically different from the ordinary die, would display a random
variability in the actually existing number of its parameters such as faces, edges,
corners, etc. This has to be so as long as one does not disavow the very core of the
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, that is, the logical somersault
according to which an interaction that cannot be measured exactly cannot take
place exactly or rather can take place only with an ontological defect in it. Instead
of measurement one can, of course, refer to what it presupposes, the specification
of parameters needed to carry it out. The necessary incompleteness of those
specifications means, according to the Copenhagen philosophy, an ontological
incompleteness.
To supply that defect the Copenhagen camp or the overwhelming majority of
physicists invokes chance or, as will be seen shortly, their short-sighted wizardry
with mathematical operators. A theologian-physicist like Pollard, with equal
allegiance to both of his professions, will of course invoke God in addition to
chance. The result is that all events in the physical realm (where all events are
ultimately chance events according to the Copenhagen philosophy) become so
many direct events actually performed by God, who alone can supply all
parameters of the die which are (partly or entirely) unspecifiable by quantum
mechanics and therefore (partly or entirely) non-existent according to that
philosophy. If, however, such is the case, all natural events become miracles and all
miracles become strictly natural events.
To his credit, Pollard minces no words: "It is an error to think of a miracle as
being 'unnatural.' " (According to him only the moral significance attributed by
the faithful to very rare events turns them into miracles.) 8 ' To be sure, in another
passage he restricts that sweeping statement to the "majority of biblical miracles."
They "are the result of an extraordinary and extremely improbable combination of
chance and accidents. They do not, on close analysis, involve, as is so frequently
supposed, a violation of the law of nature." 82 He thinks that in such a way all
miraculous healings listed in the New Testament are accounted for. As for
large-scale nature-miracles, such as the one connected with the Exodus, they are
still but natural coincidences for him. His exegesis is, of course, a rehash of ideas of
liberal Protestant and modernist divines. He seems to follow them too as he
ascribes most biblical miracles to the hunger which "late elaborators" of those
stories had for the miraculous. 83 In fact he retains only three events as miracles: the
creation of all, the Incarnation and Christ's Resurrection.
But is there a logical way of saving the reality of these three miracles while
turning the Gospel account about many others into morality tales however
exalted? One wonders whether Dr. Pollard thought of the price paid by so many
liberal theologians for their being ashamed of miracles as so many violations of the
"sacred" laws of physics. Their fate is grippingly mirrored in the spiritual odyssey
of Leo Tolstoy who took them for a guide. With his genius of a writer he could
portray grippingly their starting point as well as their state in the end. The former is
succinctly given in the precept laid down in a notebook of his where the effort "to
reinforce the teachings of Christ with miracles" is declared to be equivalent to
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"holding a lighted candle in front of the sun in order to see better." The end is
illustrated by Tolstoy's harmony of the four gospels with so many passages cut out
from the originals as to make a major biographer of his speak of it as "the Gospel
according to St. Leo."'" Better known is Tolstoy's novel, Resurrection, in which
Christ's rising from the death is turned into a mere myth, shared, of course,
communally.
Almost a hundred years later the Anglican bishop of Durham, Dr. Jenkins,
served memorable evidence that the principle of demythologization inevitably
turns, in the hands of a consistent devotee to it, the Gospel account about Christ's
resurrection into a symbolic communal expression of hope in eternal life. Pollard's
caveat that the Resurrection of Christ is an individual event and therefore cannot
concern science, that is, quantum mechanics which deals with aggregates of events,
is wholly beside the point. Christ's bodily resurrection does not come under the
competence of quantum mechanics because it is a macroscopic event, though, in its
terms, it would still ultimately he a chance event for which Pollard should have
invoked God as the One who supplied ontologically, though "randomly," the
parameters that would not be specified by quantum mechanics. Nor is this the
place to deal with Pollard's view that the ultimate truth of miracles rests with the
faith of the community which endows a very rare event with a -religious significance. Here let it suffice to say that such a falling back on communal faith would
force the Christian to abandon the biblical injunction in terms of which he has to
render a fully reasoned account of his faith and comportment. The same tactic also
deprives him of the possibility of challenging on a rational ground others not
sharing his faith. They--agnostics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Marxists, or
Voodooists—are given by that tactic the same right to rest their case ultimately on
their respective shared "faith." Clearly, what Pollard offers as a rational defense of
Christian miracles is in fact a fearsome boomerang depriving that defense of all
rationality. 85
The disservice which Pollard's explanation of miracles does to Christian faith
derives ultimately from a distortion of the biblical portrayal of God's relation to
the physical world created by Him. Of that relation Pollard mentions only God's
full sovereignty over nature and His most intimate involvement in all its events. He
is silent about another no less noticeable aspect of that relation, namely, the
constancy, endurance, stability, lawfulness and consistency of the universe and its
parts. As was already noted, the importance of that aspect is nowhere revealed
more powerfully than in passages in which God's faithfulness to his covenant with
David is supported with a reference to the faithfulness and stability with which the
physical world created by Him follows its course and endures.
That the biblical world view implies regularity and constancy was briefly
recognized by Donald M. MacKay, author of the other book to be considered
here." He did so, however, in a way that runs the risk of destroying the natural
knowability of those two cosmic qualities. The stability of the solid contents of the
world is, according to MacKay, declared in the Bible:
to he a dynamic, contingent, stability. It is only in and through the
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continuing say-so of their and our Creator that they cohere or "hold
together." He is the giver of being, moment by moment, to all the
events in and through which we encounter the world of physical
objects... But however uncompromisingly realist its tone, the Bible has
no room for the idea of matter as something eternally self-sufficient or
indestructible. The Psalmist may praise God for the stability of the
earth and the reliability of the normal links between events on which
our rational expectations are based, but the same Book of Psalms
speaks of a time when the earth and the heavens will perish and will be
changed "as a vesture" at the will of their Creator. In the end, for
biblical theism, the only solid reality is God and what God holds in
being.87
What this account leaves out of consideration is whether all those beings are
kept by God in existence from moment to moment or are created anew out of
nothing at every moment. MacKay's inveighing against what he calls the GrecoMedieval view of the cosmos consisting of "necessary natures" known by a priori
reasoning is part of that partial vision. 88 It suggests that he cannot or is not willing
to conceive of a "nature" which in itself is only one of the niany possibilities
available for God's creation but which by being a "nature" assures that it is
maintained by God in existence in conformity to it. MacKay's oversight of the
medieval philosophical and theological thinking (so critical of the Greeks on at
least three crucial points) as the spark of the rise of modern science 89 is a corollary
of his broader and distinctly Calvinist (Ockhaniist) perspective.
This should be no surprise. From the moment Calvin (or Ockham) rose against
apostolic succession, they rose against ecclesial or sacramental continuity across
time. To buttress philosophically their break with historic continuity they were
instinctively pushed toward a world view steeped in discontinuities, that is, toward
a Nature without "natures." No wonder MacKay is pushed by the logic of his own
position to asserting that continuity and objectivity in nature can only be known by
one's surrendering to biblical revelation, or rather to MacKay's reading of it. Thus
in discussing the lure of quantum theory, which challenges the distinction between
the observers and the observed, and the lure of relativity theory, which challenges
the validity of a single description of the world valid for all observers, MacKay
concludes: "True our Christian scientist in God's world may have no access to the
Creator's eye view of his situation; but because he knows that he is under judgment
by that criterion, he is saved from the trap of confusing relativity with a denial of
objectivity.""
It is the same condition of standing under the judgment of biblical revelation as
he interprets it that saves Mac Kay's believing scientist from the pitfalls of quantum
theory. This declaration of MacKay is all the more instructive because he does not
invoke revelation or biblical perspective as an indispensable ground for recognizing that Einstein's opponents "had no rational grounds for claiming that the
absence of an observable causal precedent for an event meant that it had no causal
precedent." 91 But no sooner had MacKay seemed to sight the ontological
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perspective of the problem, he lost sight of it, or perhaps he deliberately tried to
cover it up with a theological smokescreen which is, however, rather transparent.
For the question is not whether God can play dice in a manner worthy of Him. The
question is once more about the way in which the parameters or details that cannot
be specified by quantum mechanics become presently existing in order to let things
go. MacKay tries to resolve that question on the basis that God is most directly
involved in all events as a Sovereign Lord over all his creation. But in doing so he
merely sidesteps the problem which once more surfaces as he states: "From a
biblical standpoint it would be equally mistaken to argue that if there were no
causal precursor for an event, then its Creator must be thought of as 'playing
For the absence of a causal precursor, or even the partial absence of such
dice.'
a precursor, is an ontological gap. Does it fall upon MacKay's "biblical God" to fill
that gap with continual instantaneous creations? That such is indeed the thrust of
MacKay's reasoning may be surmised from his further talking around the problem
without being ready to meet it head on:
" 92

The God of biblical theism is beholden to none to account for his
creative agency. If he freely wills into being a succession of events in
which one half of the sub-microscopic details at any time are
unspecified by their precursors, this would involve no inconsistency
with his character, still less with his sovereignty, as portrayed in the
Bible. Belief in a sovereign God does not in the least entail a belief that
there must be "hidden physical variables" sufficient to determine the
beh-aviour of electrons on the basis of precedent. For biblical theism all
events, equally, with or without precursors according to precedent,
need God's say-so in order that they occur at all. The choice of "God or
Chance" is simply not a meaningful alternative, if "Chance" is meant in
the scientific sense. As the Book of Proverbs (ch. 16, v. 33) has it: "The
lots may be cast into the lap, but the issue depends wholly on the
Lord."93
Whatever the appropriateness of that particular biblical passage, MacKay's
banking on God's sovereignty seems to be very inappropriate. The issue is not that
God is sovereign but whether He is at least as rational as human beings are. The
latter can clearly recognize the difference between being and non-being. It is that
difference which is the real issue concerning the theory of hidden variables.
Whether most professional supporters and opponents of that theory have realized
this is irrelevant. As was already stated, physicists have for centuries been apt to
limit their vistas to quantitatively exact measurements and this is why they have
taken it for mechanical (and implicitly for ontological) causality. Insofar as hidden
variables have an ontological relevance, the biblical God, whose self-revealed
name I AM WHO I AM is ontology incarnate, 94 is bound to provide them in one
way or another. MacKay seems to suggest that He does so by continually creating
out of nothing at least one half of the ontological specifications of all atoms to fill
the ontological gaps created by quantum mechanics or rather by its Copenhagen
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pseudo-philosophy.
In a manner characteristic of the entire Ockhamist tradition that heavily
conditioned the Reformers' theologizing (for all their dislike for philosophy),
MacKay goes straight to God's sovereignty as if this could dispose of a plain
question whether the existence or non-existence of certain things is meant by some
staple phrases of quantum mechanics. No wonder that he sees but the veneer of the
fallacy of setting up Chance as a kind of anti-deity standing for chaos and absence
of meaning. 95 He fails to see that the basic issue about chance is whether it can be a
substitute for reality, be it the reality of physical parameters that "do not exist"
because quantum mechanics cannot specify them. Understandably, MacKay did
his utmost to make it appear that his train of thought did not force him to charge
God with the task of supplying the reality of those unspecified parameters with
special creative acts performed every split second. His fellow scientists would have
been taken aback, though not for the right reason. The latter, not a matter of
theology but of plain philosophy, could not, however, be seen by the ones who had
bartered sound reasoning about reality for the hollow glitter of mathematical
operators which give no certainty about anything real, let alone about miracles and
Providence in human history.
PERENNIAL PERSPECTIVES
Certainty about real events or things, usual or unusual, can never begin with
science, and not even with "the Lord's quantum mechanics" 96 as Schrodinger once
spoke in quasi-mystical awe of his own specialty. Science rather presupposes real
things in order to ascertain their quantitative properties; it cannot provide any of
those uncountable things. Of course, nothing reveals so forcefully the reality of
things as their limitedness which has many quantitative components. But whether
they, or the things in which they are embedded, do exist or not is not a scientific
question. Being a question about the real, it cannot be answered except by a
philosophy which provides the perennially proper place for the question. To be
sure, even idealist philosophies make claim to reality, to say nothing of the
philosophies known as rationalism, empiricism, sensationism and pragmatism.
They all claim to be the place for the real. But not the proper or primary place.
They are indeed betrayed by their labels, which are almost always the choice of
their chief articulators. Those labels invariably relate to an aspect of the real insofar
as it can be conceptualized, sensed, tested, manipulated and so forth.
None of those philosophies would carry their special labels if the very start of
their program and method would be an unconditional acknowledgment of
external reality. Only that acknowledgment is a guarantee of its being known with
certainty. This may appear a kind of plain arguing in a circle. Actually, it is the only
starting point which can save one from arguing ever in such a way. It is a
consciously and methodically-taken starting point. A chief recommendation of
that method is that all other philosophical approaches to knowing the real with
certainty have turned out to be so many seeds of doubt about reality or means
whereby the thinking man found himself cut off from the external world. Cartesian
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rationalism that aimed at complete certainty (equating it with mathematics which
is a series of tautologies, however useful) led to Spinoza's perplexity about any and
all finite real things. 97 Francis Bacon's empiricist "instauration" of a new age in
thinking revealed in Hume's hands the fragmentation through it of all judgment
about reality. Kant's effort to restore certitude through the a priori character of
mental categories led in Fichte's hands to the exaltation of the will and, in Hegel's
hands, to the divinization of the individual ego, the least reliable commodity one
can think of. The sensationism advocated by Mach locked him in solipsism which
is undoubtedly the highest conceivable measure of certainty although not
communicable. As to pragmatism, its chief spokesmen, William James and John
Dewey, would in vain try today to disavow the uncertainty which it has generated
about everything except, of course, one's selfish and all too often very transient
success.
The other chief recommendation for taking the certainty of knowing external
reality for the starting point in all philosophy is that any refutation of it implies
knowledge of that type. Thus to argue that a specific registering of a fact, thing, or
event was a mere hallucination, one must assume that it is possible not to be under
its influence in registering this or that fact. The same holds true about the argument
based on any partial deception or error of one's senses or on any exaggerated claim
about the extent of one's observations. Those "critical" philosophers who have
succeeded in spreading the belief that nothing can be known unless first critically
proven have in fact assumed this very knowledge without first critically proving it.
Moreover, just as colors cannot be discoursed upon in terms of non-colors, the
knowledge of external reality cannot be proven in terms of knowing only one's
mind, "critical" or not. 98
This is basically all that is needed to show the certainty of facts called miracles.
The all in question may sound very little, but actually it is co-extensive with that
largest entity called the world of the real, and also co-extensive with all reasoned
discourse relating to it. In a sense that all is very restricted as it is ultimately reduced
to the evidence of one's unaided senses. This may appear ridiculously little in an
age of science that probes such realms of the very small and the very large that are
inconceivably beyond the reach of the senses. It should not, however, be forgotten
that the ultimate certainty of all the esoteric findings of science in the farthest
reaches of space and in the deepest layers of matter rests on the reliability of the
senses that register the position of ordinary pointer needles. This is what no less an
"idealist" physicist than Eddington recognized when he stated that "molar physics
has the last word in observation for the observer is molar." 99 And if the physicist
takes no stock of this, he can embroil himself in the kind of embarassment which
left speechless for a moment the famed astronomer-cosmologist W. H. McCrea.
After being heard to state in a lecture that the star images seen through the
telescopes have a strict relation to reality only insofar as they are sensations on the
retina, he was asked in the question-answer period: "Would you also hold the same
about the reality of the wall which you are facing?" His answer, "I am not really
sure," speaks for itself. 10° Not even that much comment is deserved by the
inconsistency of those astronomers (some world-famous) who after boasting of
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their solipsism during dinner, 101 do not blush as they spend the night looking
through their telescopes.
Immediate direct observation of things and the certainty of that observation (or
at least the certainty with which it can be corrected or improved) is the rock bottom
basis not only of philosophy but of science as well. In view of this and of what
already has been said about the true status of scientific laws, it should not be
difficult to perceive the disingenuousness of the indignation with which miracles
are denounced as violations of the laws of nature. The indignation is essentially a
clever form of the strategy: attack is the best defense. But if it is impossible to start a
march (physical or mental) with the second step, concern about the laws of nature
should give second place to concern about man's ability to register things and
events with certainty. And since without that ability nothing can be known about
the laws of nature, the chief intellectual concern should be not so much about the
possible violations of the laws of nature as about the actual violation, if not plain
rape, of man's mind whose natural function is to know reality with immediate
certitude.
Such a rape is committed when individuals reporting extraordinary events, and
in fact lay down their lives on behalf of their witness, are declared at the outset to be
hotheaded enthusiasts, uncritical minds, or plain fakers. This is done on the
patently dogmatic ground that nature cannot change its course. Those taking that
ground rape their own intellect to the point of declaring that they cannot even have
one. A startling admission of this came from such a prominent spokesman of the
absolute unchangeability of "nature's laws" (a form of sheer materialism) as J. B. S.
Haldane:
If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms
in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true. They
may be sound chemically, but that does not make them sound
logically. And hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be
composed of atoms. 102
The defense of miracles done with an eye on physics should include a passing
reference to meteorites. Characteristic of the stubborn resistance of scientific
academies to those strange bits of matter was Laplace's shouting, "We've had
enough such myths," when Pictet, a fellow academician, urged a reconsideration
of the evidence provided by "lay-people" as plain eyewitnesses./ 03 Laymen were
they in the sense that they had no telescopes, no training in celestial mechanics, no
knowledge of trajectories, azimuth, right and left ascension. But they could
register with absolute certainty that a fiery body had just hit the ground nearby
and could unerringly distinguish its still warm stony remains as something not
belonging to the soil around it. That such a kind of witnessing stands in its own
right was the point recognized by a doctor on being confronted with the objection
of a colleague who insisted that the wide-open fracture below the left knee of Pieter
De Rudder (1822-1898), the subject of possibly the most startling cure related to
Lourdes, could not be accepted for a fact because the two ends of the broken bone
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protruding through the skin had not been certified by a medical commission. The
reply of that rightly indignant physician, "it does not take a tailor to see that a coat
is full of holes,"/ 04 contains an instructiveness that is practically inexhaustible.
The case of sighting meteorites, however extraordinary, is not the same as the
case of miracles. Unlike meteorites that repeat themselves, any given miracle is a
strictly individual event that cannot be expected to occur again. Again, unlike the
fall of a meteorite, always a purely physical event, a miracle is also a historical
event, however physical it may be. Its verification, even in the case of a fresh
miracle, is essentially one involving the historical method with its reliance on direct
witnesses, on indirect observation, and circumstantial evidence. This is why
ancient miracles as objects of historical verification are a much more difficult
matter than are recent miracles. Only upon the latter does beat "the bright light of
modern history," to recall a felicitous expression of that famed Jewish novelist
Franz Werfel in his introduction to The Song of Bernadette, his memorable
reconstruction of what happened at Lourdes. 105
For all his certainty about the miracles of Lourdes, and for all his gratitude to
the Lady of its Grotto and to the memory of her humble maidservant Bernadette
Soubirous (whose body he knew to lie incorrupt in a glass casket in Nevers), Werfel
did not become a Christian, a Catholic. As to Alexis Carrell, who received in 1912
the Nobel Prize for his study of the rate at which wounds heal, he first went in 1903
to Lourdes, 106 where incredibly fast healing of festering wounds had by then been
attested for almost half a century. Yet, it was not until 1940 or so that Carrell was
able to get rid of all his agnostic reservations and become a Christian, a Catholic,
although long before that he had known of the powerful argument that reason
could forge from an attentive consideration of those cures. The argument had
already been voiced on more than one occasion when in 1909 Teilhard de Chardin
cast it into a classic form with his powerful prose:
If a common antecedent for the cures could only be discovered; if we
could extract from all these authentic facts something which marks
them off or conditions them! But we find only this: Lourdes; and it is
not the Lourdes imagined or hoped for in the excitement of pilgrimages...but it is Lourdes alone—Lourdes, a naked and objective reality,
to which is attached a mysterious virtue, independent of anything the
sick and the praying crowds can take there.
If the cures of Lourdes were characterized by any family likeness,
attached to one category of diseases or appeared under determinate
circumstances of time or place, I might invoke with show of reason,
some magnetism, some appropriate vibration with which the human
body would enter into a vivifying resonance. The precise cause would
escape me, but a certain regularity in the phenomena would assure me
of the existence of this cause and entitle me to imagine it. But there is
nothing of the kind...effects follow each other without apparent rule.
These cures are distributed as if by chance, and sometimes there are
alarming relapses. In all truth, what renders Lourdes altogether extra-
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medical is less what occurs there than the manner in which the
prodigies take place. If what happens there astonishes the scientists,
the way it happens is absolutely beyond him. 107

The purpose of this paper was to call attention to the role which the recognition
of "naked and objective reality" (or of plain facts) plays in the philosophy that
alone can do justice to facts be they so extraordinary as to be called miracles. The
chief recommendation of that philosophy is that it alone can cope also with the
facts of ordinary life as well as with the facts which science carefully isolates for its
purposes. For even in the systematic isolation or carefully controlled conditions
which science demands for its facts, their usefulness ultimately depends on the
reliability of plain human witness about them. Without that witness not only the
vast enterprise known as scientific endeavor would lose its claim to truth, but also
the far more vast social life would be deprived of right to justice. Courts of all
levels, governments of all jurisdiction, depend on witnesses and their plain
witnessing" and so do laboratories. In none of those forums can a discrimination
against plain witnessing of unusual facts be condoned or else the most important
cases may be prejudged and the only avenues for progress be blocked. Had Oersted
refused to believe his eyes when they noted that the magnetic needle which he
placed under a live wire turned in a direction which he believed to be impossible,
the discoveries of Faraday and Maxwell might not have followed as they did. The
discovery of the world of atoms depended on Roentgen's chance witnessing the
formation,. that was not expected to happen, of the negative image of a key on a
photographic plate. Far more importantly, would Newtonian science have
developed at all if Kepler had not unconditionally trusted Tycho Brahe's eyes in
making countless naked-eye observations about the positions of the planet Mars?
Luckily for science, it witnesses relatively rarely the brushing aside of a report
about a really new case with the remark: "It cannot be really different from the
thousand other cases we have already investigated." The brave reply of the young
assistant, "But, Sir, what if this is the thousand and first case?" which after more
than half a century is still whispered in the corridors of psychoanalysis,I 09 is
precisely the rejoinder which is to be faced in connection with facts that fall under
suspicion because of their miraculous character.
The witnessing of facts is, of course, to be coupled with a willingness to face up to
the consequences of the fact witnessed. If the author of the Book of Joshua did not
mean an extremely dark cloud cover in speaking about the stopping of the sun "in
the middle of the sky" and staying there "for a whole day" (Joshua 10:13), 11) then
one has on hand astronomical consequences that even from a distance of three
thousand years could be verified. No other biblical miracle would pose a similar
problem. Such physical miracles as the multiplication of the bread, the changing of
water into wine, Christ's and Peter's walking on the water, represent disturbances
that cannot be detected from a distance of two thousand years. This would be the
case even if they were to be contemporary events. The reason for this is not so
much the relative minuteness of the physical effect they represent, but the
impossibility of making the scientific apparatus ready for the event. This is not to
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say that there would not be countless men of science ready to stand by with all sorts
of sensors to register the physical parameters of a physical miracle, including the
rapid healing of festering wounds, of broken bones, of collapsed lungs, and of
lumps of cancerous tissues. But those men of science would in vain wait for an
invitation from on High or from any of the Almighty's saintly agents. Miracles are
not for order. They never were.
This is the only point about miracles which puts the believer at a disadvantage.
Humiliating it may be, but a humiliation fully consistent with the humble
framework in which the two Covenants were offered to man across the span of
over a dozen centuries. An insignificant corner of the earth was chosen to be the
scene of both Covenants. The chosen recipient was a people that should seem most
insignificant compared with the cultural, artistic, and organizational magnificence
of great neighboring civilizations. There is, of course, a silver lining inside that
humiliation, a silver lining which is nothing short of a miracle: a unique
interpretation of history, human and cosmic, physical and moral, compared with
which all other interpretations, ancient or recent, are a poor second. That
ultimately the rise of science was sparked by that interpretation' is hardly a point
to let drift from focus in the often theatrical confrontation of miracles with science.
No humiliation is involved in the fact that miracles are never automatically
overwhelming proofs. They represent the challenge of external reality, not of
axioms of logic." 2 That true miracles are never coercive, whatever their occasional
impact on skeptics and scoffers, is their chief recommendation. A dispensation
would never be truly divine that would take man's freedom away because such a
dispensation would not also be fully human. Clearly, it all depends on the
perspective or, to use the technical term, philosophy or epistemology. That all, not
only miracles but everything else, depends on it is implied in the recognition that, to
borrow a forceful phrase from a famed analysis of the origins of modern science,
"the only way to avoid becoming a metaphysician is to say nothing."' " What the
author actually meant was the very opposite of the meaning which is usually
ascribed to metaphysics: the art of bartering facts for ideas. Unfortunately, the
author in question did not know of the only metaphysics, Aristotelian-Thomistic
metaphysics, that begins with the recognition of facts and claims in fact that all the
rules (categories) of man's mental operations are a distillation from his registering
of facts." 4
To approach any subject, be it the subject of miracles, in any other way will land
the mind in mirages as witnessed by the despair of modern man about his intellect.
That man will find help only from those Christians who have not lost sight, even
for a moment, of the truly realistic epistemology. Such Christians and only such
can fully seize their intellectual opportunity which is offered by those unbelievers
who at least admit the fact of certain extraordinary events, though not their
miraculous character. They are at one with T. H. Huxley who urged that
unreserved attention be given to all facts, however extraordinary. They would
emulate also that Huxley who, following the death of his first son at the age of
seven, firmly declined the comfort of Christian perspectives. Huxley did so with a
profession of faith in the facts of nature as seen by science as he understood it:
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Science seems to me to teach in the highest and strongest manner the
great truth which is embodied in the Christian conception of entire
surrender to the will of God. Sit down before fact as a little child,
prepared to give up every preconceived notion, follow humbly
wherever and to whatever abysses nature leads, or you shall learn
nothing. I have only begun to learn content and peace of mind since I
have resolved at all risks to do this. " 5

The defender of Christian miracles should, of course, be able to demythologize
that notion of science which Huxley in the same context made an object of worship
with his eyes fixed on the inverse square law, in obvious ignorance of its not
entirely "scientific" provenance:
It is no use to talk to me of analogies and probabilities. I know what I
mean when I say I believe in the law of the inverse squares, and I will
not rest my life and my hopes upon weaker convictions. I dare not if I
would." 6
But even with that demythologization of science done, the Christian defender of
miracles must tirelessly return to them insofar as they are facts, and insist that they
be faced with the openness of a child. He can do no more than that teenage peasant
girl, Bernadette Soubirous, whose mental aplomb under endless questioning was
no less a miracle than the cures her visions had triggered. To a visitor pressing her
with doubts about those visions, she gave this reply of astonishing balance: "Je suis
chargee de vous le dire, je ne suis pas chargee de vous le faire croire." 117 This is all a
Christian can do about miracles. He has to reassert them as facts in all their details
and context but he should under no circumstances confuse the skillful and honest
presentation of facts with the art of convincing. About miracles, however factual,
conviction is a matter of God's grace which, however, has an intimate tie to facts,
however miraculous, that can be heard, seen and touched. It is these very terms
that are the object of a perception which is as sensory as it is an understanding or
episteme. A biblical proof of this is the very start of the first epistle of John, a
casting of the entire Christian message into a realist epistemological frame:
This is what we proclaim to you:
what was from the beginning,
what we have heard,
what we have looked upon,
and our hands have touched—
we speak of the word of life." 8 (Italics added)
Clearly, this kind of epistemology stands somewhere in the middle between the
classic extremes of positivism and idealism. In positivism, the tangible facts can
never lead to metaphysical heights, let alone to heights where the Word of Life is
heard. In idealism, the metaphysical heights are not supposed to be rooted in that
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reality which human touch and sight alone give access to. Only when imbued with
a median epistemology will Christians be liberated from a veneer of sophistication
about miracles which is but a throwback to a leery Humean scepticism. Only then
will they instinctively avoid either ending or beginning their discussion of miracles
with the despondent sigh, a transparent admission of an intellectual failure of the
nerve: "Miracle was once the foundation of all apologetics, then it became an
apologetic crutch, and today it is not infrequently regarded as a cross for
apologetics to bear."" 19 Only when Christians will relearn to glory in their minds as
an organ whose natural function is to have certainty about facts and things, will
they be able to derive intellectual glory from miracles. On that certainty and on it
alone can that intellectual platform be built which provides proper perspective
about science, about miracles, and even about God insofar as He can be grasped by
that reason which makes man a being created in His very image.
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"complains of the lack of thoroughness in the investigation of cases, which he believes does
not preclude wrong diagnosis and natural remission of the illnesses." The fact is that
Sabourin called attention to the facts (p. 158), not mentioned by Brown, that West did not
meet any of those cured, nor did he study all the documents relating to them, and, last but not
least, "as especially interested in psychical research, West will more or less consciously be
inclined to find what he was looking for: psychical explanations of exceptional cures."
108. Last but not least, Congressional hearings, that have been making the headlines ever
since Watergate, derive their value from the trust placed in the testimony of witnesses.
109. The young research assistant was, if my memory is right about a story told me more
than a dozen years ago by Sir John C. Eccles, none other than Alfred Adler, one of the first
rebels against Sigmund Freud.
110. Darkness was obviously an effect of the "hailstones of tremendous power which he
(God) rained down upon the hostile army" in reply to Joshua's prayers, according to Sir
46:5-6.
III. The essence of that interpretation is the linear notion of cosmic and human history,
with a most specific absolute beginning toward a no less specific end. It was the keeping in
focus of that absolute beginning that enabled Buridan and Oresme to formulate in the
fourteenth century the idea of inertial motion and impetus (momentum). This great
discovery of Duhem around 1909 is discussed both in my Science and Creation: From
Eternal Cycles to an Oscillating Universe (1974; 2nd rev. ed., Edinburgh: Scottish Academic
Press, 1986), pp. 231-241 and Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duhem, pp.
390-400 and 428-429.
112. This should seem an all-important point in an age which has increasingly equated
proofs with mathematical demonstrations. There is no such demonstration or formula of
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logic that would cope with the relation between the knower and the external objective world
known by him. Therein lies the ultimate futility of reductionism based on science.
113. E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science (1924; rev.
ed., Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, n.d.), p. 227.
114. The point is made most explicitly by Aquinas: "Some believed that the intellectus
agens to be nothing else but a habit in us of undemonstrable principles. But this cannot be so
because we know even the undemonstrable principles by abstracting [them] from the sensory
[evidence]." Quaestiones disputatae de anima, I, art. 5, ad Resp. (Latin ed., Turin, 1953).
115. L. Huxley, The Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley (London: Macmillan,
1900), vol. 1, p. 219.
116. Ibid., pp. 217-218.
117. "It is my duty to tell it to you, it is not my duty to make you believe it." Quoted in A.
Olivieri, M.D., and Dom Bernard Billet, Y a-t-il encore des miracles a Lourdes? 21 dossiers
de guerisons (New ed., Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1979), p. 58. It was about that time that she gave
a no less astonishing glimpse of her utter certitude about her sense perception as she replied to
the searching question, "What would you have replied if the bishop of Tarbes had judged that
you were mistaken?" posed by the abbe Corbin, with the words: "I would have never been
able to say that I did not see and did not hear." Quoted in R. Laurentin, Vie de Bernadette
(Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1978), p. 124.
118. This statement of John, offered in part as a shield against the Heielians (Gnostics) of
his time, is of course a perfect echo of the thoroughly realist tone of the entire biblical
revelation.
119. R. Seeberg, "Wunder," Realencyklopadie fur protestantische Theologie and Kirche
(Leipzig, 1908), vol. XXI, p. 562. Immediately preceding this statement of Seeberg is his
disapproval of Christian theologians who accept Rousseau's remark that the truth of
miracles conditions the truth of Christian revelation. C. Brown, who uses Seeberg's
statement as the motto of the first chapter of his That You May Believe: Miracles and Faith
Then and Now (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 1985) concludes on a not much
different note by quoting the words, "My grace is sufficient," addressed to Saint Paul looking
for a cure of a still unidentified disability of his. Colin should have added that for the same
Paul miracles were an essential help in his spreading the message about God's grace. Suffice it
to recall here his healing of the boy who fell from the upstairs window, his immunity to the
viper's bite on the island of Malta, and the escape of all 276 on board the ship that fell apart
nearby, after being tossed around by a violent storm for a full fortnight.

Reflections on the Death of a Monk
JERRY L. MERCER

Tucked away in the rolling hills of central Kentucky is Our Lady of Gethsemani
Monastery. Founded in 1848, this austere order of Trappist monks is committed to
silence, prayer and work. One of their ministries is a retreat house where men may
go to renew their search for God. As often as possible, I drive the 70 miles from my
home to the monastery for a time of spiritual deepening. Something happens to
me at Gethsemani. It is too personal to communicate here. But when I listen to the
chanting of the psalms, walk the grounds in silence, sit in the woods before the
statue of Christ praying in agony, I know for sure God loves all creation.
At some point in my retreat I spend time in a small reading room near the
retreatant's library, browsing through books and periodicals, occasionally
napping. Recently while there I noticed on a table several pages stapled together. I
glanced at the words typed on the blue cover:
Br. Elias Simpson
1939-1970
One With The Lord
At first I pushed them aside without much attention. Moments later the dates
struck me: "1939-1970." This monk died at age 31 (actually 30'/2, as I learned later).
I picked up the thin makeshift pamphlet and began to read. What I found was an
intriguing story of the last hours of Br. Elias's life, written by a fellow monk. I wish
to share this story with you, along with some of my reflections on Br. Elias's
experience.
You should know that Elias (or Elijah) was the monastic name for Charles
William Simpson. Born on December 15, 1939, he entered Gethsemani at age 17,
took his solemn vows at 26, and died of cancer on June 21, 1970. The young monk
was considered by his brothers a model of the virtue of simplicity.
It was in the fall of 1969 that a mobile x-ray unit made its annual visit to the
monastery. Chest x-rays indicated that two of the monks needed further diagnosis.
One of them was Elias. Exploratory surgery confirmed that he was already
beyond human help. Elias was frightened at first, but in a letter to his brother
monks indicated that God was helping him. He returned to the monastery to
continue his regular routine during the time he had left. The following account of
his last days, focusing on the Sunday he died, is a moving one and should be read
several times in order to gain a deepened perception. The letter was not signed; the
community would know the author.

Dr. Jerry L. Mercer is professor of preaching at Asbury Theological Seminary.
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THE DEATH OF ELIAS
1 write this to you after a very sobering and religious experience. Our
brother Elias has passed over to his true home with the Lord. I had the
great grace and privilege of leading the prayers for the dying, and
watching his final moments in this world. Just two weeks or so ago we
were all thinking that he surely had at least another year with us, but the
Lord was growing impatient to bring him home and we didn't know it.
"Being perfected in a short time, he fulfilled long years, for his soul was
pleasing to God. He was caught up lest evil change his understanding
or guile deceive his sour! For, just a week ago, he developed blood
clots in the leg and took to bed. Then his breathing grew more
difficult, and they said he wouldn't live through August. A day later
they were saying July. Finally, about Wednesday, he took a sudden
and marked turn for the worse and his breathing became extremely
labored. The cancer was acting far faster than even Fr. Eudes 2
expctd,anbyherdislv.BCamu,or
infirmarian, called me to come and sit by his bedside while Fr. Eudes
went to get an oxygen tent to aid his breathing; it was so difficult for
him to breathe that Br. Camillus was afraid he might slip away. This
was Friday. I sat by his bed, held his hand and talked to him.
He said, "I didn't expect this, but He wants it. Whatever He wants."
I told him, "This is what you came here for; this is what you gave up
all for. Cleave to Him with your heart in trust and leave it there in His
hands.''
I began to fear that Fr. Eudes would not get back in time, because
Elias was very pale already. But Fr. Eudes did get back, and the oxygen
temporarily relieved his breathing. Fr. Eudes said his condition was
grave and requested the community to take turns watching at his
bedside. We each took an hour's watch while he steadily grew worse. His
breathing grew more and more difficult, though he experienced little
physical pain. He was completely resigned to God's will, and would kiss
the cross he held—the cross so many before him had held on their
deathbed.
The whole community experienced the tension of waiting for him to
expire—more than for many others who had gone before, and all were
constantly praying for him and visiting him. The love they had for him
was very evident. His parents in Cincinnati were notified and they drove
down immediately. His mother didn't expect to see him since he was in
the infirmary and couldn't be moved, but she wanted his dad and
brothers to see him. [By special arrangement, Elias's mother and sisters
were admitted to his room for a long visit.]
Saturday night and Sunday morning Fr. Eudes had given Elias
several shots to help him get some sleep. He woke twice in some fear,
because he was experiencing fantasies that he couldn't control. Fr.
Eudes told him to let them go and not to worry about trying to control
them.
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[Fr. Eudes] asked, "Are you at peace?"
Br. Elias answered, "Oh yes, I'm at peace."
"Then that's all that matters," said Fr. Eudes.
Br. Elias said, "I'm very groggy from those shots."
"It's not the shot, but your breathing that's making you groggy," said
Fr. Eudes, "any[way] you'll get more groggy gradually until you finally
fall asleep and wake up again with the Lord."
"Oh, how wonderful!" Br. Elias replied.
On Sunday, June 21st, the Lord's Day and the Day of Resurrection,
which had been preceded by three days of bleak, black, stormy
weather, the whole community gathered to celebrate the Eucharist
and the Death and Resurrection of the Lord. During the Mass, Br.
Elias awakened from his last shot in terror—the terror of dying. I am
told that at the Consecration there was a marked change that came
over him. Precisely at the end of the final hymn of the Mass he began
to enter his death agony. The whole community was available, and we
all went to the infirmary and began the prayers for the dying. Fr.
Eudes was inside the tent with him telling him that we were all there
and praying with him. Shortly before we got there, he had said, "Oh,
we don't realize how good God is!" It was right after the Consecration
that he began to say the Our Father 3 with an intensity and fervor that
Br. Camillus said he'll never forget. Then he wanted to say it again,
after,which he said, "Into thy hands I commend my spirit." 4 While I
stood in the door of his room, leading the community in the prayers
for the dying, Fr. Eudes had his head inside the oxygen tent speaking
to him and saying prayers. Br. Elias was also saying prayers quite
loudly and intensely, one of which was "Lord Jesus Christ, have
mercy on me a sinner." 5 Then Fr. Flavian6 knelt beside his bed and,
with his head also inside the tent, began to say the prayers for the
dying to him. We finished them all, but since he was still conscious and
breathing, Fr. Eudes prayed Psalm 26 7 for him, at the end of which he
gave his last breath..
Elias's final days and last hours were a profound experience for the
whole community. One could feel a unity and intensity of concern and
prayer for and with him that has never before been experienced for a
death here, and many are certain (including myself who knew him
intimately) that he died a saint. Judging from what others have told
me, I think the whole community experienced many graces at his
death. Certainly I have. After his death, the sky cleared within a few
minutes, and the sun shone brightly and brilliantly. Elias was buried
beside Fr. Louis. 8
One additional note of uncanny "coincidence": Br. Alan, who was
standing near the entrance to the infirmary, told me that precisely at
the moment Br. Elias drew his last breath, and as Fr. Eudes stepped
out of his room and said, "He just drew his last breath," the tower
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began to strike 12:00 high noon; at that very moment the Sun reached
its zenith in the heavens! I leave this to your reflections, but to me,
everything including Nature itself seemed to be proclaiming, "He is
not dead! He is alive and in glory!"—just the opposite of what
appeared to be happening. In addition, not only was it the Lord's Day
of the Resurrection, it was also June 21st, literally "Sun-day," the day
of the Summer Solstice, when the Sun "stices," "stands still in the
heavens."
In our Resurrection and our Life.

I have mulled this letter over in my mind many times, and have even read it to
my classes and some of my friends. It never fails to make an impression and always
sparks discussion and reflection. Several things emerge from this account that can
benefit people of faith, especially when they ponder the reality of their own death.
ELIAS REMINDS US OF OUR BAPTISMAL VOWS: TO LOVE AND
FOLLOW CHRIST
The news of his physical condition hit Elias with force, but his response was
perfectly natural and understandable. In spite of the obvious—that we all know
people die—we normally seem psychologically ill-equipped to seriously believe in
our own death. That Elias was a professional "religious" did not exempt him from
feelings of terror upon learning of his own approaching death. As a monk he was
very familiar with biblical statements on death—that on earth we have "no
continuing city," that our final destiny is in the Kingdom of God. Had Elias been,
say, 75 and "full of years," he may have been better prepared. But at age 30 he was
initially dismayed and anxious. The important thing is that he was not
overwhelmed by the diagnosis. He was able to gather his concerns and begin the
process of reconciling them in God.
As Elias neared his death he was seemingly consoled by the words, "This is what
you came here for, this is what you gave up all for. Cleave to Him with your heart
in trust and leave it there in His hands." These words seem to have been tenderly
but forcefully spoken. Certainly the abandonment to God of mind, spirit and,
eventually, body is the primary goal of a monastic vocation. It is also to be the goal
of all baptized Christians. Every Christian is a stranger and pilgrim in this world.
Every Christian moves toward complete union with God, here and hereafter. The
advice given to Elias is for us all; that is, "Cleave to Him . . . leave it there in His
hands." An important insight from Elias's experience is that it does not really
matter how long a person lives if complete union with God is the final goal of
living—and dying. Our lives are God's possession. We need only learn to follow
Christ and love His good will for our lives.
ELIAS'S DEATH TEACHES US TO LOVE EACH OTHER WITHOUT
JUDGMENT, RECALLING OUR OWN HUMANITY
The monastic community was totally loving and supportive during Elias's
anxious times, especially in his bouts with "fantasies," or wild dreams. The
physician, Fr. Eudes, was extremely sensitive. His only question was, "Are you at
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peace?"—and that was answered affirmatively. On that basis nothing else
mattered at that moment. No expectations were laid on the young monk. There
was no role to play. He was allowed to be a human being in Christ, with a mixture
of fears and triumphs. After all, victory over death was God's doing, not his own.
The only requirement of a faithful person is to be open to God, which he
apparently was.
Too often we expect people to die without fears, fuss or doubts, notwithstanding
St. Paul's view of death as an "enemy." In its early days, my own tradition
emphasized dying well. It was expected that faith enabled one to meet the grim
reaper triumphantly. I think Elias's statements and his community's perceptions
support this view. But we must avoid a smug triumphalism, especially in cases
where dying is a slow process. Lingering illness sometimes breaks down our
normal defenses, and when that happens something of the deeper self comes to the
surface. Christians should not be put off by any expressed fears, angers or
frustrations of the seriously ill or dying. The grace of God is with them, and their
long battle is almost over. We should rather thank God for His grace, keeping in
mind our own limitations.
ELIAS'S EXPERIENCE ENCOURAGES US TO FACE DEATH HONESTLY,
TRUSTING IN CHRIST'S TRIUMPH
Those who tended Elias were refreshingly honest about his physical condition.
As soon as it was confirmed that he had inoperable cancer, he was told. Again as
he neared death, the gravity of his condition was never skirted. I especially
appreciated the following exchange between Elias and Eudes: "... you'll get more
groggy until you finally fall asleep and wake up again with the Lord."
A man of faith, Elias responded, "Oh, how wonderful."
And it will be, if we take our Lord at His word that where He is now, we also will
be one day. Perhaps one reason Christians are so apprehensive about death is that
we do not prepare ourselves by meditating on heaven and the Kingdom of Glory.
There are those who think we should keep the news of impending death from
those about to experience it. I do not share this view. The thought of going to be
with one's Lord should be a source of real strength. The idea concerning Elias—
that "the Lord was growing impatient to bring him home"—affirms a basic
Christian teaching that all of our experiences, including death, are redeemed by
the love and power of God. God wants us home! And that kind of sensitivity ought
to have force in our lives. Through God's grace, our destiny is His Kingdom. For
lovers of God, that is a happy thought indeed.
THE CHRISTIAN'S TRIUMPH IS IN HUMILITY
As the end drew near, Elias prayed "loudly" and "intensely." These were not
prayers of desperation—looking for someplace to land! Rather, Elias's statements
of resignation to God's will and his prayers, including the Our Father and the Jesus
Prayer, blended together into an appropriate posture for entering heaven. In
monastic thought, prayer heightens the notion of one's absolute dependence on
God. Prayers at the time of death intensify the confessional aspect of Christian
spirituality; that is, that we are unworthy of God except as He makes us worthy by
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His grace.
Salvation is always the gift of God, never the result of good works. The
redemptive process is God's doing. In one sense He is active and we are passive. If
everything depends on Him, then we are stripped bare before Him. If we have no
righteousness of our own, then we must plead for the free gift of His love. In
another sense the salvation process shows our activity as well. We are called to
respond to the grace which is given. Prayers are expressive of our dependence and
our soul's desire to be obedient. Our sense of the distance between ourselves and
God is bridged by prayers of faith. These prayers provide a sense of God's nearness
and goodness. Intense prayer at the time of death can be a sign of mature
spirituality entering its destiny.
OUR LIFE AND DEATH ARE IMPORTANT TO THE LARGER BODY OF
CHRIST
At Gethsemani death is a community experience. Elias was loved; that is clear.
He was surrounded by love. Death at an early age was seen neither as a tragedy
nor a punishment (both popular notions), but as an act of grace. Remember the
unidentified quote?
Being perfected in a short time, he fulfilled long years, for his soul was
pleasing to God. He was caught up lest evil change his understanding or
guile deceive his soul.
Such an evaluation of his life fulfills the apostolic injunction to think better of
others than we do of ourselves. It is also a good example of the "golden rule"about
doing unto others.
The monks joined in the Prayers for the Dying at Elias's infirmary room. They
were there as brothers, experiencing Elias's death as a mixture of triumph
through Christ and battle with the force of illusion—the illusion that death is final.
At the moment of his death Elias represented the hopes of all Christians that we
will have pleased God and be admitted into His Kingdom. The physician and the
abbot were inside the oxygen tent with Elias, praying the same prayer for Elias
that he had prayed for others. This is another instance where the life of the Church
is intertwined with the life—and death—of its members. Each of us is a microcosm
of the whole. Each of us needs the life of the whole Church to sustain our
individual faith and hope.
NATURE IS A WITNESS TO FAITH
There is an innocence in the suggestion that nature became a sign of Divine
approval at the death of Elias. With our present understanding and control of
weather patterns, this notion must seem odd to many moderns. Existentialist
thought, which emerged with force during the World Wars, sees nature as a neutral
reality, totally unconcerned with the dilemmas of human life. In biblical thought,
however, nature often cooperates with Divine intentions. Nature seems to have a
hidden life of its own, rejoicing in the goodness of God and even anticipating its
peculiar destiny in the Kingdom of Glory. Although the writer leaves it for us to
decide, we know where he stands. For him nature bears witness to the faith of the
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Church—that things are not as they appear. The monk's body may be wrapped in
linen and laid on evergreen boughs. Dirt may be thrown in the open grave while
the brothers pray. But Elias has joined the great procession of the redeemed as it
makes its way to the foot of the throne. And so will we who serve God!
PARTING WORDS
I am always uplifted after reading this fascinating letter. I have replayed it in my
mind many times since I first read it on that warm spring afternoon. It served me
well in my own struggle with my father's death. The letter has been for me an
example of Christian care at its best.
Frankly, I hope for such a death myself: having resolute confidence in God's
redemptive love and being surrounded by the support of a genuinely Christian
community. Then the last line of the Elias letter will become my last line as well:
"In our Resurrection and our Life." I wish the same for you.

Notes
1. Unidentified source.
2.

Fr. Eudes Bamberger, at the time physician to the monastery.

3. Commonly known among many Christians as The Lord's Prayer.
4.

Our Lord's words as recorded in Luke 23:46.

5.

A form of the Jesus Prayer, which is the heart of Orthodox Christian spirituality.

6.

Fr. Flavian Burns, at the time abbot of the monastery.

7. According to the numbering system of the monastic psalter the psalm is 26; for most
other English Bibles it is 27.
8. Fr. Louis, better known to many as Thomas Merton. His writings continue to exert
influence in the areas of Christian spirituality and Christian ethics.

A Distinctive German-American Credo:
The United Brethren Confession of Faith
J. STEVEN O'MALLEY

Among the "landmark documents" of the United Methodist Church is the
Confession of Faith of the former Evangelical United Brethren Church. The
historical antecedents to that Confession were the Confession of Faith of the
Church of the United Brethren in Christ and the Articles of Faith of the Evangelical Church, which were rewritten to produce the new Confession in 1962. The
1962 Confession shows its indebtedness to that of the former United Brethren both
in its title and in the use of specific phrases which were characteristic of the older
Confession.'
The earlier document, which was officially promulgated at the United Brethren
General Conference of 1815, has not been the subject of historical and theological
analysis since the era of nineteenth-century denominational historiography. The
historians of that era were in accord in their intention to show the uniqueness of the
Confession, but their conclusions were at times either misleading or not fully
explicated. 2
An examination of the old United Brethren Confession of Faith brings to light a
long-obscure perception of the Christian faith which in its early setting had direct
and living ties with the deeply personal witness of its adherents. How this
document became progressively "stereotyped" and made more distant from the
living faith of the "Brotherhood" is a concern subsequent to the question under
focus. This first concern is to discern what made the early Confession of Faith of
the Church of the United Brethren in Christ a distinctive German-American credo,
one which added its own distinctive elements to the emerging pattern of American
evangelical Protestantism.
In reconstructing this confessional tradition, attention will be given to its
historical context, its form and function, and to the alteration of the Confession
which occurred in the first half century of its existence.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA
Henry Spayth, one of the earliest historians of the United Brethren, asserted
without supporting evidence that the Confession was written by Philip William
Otterbein for use in his Baltimore congregation, the Evangelical Reformed
Church of Baltimore, and that this document, along with Otterbein's Constitution
Dr. J. Steven O'Malley is professor of church history and historical theology at
Asbury Theological Seminary.
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and Ordinances of 1785, was the one adopted as the credo of the nascent

movement at its meeting in Otterbein's Baltimore parsonage in 1789. 3
In the 1814 manuscript version of the Confession one finds the primitive form
for the document that was officially adopted by the first General Conference of the
church in 1815. A comparison of the two brings to light differences which indicate
that the distinctively Reformed-Pietistic character of the document was being
eroded. In its place, denominational consciousness was emerging, and the
amended forms of the Confession from 1815 onward increasingly show the
tendency of the United Brethren movement to become gradually assimilated into
the mainstream of American evangelical Protestantism.
The historical milieu of the German AuJklarung in which the Confession
appeared provides a perspective for assessing its distinctiveness. In Germany, the
established territorial church orders (Kirchenordnungen) were frequently being
overturned in favor of universalistic credos asserting a secularized "rights of man"
ideology.4 The venerable Heidelberg Catechism, which had assumed a confessional status among the German and Dutch Reformed in the era of Protestant
orthodoxy, 5 was less frequently being expounded after 1700 in pulpit and school.
Georg Gottfried Otterbein (1731-1800), a brother of William and a pastor in
Duisburg, Germany, published sermons and primers on the Catechism which were
used extensively in those homes of Germany and the American Middle Colonies
where streams of Reformed Pietism kept alive a witness to the Christian faith when
it was elsewhere being eroded. 6 By invigorating a theologically-informed, popular
piety in a period of marked religious decline, the Otterbeins contributed to the
evangelical Wing of the German Reformed Church and helped to provide a basis
within that tradition for the "unsectarian" (unparteiisch) United Brotherhood
movement to emerge.'
This milieu points to several distinctives which may be claimed for the
Confession. It exists as one of the first post-Revolutionary War credos to be
developed by an American religious body, and it was contemporary with that
period of United Brethren history when Otterbein was its guiding influence.
Second, it emerged from a quite different environment than the sixteenth-century
confessions to which the great "confessional" church bodies, the Lutheran and the
Reformed, remain committed. Unlike these, the United Brethren Confession was
the expression of a lay, revivalistic movement that was admittedly unsectarian and
less polemical in tenor. While the Reformation confessions contained strongly
polemical articles that were anti-Roman, anti-Anabaptist, and occasionally antiLutheran or anti-Calvinist, as the case may be, the only polemical tone in the
United Brethren Confession was its implicit critique of the godlessness of the
Enlightenment Age. Its distinctive status as an unsectarian rallying point for all
"awakened" German-Americans of differing traditions was obscured as it became
the official credo of a new American denomination. Third, the United Brethren
Confession is distinctive as an eighteenth-century response to the divisive,
sectarian ferment that was a characteristic of the German-American culture. 8 The
other major proposal to unify these divergent voices upon a new confessional basis
was that of the Moravian leader, Count Zinzendorf. In the 1740s he proposed the
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formation in Pennsylvania of the semi-ecclesiastical "Congregation of God in the
Spirit," that was intended to supersede all other church traditions and would fuse a
highly subjective piety focusing upon Christ's passion with a rigorous, hierarchical
organization. Only a few ministers remained fitfully committed to this ideal during
this decade. 9 Otterbein arrived in Pennsylvania in 1752, during the eclipse of this
abortive effort. The movement which came to be associated with him reflected
both his sense of churchmanship as a Reformed pastor and his conviction that
awakened believers may participate in a "higher unity" in the Spirit without
sacrificing their responsibilities to their historic churches. This outlook is first
reflected in the records of his "Pipe Creek Conferences" (1774-1776) with fellow
Reformed pastors of evangelical persuasion and later in the United Brethren
movement, which included a significant number of Mennonite participants. 10 For
Otterbein, the millennial kingdom would be a divinely-initiated "more glorious
state" within the future of the church in history." It was the United Brethren
Confession of Faith that gave concrete form to that hope.
FORM AND FUNCTION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The following is the text of the 1814 manuscript version of the United Brethren
Confession of Faith, with an accompanying English translation by this author./ 2
Die Lehre der Vereinigten Bruder in
Christo

The Teaching of the United Brethren
in Christ

Artikel 1. Im Namen Gottes bekennen wir vor Jedermann, dass wir
glauben an den Einigen wahren Gott,
Vater, Sohn und heiligen Geist, dass
diese drey Eins sind, der Vater in
Sohn, der Sohn in Vater, und der
heilige Geist gleiches Wesen, mit beiden, dass dieser Gott, Himmel and
Erden, and alles was darinnen ist,
sowohl sichtbar als unsichtbar, erschaffen hat, und alles traget, regiret,
schitzet and erhalt.

Art. 1. In the name of God we confess
before every man, that we believe in
the only true God, Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit; that these three are one,
the Father in the Son, the Son in the
Father, and the Holy Spirit of the
same essence with both; that this God
created heaven and earth and everything which is within them, visible as
well as invisible, and he sustains,
governs, protects and supports them.

Art. 2. Wir glauben an Jesum Christus
dass er wahrer Gott und Mensch,
Heiland und Versohner, der ganzen
Welt ist, dass alle Menschen durch ihn
seelig werden konnen, wenn sie wollen, das dieser Jesus, fur uns gelitten,
gestorben und begraben, am driten
tage wider auferstanden, gen Himmel

Art. 2. We believe in Jesus Christ; that
He is true God and true man and the
Savior and Mediator of the whole
world; that all men can become
blessed through Him if they will; that
this Jesus suffered and died and was
buried for us, and rose on the third
day, ascended into heaven, and will
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gefahren, und am ji.ingsten tage, wieder kommen wird, zu richten die
lebendigen und die toden.

come again on the last day to judge
the living and the dead.

Art. 3. Wir glauben an den heiligen
Geist, das er vom Vater und Sohn
ausgehe, dass wir durch ihn milssen
geheiligt werden, und den glauben
erlangen, welcher uns reiniget von
Aller befleckung des fleisches und des
geistes.

Art. 3. We believe in the Holy Spirit;
that He proceeds from the Father and
the Son; that we must become blessed
through Him and attain unto the faith
which cleanses us from all blemishes
of the flesh and of the spirit.

Art. 4. Wir glauben das die Bibel
Gottes Wort ist, dass sie den wahren
weg zu unserm seelenheil und seeligkeit enthalte, das ein jeder wahrer
Christ, dieselbe, mit den einflissen des
geistes-Gott, Einzig und alein zu seiner
richtschnur nehmen mtisse, und das
ohne buse und glauben, an Jesum
Christum vergebung der sunden, und
nachfolge Jesu Christi, niemand ein
wahrer Christ seyn kann.

Art. 4. We believe that the Bible is
God's Word; that it contains the true
way to our spiritual welfare and happiness; that every true Christian might
receive it with the influence of the
Spirit of God singly and solely as his
guideline (lit. "plumbline"); and that
without repentance and faith, without
the forgiveness of sins in Jesus Christ,
and without following after Jesus
Christ, no one can be a true Christian.

Art. 5. Wir glauben das die Lehre,
welche die heilige Schrift enthalt,
namlich der Fall in Adam, und die
errettung durch Jesum Christum der
ganzen Welt geprediget und verkiindiget werden solte. Aeussere Zeichen
und verordnungen, namlich die taufe,
und das gedachtnis des Herrn, in
austheilung des brods und Weins,
werden anempfohlen, wie auch das
fusswaschen, wo es begehret wird.

Art. 5. We believe that the teaching
which the holy Scripture contains;
namely, the fall in Adam and the deliverance through Jesus Christ should
be proclaimed and made known
throughout the entire world. The outward signs and ordinances, namely
baptism and the remembrance of the
Lord in the distribution of the bread
and wine, we will recommend, as also
the washing of feet, where it is desired.

It is evident that this Confession, with its grammatical errors, reproduces the
basic form of the Apostles' Creed with the addition of a paragraph on the Bible
and one on the "outward means of grace."
As for its more immediate historical antecedents, the Confession bears some
resemblance to the Anabaptist credos, of which the Schleitheim Confession (1527)
of the Swiss Brethren is the most notable. Like the latter, it is marked by a
non-scholastic, lay-oriented simplicity, with emphasis upon the ethical demands
of the faith, explained in terms of "following after Christ" (Nachfolge Christy).
Implicit in its teaching is a doctrine of two worlds, the fallen, coercive corpus
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Christianum, and the gathered, eschatological community of the redeemed. The
believer is the one who forsakes the former (in Absonderung) and obediently
presses into the Age of the Kingdom, whose first fruits are to be discovered within
the bounds of the believers' fellowship. 13
Although the only explicit reference to Anabaptist teaching is in the final
statement which permits different modes of baptism 14 and recognizes the practice
of footwashing, there are other parts which reflect some commonality with the
Anabaptist credo. For example, the Confession links "forgiveness of sins"
(Vergebung) with "following after Christ" (Nachfolge Christi), as a clear indication
that there is to be no one-sided, antinomian stress on justification without sanctification. For the Anabaptist, his credo was a witness which was to be personally
lived out in the midst of a fallen, hostile society. Is there not an echo of this legacy
when the Confession affirms "...that every true Christian is bound to receive it as
his only guideline," or again, "Christ shall be preached and made known throughout the whole world" (italics mine)? 15
The most likely link with Anabaptism is provided by Martin Boehm (17251812) and other former Mennonites, notably Christian Newcomer (1750-1830),
who participated in the United Brotherhood movement after L789.' 6 These men
were also guaranteed full participation in the life of Otterbein's Baltimore congregation by virtue of the church constitution which he implemented in 1785. 77

Newcomrasilngtbpzechdr,wilBomasntdhi
Journal he recorded that the washing of feet was practiced in connection with the

Lord's Supper at the first General Conference in 1815. 18 The 1833 General
Conference enacted a rule that retained the Mennonite opposition to the swearing
of oaths, although it was not included in the Confession of Faith 19. The provision
"against the world" was interpreted by Mennonites to be a mandate to continue
the wearing of simple attire. 20 One of the few existing documents reflecting the
critical stance taken by conservative Mennonites toward the revivalist preachers is
a book by the Mennonite Bishop Christian Burkholder of Lancaster County,
Pennsylvania, entitled Niitzliche und erbauliche Anreds an die Jugend, von der
wahren Busse ("A Useful and Edifying Discourse to the Young on True
Repentance," according to the English edition of 1857.) 21 He upholds discipleship
ethics against the revivalists' emphasis upon emotional experience, saying, "My
experience can help you nothing, nor can your experience help me anything."
Rather, says Burkholder, "Christ identifies the new birth with the following of
Him . . . A follower of Christ is in his whole course of life a light of the world and
salt to the earth .. .."22 As we have seen, the Confession balances an emphasis upon
a conscious awareness of repentance and faith (Busse und Glauben) with a
recognition of the need for "following after Jesus Christ"(nachfolge Jesu Christi).23
Yet, it may be that, in practice, many United Brethren gave less attention to the
ethical implications of Nachfolge than to the conscious experience of the
penitential struggle (Busskampf) and rebirth ( Wied,rgeburt).
Another historical antecedent to the Confession which gives a somewhat
different perspective to its distinctiveness is the Confession of Faith of the Czech
Brethren of 1535 (The Bohemian Unitas Fratrem), which was reprinted and given
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new life by John Amos Comenius (1592-1670), the most celebrated Moravian
scholar. 24 Comenius reconstituted the Czech Brethren and worked toward the
dawn of a millenial kingdom which would supersede the fallen, coercive era of his
own day. There is here no direct, personal link, as in the case of Boehm and
Otterbein, but both traditions share in part a common historico-theological
rootage that has been insufficiently noticed. Only Lawrence, an early historian of
the United Brethren in Christ, suggested that the work of Comenius be regarded as
a precursor to the movement associated with Otterbein. 25 H owever, Lawrence was
also preoccupied with a denominational polemic with contemporary German
Reformed historians. 26 His intention was to establish the preeminence of his
denomination by showing how, in spirit, it was in the line of succession to the
"righteous remnant" in Christian history—from the Waldensians and the Hussites
to the reconstituted Unitas Fratrem under Comenius and then Zinzendorf. A
closer examination of Comenius reveals that his work in restoring the confessional
unity of the Czech Brethren was the direct product of his theological education
which he received at the Herborn Gymnasium in Nassau, the noted Reformed
school where Otterbein and his brothers studied and lectured a century later. 27
FromthedaysfgJonAlted(158-63),whoasCmeniu'
teacher, to the time of the Otterbeins, Herborn was known throughout Europe as
a center for non-scholastic, irenical Protestantism. It was here that both men
acquired a taste for learning that was to be integrally related to the practice of the
Christian life. Comenius published A Manual, or the Kernel of the Holy
Scriptures which was to serve a similar pedagogical function for the Czech
Brethren that the Lehre ("Teaching"), which later became the Confession of the
Otterbein movement, served. 28 It was also at Herborn that both men received a
vision of the worldwide mission of the church which prompted them to embark on
divergent missionary careers. 29 Finally, the reordering of creation which Comenius
had in view—church unity, world freedom and the conversion of the globe
through the enveloping mission of the gospel—might also characterize the early
outlook of the Otterbein movement. The Confession speaks of the possible
salvation "of the whole world" (Article 2), of God's graceful intention "that all men
can become blessed through [Christ], if they will," and of the goal that there is to be
made manifest "one holy church" (eine heilige Gemeinde). 30 In this vein, Otterbein
frequently implored that the Brotherhood be careful to remain unpartisan
(unparteiische).31

To summarize, the form of the Confession is noted for its simplicity, brevity and
capacity to reach quickly the marrow of Reformed Pietistic theology with a
narrative and even poetic deftness. To this is joined an array of Anabaptist themes
which is interwoven to produce a unified statement. In function, the Confession
intended to assist the earnest pilgrim on the way of salvation (Heilweg) in "making
his calling and election sure" 32 amid a hostile world of Enlightenment secularism
on the one side and sterile theological orthodoxy, on the other.
THE ALTERATION OF THE CONFESSION
An indication of the manner in which the self-identity of the United Brethren in
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Christ was being altered in its early, formative years is to observe the way in which
its Confession was amended. The earliest version reflects most closely the unique
blending of themes from classical Reformed Pietism with Mennonite elements,
which was first symbolized by the personal meeting of Otterbein and Boehm.
These themes are gradually obscured as changes and additions begin to take place
as early as 1815, when the general conference of the new denomination placed it at
the front of its first published Discipline. What were these changes?
First, the earliest edition, entitled the "Teaching (Lehre) of the United Brethren
in Christ" was changed in 1815 to the Confession of Faith (GlaubensBekenntniss). The former term was the one used by Otterbein in the Constitution
and Ordinances for his Baltimore congregation, when he wrote that the pastor
shall "impart instruction (Lehre)" to the youth (Rule 8) and that he "shall make it
one of his highest duties to watch over the rising youth, diligently instructing them
in the principles of religion, according to the Word of God (Rule 9)." 33 The new
term gave the document the preeminence befitting its new status as the official
symbol of an ecclesiastical body, although the word "church" is not yet included in
the title of the denomination. The arrangement of the pre-1815 version into five
articles emphasized its function to provide points of instruction in the faith, after
the manner specified in Otterbein's church order.
Second, the object of Christ's saving activity was changed from "the whole
world" ("der ganzen Welt," in the early text) to "the whole human race" ("des
ganzen menschlichen Geshclechts," 1815). The earlier formulation allows for a
more comprehensive view of salvation which could rightly be seen to include
nature as well as history. Here is a theme found in Paul in Romans 8:22f and in
Ephesians 1:10 and, more directly, it had been extensively developed in the
"federal" theology of Friedrich A. Lampe (1683-1729), which Otterbein had
studied at Herborn. 34 The close correlation which Lampe maintained between the
redemptive Word and nature and history is illustrated in this citation from his
important work, The Secret of the Covenant of Grace (Geheimnis des Gnadenbundes): "Since new discoveries in nature are daily being made through field
glasses, what is it to wonder that new discoveries are also taking place through the
increasing diligence in the examination of the godly Word, and the promised
growth in knowledge in the last times is always being further enhanced toward
fulfillment.
A third strategic change which occurred in this article alters the expression of
the human response in the covenant of grace. In line with Reformed Pietism, the
early version tells us that the goal of Christ's saving work is the creation of new
moral beings who are "seelig "or controlled by an inclination of heart through the
action of the Divine Spirit. 36 This term was eliminated in 1815, and the new
formulation merely emphasizes the need for our free acceptance of Christ's grace,
in Arminian fashion, but without reference to the quality of life which results. 37
ArticleTh,wonrsteHlySpi,waksetrdin185oa
diminish somewhat the emphasis upon a complete spiritual and moral transformation as the goal of salvation. This change appears to reflect the growing influence
in the Brotherhood of former Mennonites, for whom the theme of Christian
"3 5
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perfection was less significant than it had been for Otterbein, whose treatment of
the theme reflected Reformed Pietist rather than Methodist influence. The earliest
text simply expressed that "We must become holy through the Spirit," and that we
"will attain unto the faith which purifies us from all blemishes of the flesh and of
the spirit."38 In 1815, this clause was stricken and in its place appeared the
following: "that through Him we are enlightened, justified through faith, and we
become holy (or sanctified)."39
Fourth, in 1815, this new article was inserted following the affirmation
concerning the Holy Spirit: "We believe in a godly communion, (Gemeinde), the
This
fellowship of the godly, the resurrection of the body, and a life everlasting.
addition from the Apostles' Creed reflects the emerging ecclesiastical self-awareness of the fledgling spiritual brotherhood. While Gemeinde was translated
"church" in the English edition of 1819, the German context denotes a spiritual
koinonia rather than church in the externalized sense, as in Kirche.
The next article in the early Confession is devoted to the Bible and the final one
to the essence of its teaching. It says that the Bible "contains the true way to our
spiritual welfare and happiness." Scripture functions here in a hermeneutical sense
as the path for the pilgrim to follow through the labyrinth of earlyjife en route to
God's Kingdom. This outlook is reminiscent of the Heilweg methodology of the
Reformed Pietists, who discerned in Scripture, with the help of their Heidelberg
Catechism, a precisely-structured guide—sometimes referred to as a "ladder to
heaven" (Himmelsleiter)--which every earnest believer is in the process of
ascending. "The Bible is the source," wrote Georg Otterbein, "and the Catechism
points out the order which is derived from this source."'" Referring to this "order
of salvation," he exclaimed, "How beautiful it is to learn to know the order itself, ...
what we originally were, what we have become through the fall, and what we shall
again become through the fully gracious design of God." 42 In this tradition, the
pastor's task is not so much the proclamation of the Word as a fait accompli;
rather, it is to function as a spiritual counselor who escorts his pilgrims through the
steps of the order of salvation according to the readiness for discernment that they
manifest. It was in this vein that Johann Daniel Otterbein (1736-1804), the brother
who was pastor of the parish of Berleburg, published a narrative of his counseling
sessions with a condemned murderer.'" It was from this perspective that Georg
Otterbein, pastor at Duisburg, published a primer on the Catechism that was used
both by the German Reformed and by the earliest United Brethren in this
country." It was also in this vein that William Otterbein instituted his rules for
examining communicants at his Reformed parish in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, to
ascertain their readiness for participation in the Lord's Supper.'" This theme is
further developed when, in the next line, the Confession affirms that "every true
Christian is bound to receive it with the influences of the Spirit of God, purely and
simply as his only guideline (Richtschnur)...." The 1819 English translation
renders Richtschnur in a more legalistic context as a "rule." This affirmation of the
role of Scripture was retained by subsequent revisions, including the major one of
1889.46
Finally, the statement in Article Five, concerning the sacraments, was made
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into a separate article beginning in 1815. Actually, the word "sacrament" is not
used. Instead, reference is made to the "outer signs (or testimonies) and
ordinances" ("Aeussere Zeiehen and verordnungen'), which designates the
sacraments not as objective means of grace, or "converting" ordinances, but rather
as public signs of the presence of saving grace within the reborn believer. The 1815
revision of the Confession strengthened the place of the sacraments in the life of
the Brotherhood. Whereas the earliest statement had said that the ordinances are
"recommended," the subsequent statements all say "they shall be used according
to the example of the Lord Jesus among His children." 47 However, it was also
added that "the mode and manner should be left to each one according to his
judgment." In addition, the 1815 revision replaced "outer testimonies and
ordinances" with the "outer means of grace"—an indication of the apparent rise of
more traditional sacramental theology befitting a movement that was now
acquiring a conscious churchly status. Similarly, subsequent revisions of this last
article indicate that the practice of foot washing was also becoming less
important. 48
SOME CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVES ON THE UNIQUENESS OF THE
CONFESSION
The document which we have examined is a major product of a little-investigated
but formative tradition in American religious life that emerged from the
interaction of the "Pennsylvania Dutch" culture with the revivalism rooted in the
Great Awakening. It was conceived in an irenic milieu of Reformed and Mennonite
spirituality that is perhaps best characterized by William Otterbein's expression
that it was to be an "unpartisan"(unparteiisch) Brotherhood in Christ. This irenic
temper, in which Otterbein had been nurtured in Herborn, conditioned the
manner in which theology was articulated in word and in life among the early
United Brethren.
Its distinctiveness begins to appear as the early Confession is compared with its
later revisions. Emerging from our in-depth study of the alteration of the early
German text, it is now evident that the changes in content and expression which
occurred as early as 1815 were in no way "minor changes of no great significance"
as Drury had summarily concluded. 49 Instead, they possibly reflected more basic
doctrinal matters than did the new Confession of 1889, which led in part to a
painful schism in the denomination. 50 Although these changes in the early Confession frequently obscured the visible influence of themes deriving from earlier
Reformed Pietism, they also reflect a fluid, dynamic era in the life of the
movement in which the issues of faith and order were widely and extensively
discussed in the conferences of the Brotherhood.
Not only do the early revisions of the Confession tend to detach it from its
Reformed roots; they also were inclined to render its formulation of the faith more
akin to the Articles of Faith of the Evangelical Association and the Articles of
Religion in Methodism. To be sure, the "middle period" (1833-1889) was not a
time of significant sentiment for church union with these bodies, but this growing
doctrinal kinship would seem to be a natural occurrence at a time when the United
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Brethren were acquiring a more definite connectional system vis-a-vis the
Methodist model. The Evangelicals had a more Methodist-like doctrinal statement and discipline from their outset, since their Articles of Faith were in large
measure based on Ignatius Roemer's German translation of John Wesley's
Twenty Five Articles of Religion, with the addition of an article on the Last
Judgment that was likely derived from the Augsburg Confession. 51 Wesley's
document was a twenty-four article abridgement of the Thirty. Nine Articles of the
Church of England, plus a loyalty article to the American nation.
The major points of difference between the early United Brethren Confession
and its Evangelical and Methodist counterparts can be summarized as follows.
The one is short and compact, consisting of seven paragraphs. It reads more as a
narrative, reciting the events of God's saving activity with the human race,
stemming from its reliance upon Reformed Pietism and especially Cocceian
biblical thought, with its covenantal mode of theologizing. The other documents
present the faith in a declarative, third-person fashion and not in a first-person,
confessional sense. Being more scholastic in tenor, they make greater use of the
substantial metaphysics of the early Greek Fathers, who were concerned with
defining the essence of God and man as an ontological undergirding for the
biblical faith.
The recovery of the vision of the early Confession may hopefully raise the
possibility of its transformed influence today. It embodied the piety of those who
lived a concrete existence, close to nature and the harshness of an often unfriendly
English cultural hegemony. 52 Its language was also vernacular, concrete, and even
poetic in its style, with no apparent inconsistency between their vital piety and the
only language they knew. As a theological formulation, it was not critical,
sustained, or dominating; rather, it narrated a spirituality that was intimately in
touch with the wisdom of a lived Christian piety and whose service it commended.
While it did not busy itself with a rational defense of an abstract "Arminianism," 53
Confession affirmed concretely that Christ's work was available to all on the the
same basis and that it might be experienced as participation in a new, "unpartisan"
Gemeinde. As a manifesto of "New Pietism" transformed by the American
Revolutionary epoch, it embodied a living protest against the artificiality of the
rationalist theology and served as a vehicle for adjusting the "requirements of
orthodoxy to the demands made by intensity, diversity, and the liberation
experienced in Christ." 54
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Harold Sloan and Methodist Essentialism
FLOYD T. CUNNINGHAM

As leader of Methodist conservatives in the 1920s, Harold Paul Sloan defended
the divinity of Jesus against modernism. Though he sometimes associated with
Fundamentalists, he disavowed two of their chief concerns, the verbal inerrancy of
the Bible and the premillennial return of Christ. Sloan wanted Methodists to retain
the cultural forms, the language and the inner experience of previous generations.
Only on such bases, he believed, could men and women maintain a rooted sense of
themselves and a clear view of God's purpose in the world. Sloan trusted only
proven answers to age-old problems. He felt no compulsion to alter the
resolutions of the past.
After graduating from Drew Theological Seminary, Sloan served several
obscure parishes before winning a place of leadership in the New Jersey conference. For twenty years after 1915 he pastored some of its largest churches: Red
Bank; Central Church, Bridgeton; and Haddonfield, a Philadelphia suburb. In
1925 he began the League of Faith and Life, the main organization of the
Methodist response to modernism, and served thereafter as its president and
publicist. The League had at least 10,000 dedicated followers, and perhaps many
more. Several bishops and other national leaders supported Sloan behind the
scenes. In 1934 he became superintendent of the Camden district and two years
later the general conference elected him editor of the denomination's most influential weekly, the New York Christian Advocate. From 1941 to 1953 he
pastored the Wharton Memorial Church in Philadelphia./
After entering his first pastorate, Sloan began to perceive modernism as a threat
to The Methodist Church and he lamented the neglect of the preaching and
experience of new birth among fellow Methodists. When the New Jersey annual
conference in 1913 appointed him a member of a committee instructed to review
both Sunday school literature and the books assigned to prospective ministers in
the course of study, Sloan found opportunity to rebuke those who emphasized
Christian nurture over spiritual rebirth. The committee reported that the church
was entrusted with certain inviolable doctrines: the incarnation of God in Jesus
Christ; the supernatural works of Christ, especially his atoning death for sins; the
resurrection and ascension of Christ; and the outpouring and continued presence
of the Holy Spirit. The committee "heartily agreed" with the "method of biblical
criticism." This set of "fundamentals" evidenced the primary concern of Methodist
conservatives for the doctrine of salvation through Christ, rather than for the
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inerrancy of Scripture or the Second Coming. 2

After the 1916 General Conference failed to remove certain books from the
course of study, as recommended by Sloan, the New Brunswick district directed
him to renew his investigation into the denomination's modernism. A book, The
Child and the Church, resulted from his efforts, and for the next four years Sloan
mounted an assault upon Methodist modernism. Aiming to produce a confrontation at the next general conference, he distributed to denominational leaders The
Child and the Church and resolutions which the New Jersey Conference had
passed against the course of study. He received favorable responses from across
the country, including those of Bishops Charles B. Mitchell of Minneapolis, and
Joseph F. Berry, newly appointed to the Philadelphia area; Clarence True Wilson,
head of the denomination's board of temperance, prohibition and public morals;
James R. Day, chancellor of Syracuse University; and Henry Clay Morrison,
president of Asbury College. 3
Meanwhile, Professor John Alfred Faulkner of Drew helped Sloan formulate
positions to be used against the Methodist liberals. Faulkner tried to keep Sloan's
critique of modernism on an intellectual level, while believing that Methodists
faced a choice of modernism's lifeless rationalism and John Wesley's "apostolic
enthusiasm."4 He feared that "in a few years Unitarians will have percolated
through our whole structure,"5 and he became discontent with the theological
direction of his colleague at Drew, Edwin Lewis. Liberals seemed to be "on the
saddle everywhere." It was a "queer old world," Faulkner said, when Methodist
ministers were "far more radical" in their beliefs than the "old Unitarians. 15
BecausofFlknr'wig,docteshm ratendivy
of Jesus became the focus of Sloan's attacks.
By the time of the 1920 General Assembly, thirty-one annual conferences had
passed resolutions regarding the removal of certain books from the course of study
for preachers. A commission authorized to deal with the matter, however, recommended few changes. The books that were finally substituted for controversial
ones seemed to Sloan and Faulkner no less modernist. So Sloan immediately
prepared for the next general conference.'
In 1922, largely because of Faulkner and the proximity of Drew, Sloan began to
direct much of his discontent with modernism against Professor Edwin Lewis,
who taught theology at Drew. 8 As the two men vented their concerns in letters to
each other, Sloan admonished Lewis to refute his "naturalistic thinking" and join
the battle against "proud-hearted unbelief." 9 But Lewis minded a different agenda.
He explained to Sloan his intent to reach those who rejected the old supernaturalist
reasons for following Jesus as Lord.'° But Sloan remained convinced that men
and women needed a "fearless advocacy" of faith, not Lewis's "mediating
opinions."" Though Lewis tried to persuade Sloan that he was as fully
"evangelical" as any Christian insofar as he stated the faith in a constructive rather
than defensive manner, and insofar as he was personally devoted to Christ, Sloan
warned that "heart devotion" did not guarantee orthodox theology.I 2
Meanwhile, Sloan progressed with his conservative drive and believed that he
and his allies won a victory for the faith at the general conference held in June
1924. Bishop Berry, reading the key address, affirmed the deity of Jesus, the virgin
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birth, the Bible as the inspired Word of God, and the necessity of repentance for
sin and justification by faith for personal salvation. Sloan himself could hardly
have said it better. Indeed Christian Advocate editor James R. Joy reported that
Sloan's "impassioned" appeals for the "standards of evangelical belief" had
"carried the convention." /3
After the conference, Sloan organized the "Methodist League for Faith and
Life." Its initial aim was to purge modernist books from the course of study, but it
soon focused upon seminary professors suspected of heresy. With its headquarters
in Philadelphia, in April 1925, Sloan began publishing the League's Call to Colors
(renamed the Essentialist in 1927). The publication maintained a sometimes
vicious attack on modernism and supposed modernists. The League relied on the
financial contributions of professionals and small-business proprietors, and
received money from various sources, including manufacturing companies, life
insurance agencies and law firms. Perhaps the leaders of such enterprises felt left
out of the vast organizational networks transforming the national economy and
found satisfaction in joining one devoted to renewing the kind of evangelical faith
which they believed had built America. 14
Sloan's cause united many theologically conservative Methodists. He was a
leader in rallies the League held throughout the nation and his paper advertised
anti-modernist resolutions passed by various groups.is A few Methodists hoped
he would be elected bishop, and occasionally laypersons solicited his advice as if he
were already one. In response to queries, Sloan affirmed that Christians might
attend motion pictures, that Catholics were "beautifully devoted to the faith," and
that infant baptism was consistent with the New Testament and the entire history
of Christianity. He refused to adopt positions which deviated from the historic
stream of Methodism. By such means he held many Methodists back from joining
fundamentalist or holiness sects. He refused to become a demagogue./ 6
Remaining within Methodism, Sloan sought allies among the more conservative bishops. Berry often defended him before the board of bishops. Adna
Leonard advised Sloan on the wording of various resolutions. Sloan tried to
persuade Leonard to head the League and later approached him about a plan to
start a Methodist seminary committed to the denomination's stated creeds. Sloan
considered Bishops Brenton T. Badley, Anton Bast, Frederick D. Leete, and
Ernest G. Richardson friendly to his cause./ 7 Leete, for instance, told Sloan that he
was also eager to save what was "most vital in the Christian religion."/ 8 Sloan
criticized liberal bishops Francis J. McConnell, Edwin H. Hughes and Edgar
Blake, but they generally ignored him. After the League was expanded into the
South, a few southern bishops, including Warren A. Candler, Collins Denny and
Horace M. DuBose, supported Sloan's efforts. Some dreamed of creating a
denomination composed of conservatives from both branches of Methodism."
Sloan resumed heated attacks on Edwin Lewis. In Jesus Christ and the Human
Quest, published in 1924, Lewis had tried to present the religion of Jesus in such a
way as to make it personally and socially appealing to modern men and women.
He attempted to prove the divinity of Jesus on the basis of his ethical character. 20
SloantriedcfmDwstuenadroicspnewth
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Lewis any evidence that his teachings were unorthodox. 21 In December, 1927,
Sloan proclaimed that the struggle against Lewis was "the next major battlefield in
Methodism."22 Lewis should either "return to the faith or else leave Drew
Theological Seminary," Sloan declared, for there he robbed "young men of their
faith."23
Prior to the 1928 General Conference, Sloan circulated a petition calling upon
the church to demand of its pastors, teachers and laypersons an unqualified pledge
to uphold its creed. Though "we are tolerant of any and all opinions that do not
strike at the essential truths of Christianity," the petition read, "we will not tolerate
any teaching that compromises Christ and His Word." The petition criticized
books in the course of study, indicted several seminaries, including Drew, for
"employing professors who teach contrary to our doctrines," and criticized the
Sunday school literature and most other material being published by the
denomination. Ten thousand Methodists signed the petition before the general
conference convened. During one session Sloan dramatically strode to the podium
in order to speak on behalf of the signers and to urge the petition's adoption. He
was quickly turned away without being allowed to make his appeal. Embittered,
Sloan returned home to renew his attacks on Lewis and modernism. 24
Throughout the controversies in the 1920s, Sloan recognized that his ideas
regarding what was crucial to Christian faith differed not only from those of
Methodist liberals but from those of most American fundamentalists. Sloan's
criticism of modernism was that it offered a "whittled-down" Christ. His criticism
of fundamentalism was that it made the verbal inerrancy of the Bible and the
pre-millennial coming of Christ as important as his divinity and the possibility of
new birth. A decisive conversion, Sloan believed, was necessary in order to change
an individual's destiny from eternal punishment to salvation, and this was the
central Methodist doctrine in danger of being lost. 25
The view of biblical inspiration which Sloan defended was that of Olin A.
Curtis. Not every word of the Bible was given directly by God, Sloan said. God
revealed Himself to men and women in the context and language of their cultures.
Nevertheless, Sloan declared that the Bible was inerrant in all matters essential to
Christian faith. Since higher criticism did not directly undermine that way of
interpreting the Old and New Testaments, it could be accepted. The Bible, Sloan
wrote, was "God's progressive revelation of Himself," and as such some parts
testified more nearly than others to the central Word of God in Christ. Since
Hebrew writers lacked the full light, the Old Testament needed to be judged by the
teachings of Jesus. 26 Sloan's idea of biblical inspiration paralleled his view of
salvation. Both stressed the human response to divine initiative. Though he
wanted to retain a high view of Scripture, he actually depended more upon the
creeds than biblical authority to support his positions against modernism. This
reflected an uncertainty among many Methodists as to how they should best
combine historical criticism and biblical inspiration. 27
Sloan did not at first see the theory of evolution as a threat to the biblical
theology of creation. Faulkner believed that the theory posed no threat to
Christianity. At one point Sloan declared himself for the teleological implications
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of evolution, that history was proceeding toward a goal. 28 But later Sloan
repudiated the theory. He noted the use of Darwinism to attack supernaturalism
and to advance novel theological ideas. Too many scientists speculated on ethical
and religious matters and endeavoured to impose their naturalism and behaviorism on others. Those who were truly objective would not move so readily from
their own fields. When Darwinism "ceased to be a hypothesis" and became a
"creed" the conflict became one between two faiths. 29 Yet such theories could
never really touch inward faith, he declared. "The progress of science has not made
Christ obsolete."Therefore he did not make evolution a major issue in his attacks
on modernism.30
Sloan's ambivalence toward premillennialism further separated him and other
conservative Methodists from fundamentalists. Postmillennialism had encouraged nineteenth-century Methodists to find humanitarian ways of expressing the
gospel, and Sloan did not criticize their efforts. In April 1922, William Bell Riley
invited Sloan both to participate in an Indiana campaign and to speak at the July
assembly of the "World's Christian Fundamentalist Association" in Los Angeles.
Initially Sloan agreed, affirming his belief in every historic Christian doctrine,
including the Second Coming. Sloan believed that the event would occur
someday, but did not specify whether he believed that Christ would come before
or after the millennium, or whether he believed in a millennium at all. He told
Riley that the question was trivial and that its emphasis prevented a broader
coalition of evangelicals. Riley rebuked him, declaring that the premillennial
coming of Christ was "as plainly taught in Scripture as any other doctrine," and
that to "soft-pedal" it was to "suppress" the Bible's "plain statements." 3/
Meanwhile San Francisco Bishop Adna Leonard reminded Sloan that Methodists
would never support premillennialism and warned him that his participation in
the convention would embarrass the denomination. 32 Sloan had hoped that by
offering to swing "the whole of Pacific Methodism" behind the fundamentalist
movement he might persuade Riley to drop his stress on premillennialism; but
Riley refused to budge or to widen the fundamentalist fray.33 So Sloan decided
that he would not attend the convention. He recognized Riley as a "friend and
ally," and his influence as "vital to saving faith in Jesus Christ." but he did not
think it wise for him to concentrate on a doctrine not truly central to historic
Christianity. 34
Sloan refused to alter his stands in order to suit fundamentalists. In 1931, when
plans were being laid for a fundamentalist convention in Philadelphia, Sloan's
credentials in it, despite his renown as Methodism's leading conservative, were
challenged by its organizer, Charles G. Trumbull. Sloan defended his right not to
subscribe to either the premillennial Second Coming or the verbal inerrancy of the
Bible. The latter more than the former jolted Trumbull. In response, Sloan
affirmed that he believed in biblical authority, but repeated his long-held view that
the Holy Spirit had spoken in a variety of situations to writers with different
capabilities of understanding and expression. This, he said, was the true and
historic position of the Christian Church. If fundamentalism would return to this
truth and refute the novel theory of verbal inerrancy, he told Trumbull, its
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influence would be much greater. 35 Though he declined a leading part in fundamentalism, Sloan lectured at the Winona Lake School of Theology, spoke
occasionally at Moody Bible Institute and was instrumental in the reformation of
the League of Evangelical Students in 1921. 36
Sloan felt closer to the faculty at Princeton Theological Seminary than to the
premillennialist wing of fundamentalism. In the 1920s he encouraged Methodist
ministerial students to attend Princeton in order to study under such men as J.
Gresham Machen. Though Machen welcomed these Methodists, he concentrated
his efforts on his own denomination. Princeton, Machen believed, was succumbing
to modernism. He felt sure, nevertheless, that though "evangelical Christianity"
might be driven out of Princeton and other citadels in the Presbyterian or
Methodist churches, it could never be rooted out of the hearts of believers. 37 When
Machen started Westminster Theological Seminary in 1929, Sloan suggested that
the school's faculty include a professor of Methodist doctrine and discipline.
Having taught theology part time at Temple University for the previous two
years, Sloan clearly was proposing himself. But Machen was as convinced that
Calvinism represented true Christianity as Riley of premillennialism; so he did not
offer Sloan a job.38
Sloan distinguished Calvinist from Wesleyan evangelicalism. Strict Calvinists
taught that sin was inherent to human life, that God chose which individuals would
be saved, and that the atonement of Christ reached only those so chosen. True
Methodists, Sloan said, believed that God offered salvation through the
atonement of Christ to all who would believe and that individuals freely chose
whether or not to accept this grace. 39
Because his fight was not over verbal inspiration or the Second Coming, but
over the divine nature of Jesus and his power to transform lives, Sloan declared
that Methodist conservatives were "fundamentalists" on a "broader basis than the
organized movement." 40 His League of Faith and Life attracted Lutherans and
other evangelicals without ties to either the premillennialist or Calvinist wings of
fundamentalism. 41 Bishop Leonard proposed the word "essentialism" to differentiate the Methodist movement from fundamentalism, though Curtis had used the
term in 1907. "Essentialists," Sloan wrote, were those who believed that Christ's
incarnation was the means by which God offered salvation to a fallen humanity
and that the Bible was the "providentially produced and guarded record of this
redemptive work." "Fundamentalism" was a perfectly good word, Sloan added,
but in the recent controversy it had been taken over and distorted by Calvinists. 42
Despite these efforts to strengthen the conservative position in Methodism,
Calvinist fundamentalism lured some away from the denomination. The most
notable was Harold John Ockenga, who Sloan hoped would succeed him as
editor of The Essentialist. Ockenga had graduated from Taylor University, then
enrolled at Princeton and followed Machen to Westminster. Though Ockenga
continued to work closely with Sloan and the League, he came to believe that the
crucial battle was not between Wesleyans and the Calvinists, but between true
Christians and modernists. In order to defeat modernism, he wrote in 1930, "all
evangelicals must unite." He described Sloan as standing virtually alone in
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Methodism, "a true, balanced and uncompromising witness in the days of its
apostasy."43 But the logic of Machen's Calvinism proved "irresistible." 44 To
Sloan's sorrow, the promising young preacher left the Methodist church and
joined the Presbyterians. By his conversion to Calvinism, Ockenga was headed
toward leadership in post-war evangelicalism in America.
This was only part of Sloan's woes. In the summer of 1930 Sloan suffered an
illness that he himself called a nervous breakdown. An "obscure infection"
accompanied severe head pains, a rapid pulse and trembling hands. 45 His controversies now pressed upon him "like a continent," while his "strength and resource"
seemed like those of a "fly." 46 His anxiety was deepened by the economic
depression of the 1930s, which left his Haddonfield congregation struggling to pay
a $19,000 debt, and left both his broadcasting ministry and The Essentialist in
jeopardy. 47 The crusade against Lewis took its toll emotionally as it became
evident that Drew's new president, Arlo A. Brown, was not about to take Sloan's
side in the dispute, and much less appoint him to the Drew faculty. A revival at
Ocean Grove campmeeting, conducted by evangelist Gypsy Smith, brought scores
of ministers to the altar of prayer. Sloan described it as a "modern Pentecost."
Perhaps it was a turning point for him. 48
Other reasons as well prompted changes in Sloan's attitudes toward the role he
was called to play in Methodism. After the merger of The Essentialist with The
Bible Champion in January, 1931, he left its control to others. Later that year
Faulkner died. Though a faithful mentor, he had burdened Sloan with his nagging
pessimism,. Most important, Edwin Lewis's new book, God and Ourselves, seemed
to Sloan a major return to the faith. In the book Lewis commented at length on the
failure of Methodism, and stressed the limitations of human speculation regarding
God in comparison to his divine revelation. 49
The two men began to reconcile their differences. Sloan told Lewis that he
would recommend God and Ourselves to young people who had lost their faith.
When they met in Atlantic City during the 1932 General Conference, Sloan
admitted to Lewis that he had come "short of the grace" anyone could expect of a
Christian in many of his tactics, and that where he still could he would make
amends. 50 Sloan even advised his son to attend Drew, so that he might experience
Lewis's "vision of Christ."51 Sloan was further astonished by the completeness of
his agreement with Lewis's Christian Manifesto, 52 and he was also impressed by
the book's generally positive reception. "What you have affirmed in your
`manifesto' is what I have striven to hold," Sloan wrote Lewis; "I will honor you as
a chosen instrument of Christ." 53
Sloan considered his own election to the editorship of the New York Christian
Advocate in 1936 the ultimate vindication for his ideas. 54 Sloan used his position
as editor to promote a revival which he hoped would center Methodists once more
upon a vital, saving faith. Upon such faith Methodists might lead the nation
upward toward "spiritual renaissance." 55 He reported signs that revival was indeed
on its way. Indeed the conference that united the northern and southern branches
of Methodism in 1939 declared envangelism to be the church's primary task. 56
BishopEdwnH.uge,coSlan'sitfber,daokntile

72

Cunningham

Are You an Evangelist?, which explored new methods of accomplishing the old
aim of winning souls to Christ. 57 The Federal Council of Churches sponsored
large-scale preaching missions, many of them conducted by E. Stanley Jones. 58
AndSloasciern-thodxyapfervil.Itcodmany
essential Christian truths, he believed, even though he could not accept Reinhold
Niebuhr's seeming equation of human finitude with evil. He tried to preserve a
distinct Methodist viewpoint toward neo-orthodoxy, despite the parallels between
his moral relativism and Niebuhr's Christian realism. 59
As the war approached, Sloan found himself drawn to spiritual assurances that
while all else gave way it could be well within his own soul. The 1940 General
Conference decided to combine the denomination's regional papers, and to his
great disappointment he was not selected to edit the national Christian Advocate.
Instead, he became pastor of the Wharton Methodist Church in Philadelphia. He
affirmed as he always had the provisions of faith. 60 Despite the horrendous evils all
around, Sloan continued to believe that individuals who possessed faith in eternal
verities could remain unshaken. Nevertheless, he later described the war period as
one when "demons" seemed incessantly attacking him. 6 '
During the war Sloan no longer attacked modernism, which he considered
dead, but he still blamed the war on the decline of religious convictions in the face
of rising secular forces. Men and women, entranced by the notion that they could
remake the world, had blinded themselves to the brutalities of Hitler. Sloan
believed that the war was being fought to protect sacred institutions and to
preserve free societies. But he had few illusions regarding a permanent moral
victory. He did not preach hope or optimism regarding the future. 62
As Sloan later saw the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet
Union emerge, he sensed that communism was a threat to Christianity as well as
democracy. Because communism made no efforts to change men and women
spiritually, it ultimately would fail, Sloan believed. Rather than relying on God,
Communists tried to find salvation in their own social schemes. He linked the
deficiencies of the social gospel (which he had not often criticized before the war),
to those of communism. Both the social gospel and communism, he now said,
taught that men and women could be perfected by social engineering. He attacked
communism with the same vengeance with which he had attacked modernism. But
he knew that this new menace was quite out of his reach. He charged the entire
nation to preserve Christianity against communism. 63
Throughout the years when great change in society took place, Sloan professed
to have consistently maintained the faith he long before had been personally
given." His emphases were lines of defense against the enemies which seemed to
encroach upon his faith and even threaten him personally. Sloan believed that his
holding on to belief in the divine nature of Jesus had helped thwart the intrusion of
modernism. By 1940, events seemed to confirm that Christians could not exist for
long without faith in a divine Savior and in God's transforming grace. Sloan found
theologians and bishops he had opposed coming around to his long-held beliefs.
He sensed a revival sweeping over the country. But during the war it seemed
obvious that the forces which threatened the collapse of Christianity and
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civilization itself were much larger than modernism. His faith remained, but even
he clung more dearly than he ever had to the inward assurances central to his
Methodist beliefs.

Notes
1. William B. Lewis, "The Role of Harold Paul Sloan and the Methodist League for
Faith and Life in the Fundamentalist-Modernist Controversy of the Methodist Epis-

copal Church" (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1963), 33-34, 43-48, 53-53,
95-100; Floyd T. Cunningham, The Christian Faith Personally Given: Divergent
Trends in Twentieth Century American Methodist Thought" (Ph.D. dissertation,
Johns Hopkins University, 1983), ch. 4.
2. Sloan, The Child and the Church (Red Bank, NJ: Standard Publishing, 1916),
68, 73; Sloan, "Annual Conference Report, 1914, On Church Publications," (ms.,
1914), 4, Sloan papers; Sloan, autobiographical notes, (1958), Sloan papers, Drew
University.
3. Sloan, The Child and the Church, 11-16; Clarence True Wilson, Washington,
DC, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 1 June 1918; Charles B. Mitchell, St. Paul, MN, to Sloan,
Red Bank, 23 January 1917; Joseph F. Berry, Philadelphia, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 8
May 1918; James R. Day, Syracuse, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 16 April 1920; Henry C.
Morrison\ Orlando, FL, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 12 December 1921, Sloan papers.
4. Faulkner, Modernism and the Christian Faith
Concern, 1921), 230.

(New York: Methodist Book

5.

Faulkner, Madison, to Sloan, Red Bank, 1 June 1917, Sloan papers.

6.

Faulkner, Madison, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 6 May 1919, Sloan papers.

7. Sloan, "Course of Study," New York Christian Advocate, 95 (29 January 1920):
154; Sloan, "The Laws of the Church Not Fulfilled by the New Course of Study,"
Methodist Review, 104 (September 1921): 792 797; Sloan, Historic Christianity and
the New Theology (Louisville, KY: Pentecostal Publishing, 1922), 21, 23.
-

8.

Faulkner, Madison, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 11 August 1922.

9.

Sloan, Bridgeton, to Lewis, Madison, 3 May 1923, Sloan papers.

10. Lewis, Madison, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 5 May 1923, Sloan papers.
11. Sloan, Bridgeton, to Lewis, Madison, 19 May 1923, Sloan papers.
12. Sloan, Bridgeton, to Lewis, Madison, 4 March 1924, Sloan papers; Lewis,
Madison, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 1 February 1924, Lewis papers, Drew University.
13. New York Christian Advocate, 99 (8 May 1924): 573.
14. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Faulkner, Madison, 20 August 1924; E. M. Conover,
Wenonah, NJ, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 18 September 1928; Sloan, "The League and Its
Origin," The Call to the Colors, 1 (April 1925): 1-2.
15. The Call to the Colors, 1 (January 1926): 151; The Essentialist, 3 (June 1927): 76;
ibid., 3 (July-August 1927): 110-1 12; ibid., 3 (October 1927): 155-156; ibid., 6 (May
1930): 33.

74

Cunningham

16. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Carrie V. Firer, Baltimore, 31 December 1927; Sloan,
Haddonfield, to J. Foster, Flanders, NJ, 1 August 1928; Sloan, Haddonfield. to
Miriam A. Coddington, Atlantic (December 1929): 166-168.
17. Berry, Philadelphia, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 30 March 1923, 4 June 1924; Adna
Leonard, San Francisco, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 25 January 1923; Sloan, Haddonfield,
to Faulkner, Madison, 25 November 1924, Sloan papers.
18. Leete, Indianapolis, to Sloan, Bridgeton. 1 July 1923, Sloan papers.
19. Robert Crawford, "A Real Methodist Unification," The Call to the Colors, 1
(February 1926): 153. See Horace M. DuBose, Nashville, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 22
February 1929, Sloan papers; DuBose, "Introduction," in Sloan, The Apostles' Creed
(New York; Methodist Book Concern, 1930), 7-11; Collins Denny, Richmond, to
Sloan, Philadelphia, 29 June 1925; Warren A. Candler, "What Is At Stake," The Call
to the Colors, 1 (July-August 1925): 49-51.
of the
20. Jesus Christ and the Human Quest: Suggestions Toward a Philosophy
Person and Work of Christ (New York: Abingdon Press, 1924), 19, 22-23, 90-107.
21. Sloan, "Jesus Christ and the Human Quest--A Criticism," Methodist Review,
108 (September 1925): 800-806; Lewis, Madison, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 9 February
1928; Sloan, Haddonfield, to Lewis, Madison, 11 February 1928, 14 March 1928;
Lewis, Madison, to Roscoe E. Ingersoll, Atlantic City, NJ, 28 March 1929, Sloan
papers.
22. Sloan, "The Next Major Battlefield in Methodism: Professor Lewis of Drew
Theological Seminary Denies the Deity of Christ," The Essentialist, 3 (December
1927): 191-194.
23. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Lewis, Madison, 28 September 1926; and 14 March 1928,
Sloan papers.
24. The Essentialist, 4 (January 1929): 220: New York Christian Advocate, 103 (10
May 1928): 581; ibid., 103 (17 May 1928): 622.
25. Sloan, Historic Christianity and the New Theology, 11-12, 35, 44, 77-86, 107, 112,
119-120, 125, 143: Sloan, The Apostles' Creed, 33-34.
26.

Sloan, Historic Christianity and the New Theology,

9.

27. Ibid., 8, 32, 53-59, 96, 100, 143, 169-197; Sloan, "The Ninety-Five Theses of the
New Reformation," The Call to the Colors, 2 (December 1926): 147; Sloan, editorial,
The Essentialist, 4 (January 1929): 159-161; Sloan Personality and the Fact of Christ
(Nashville, TN: Cokesbury, 1933), 73-80. Cf. Olin A. Curtis, The Christian Faith
Personally Given in a System of Doctrine (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1905),
161-180.
28. Faulkner, Winona Lake, IN, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 15 August 1924, Sloan
papers.
29. Sloan, Historic Christianity, 188.
30. Sloan, Personality and the Fact of Christ, 193. See William Jennings Bryan,
Miami, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 20 June 1923, Sloan papers; Sloan, "Evolution!" The Call
to the Colors, 1 (July-August 1925): 60.
31.

William B. Riley, Minneapolis, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 21 April 1922, Sloan papers.

32. Leonard, San Francisco, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 8 May 1922; Sloan, Bridgeton, to
Leonard, San Francisco, n.d., Sloan papers.
33. Sloan, Bridgeton, to Riley, Minneapolis, (26 April 1922); Riley, Minneapolis, to
Sloan, Bridgeton, 23 May 1922, Sloan papers.

Harold Sloan and Methodist Essentialism

75

34. Sloan, Bridgeton, to Riley, Minneapolis, 10 June 1922, Sloan papers. See Sloan,
Bridgeton, to Riley, Minneapolis, 19 April 1922, 26 April 1922; Riley, Minneapolis, to
Sloan, Bridgeton, 14 April 1922, 19 June 1922, Sloan papers.
35. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Charles G. Trumbull, Philadelphia, 27 December 1930,
11 December 1930; Trumbull, Philadelphia, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 24 December
1930, Sloan papers.
36. "Report of League of Evangelical Students," n.d.; Sloan, Haddonfield, to
William J. Jones, Wheaton, IL, 14 May 1931; Sloan, Haddonfield, to J. A. Huffman,
Marion, IN, 15 November 1932, Sloan papers.
37. J. Gresham Machen, Seal Harbor, ME, to Sloan, Philadelphia, 5 September
1927, Sloan papers.
38. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Robert Dick Wilson, Princeton, 27 July 1929, Sloan
papers. See Sloan, Bridgeton, to Machen, Princeton, 18 January 1923; Machen,
Princeton, to Sloan, Bridgeton, 24 January 1923; Sloan, Haddonfield, to Machen,
Princeton, 30 December 1924; Machen, Princeton, to Sloan, Philadelphia, 25 April
1925, 20 October 1926, 10 March 1928; Machen, Seal Harbor, to Sloan, Philadelphia,
5 September; Machen, New York, to Sloan, Philadelphia, 18 June 1928; Machen,
Philadelphia, to Sloan, Philadelphia, 13 September 1930, Sloan papers. See also
Sloan, Haddonfield, to Faulkner, Madison, 21 July 1927.
39.

Sloan, "Articles," The Essentialist, 3 (March 1928): 270-271.

40. Sloan, "The League and Its Origins," The Call to the Colors, 1 (April 1925): 2. See
ibid., 8-9; Sloan, "The Methodist League for Faith and Life Is One Year Old," ibid., 1
(January 1926): 144-146; Sloan, "The Ninety-Five Theses of the New Reformation,"
ibid., 2 (December 1926): 145.
41. Leander S. Keyser, "The Reformation Principle of Authority," The Call to the
Colors, 1 (December 1925): 122-124.
42. Sloan, "Bishop Leonard's Great Statement," ibid., 1 (April 1926): 192-194;
Sloan, "An Essentialist," ibid., 2 (May 1926): 1-2; Sloan, "Just Words!" ibid., 2
(November 1926): 113-115; The Essentialist, 2 (January 1927): 149. See Sloan, "Fundamentalism in History--A Fundamentalist Rejoinder," Methodist Review, 106
(November 1923): 955-959. See Olin A. Curtis, "The Catechism of Sir Oliver Lodge,"
Methodist Review, 89 (September 1907): 692.
43.

Ockenga, Atlantic City, NJ, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 26 July 1930, Sloan papers.

44. Ockenga, Avalon, NJ, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 18 January 1930, Sloan papers.
See Ockenga, "Resurrection," The Essentialist, 6 (April 1930): 15-19, 23; Sloan,
Haddonfield, to Ockenga, Pittsburgh, 11 December 1930, 17 December 1932, Sloan
papers.
45. Ockenga, Pittsburgh, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 20 October 1933; Sloan, Haddonfield, to Ernest G. Crabill, Binghamton, NJ, 22 August 1930, Sloan papers.
46. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Charles K. Haddon, Haddonfield, 10 February 1933,
Sloan papers.
47. First Camden National Bank, Camden, to Sloan, Haddonfield, 24 March 1930,
Sloan papers; The Essentialist, 6 (December 1930): 249.
48. Sloan, "A Modern Pentecost," The Essentialist, 6 (November 1930): 235-236. See
Sloan, "The Promise of the Holy Spirit," Methodist Review, 113 (July 1930): 499-512.
49. Lewis, God and Ourselves: A Plea for the Reality, Adequacy and Availability of
God (New York: Abingdon Press, 1931), 11-42; Sloan, "Salutatory," Christian Faith
and Life, 37 (January 1931): 1-2.

76

Cunningham

50. Sloan, Haddonfield, to Lewis, Madison, (April 1932), 3 June 1932, 22 June 1932,
24 June 1932, Sloan papers and Lewis papers.
51. Sloan, Woodbury, NJ, to Lewis, Madison, 8 September 1934, 10 September
1934, Lewis papers.
52.

Edwin Lewis, A Christian Manifesto (New York: Abingdon Press, 1934).

53. Sloan, Woodbury, to Lewis, Madison, 19 October 1934, Lewis papers; Sloan, "A
Most Christian Book," New York Christian Advocate, 109 (29 November 1934): 962.
54.

Sloan, "Autobiographical Notes," (1958), Sloan papers.

55.

Sloan, "Decalogue of the New Spiritual Renaissance," New York Christian
(4 June 1936): 531-532.

Advocate, 111

56. New York Christian Advocate, III (18 June 1936): 577; Sloan, "The Great
Conference Is On," ibid., 114 (4 May 1939): 419.
57. Edwin Holt, ed., Are You An Evangelist?(New York: Methodist Book Concern,
1936); Sloan, Personalit y and the Fact of Christ, 64, 89, 147-154; Sloan, "Modernism's
Self-Announced Collapse," New York Christian Advocate, 111 (6 August 1936): 748;
Sloan, "Christendom Reviving," ibid., 112 (7 January 1937): 3; Sloan, "Return to
Religion Reflected in the News," ibid., 112 (11 February 1937): 132, 151: Sloan, "The
Intellectual Repossession of Christ," ibid., 112 (15 April 1937): 347.
58. Sloan, "Restore the Protestant Pulpit," New York Christian Advocate, 111 (1
October 1936): 945, 949; Sloan, "There is a New Spirit in the World," ibid., 111 (29
October 1936): 1035; Sloan, "The Rising Tide of Conviction," ibid., 113 (7 July 1938):
704.
59. Sloan, "Answer," New York Christian Advocate, 113(10 November 1938): 1137;
Sloan, "Basic Evil," ibid., 114 (15 June 1939): 564. See Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man
and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), 174.
Journal of the First General Conference of the Methodist Church, ed. Lud H.
Estes (Nashville: Methodist Publishing House, 1940), 297, 646; Sloan, "Autobiographical Notes," Sloan papers.
60.

61.

Sloan, He Is Risen (Winona Lake, IN: Light and Life Press, 1942), 55, 124.

62. Sloan, "Thus We Evangelize Now," New York Christian Advocate, 118 (25
November 1943): 1495; Sloan, "What Can General Conference Do?" ibid., 118 (7
October 1943): 1255.
63. Sloan, One Gospel for One World (Philadelphia: Wharton Memorial Church,
1946), 19-20, 167-168, 202, 205.
64.

Sloan, "How My Mind Has (Not) Changed in This Decade," New York Christian
114 (31 August 1939): 827-828.

Advocate,

Literary Structure and Unbelief:
A Study of Deuteronomy 1:6-46
EUGENE E. CARPENTER

The theological themes and the literary structure of the Book of Deuteronomy
combine to communicate the message of the book: "You shall love the Lord
(YHWH) your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your
might. And these words which I command you this day shall be upon your heart"
(Deut. 6:5-6). According to Jesus this is the word of God par excellence from the
Old Testament. He quotes Deut. 6:5-6 in Matt. 22:37 (cf. Matt. 22:34-40; Mk.
12:28-34; Lk. 10:25-28). He also quotes Lev. 19:18 as its corollary: "You shall love
your neighbor as yourself."
However, Deuteronomy develops the concept and practice of neighbor love
fully and more consistently than Leviticus or any other Old Testament book. It
illustrates in theory and by concrete cultural scenarios the corollary of the great
commandment. Love for God and love for other persons are enjoined concomitantly throughout the book.
The word love ('ahabah) is used sixteen times (4:37; 6:5; 7:8, 9, 13; 10:12, 15;
11:1, 13, 22, etc.). Yahweh's love for his people (eleven times) and Israel's love for
Yahweh (five times) encompass the past, present and future purview of the writer.
The unity of Israel and the solidarity of brotherhood are emphasized' throughout
the material. In 3:18-20 the point is made that members of the various tribes are
brothers. The phrase "all Israel" (01 yisrd'El) is employed twelve times and the
word for brother(s) ('ab/ 'alkim) is found twenty-eight times (cf. 1:16; 3:18, 20;
10:9; 15:3, 7, 9, 11). The use of the term "brother" inspires obedience to commands
concerning relationships within Israel; it encourages the hearer to see Israel as the
family writ large. 2 Even the King is chosen from among "your brothers" (17:15). 3
In fact, Moses teaches that all Israel's leaders or representatives (judges, kings,
levites, prophets) are leaders among brethren (1:18; 17:14-20; 18:1-5, 15-18).
In Israel the concept of "caring for one's brother" influenced all of life. The
question of Cain is answered positively in Deuteronomy: Yes, you are your
brother's keeper. This motif regulates the suspension of debts, making loans,
releasing slaves, dealing with perjury, foregoing interest, kidnapping, slave trading
and the avoidance of excessive penalties (15:2, 3, 7, 9, 11, 12; 19:18-19; 23:20-21
[19-20]; 24:7; 25:3). The concern for mutual support and brotherhood among
Israelites motivates the command for the Transjordanian tribes to commit
themselves to the other tribes to help them receive their inheritance in Canaan
(3:18-20). Never was an Israelite to harden their heart or shut their hand to
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withhold what was needed by their poor brother (15:7-8). An Israelite was to let his
Hebrew slave go free with joy (15:18), and the King was to see "that his heart may
not be lifted up above his brethren"(17:20). Brotherly love was possible only when
Israel loved the Lord supremely, as he had loved them: "because he loved your
fathers and chose their descendants after them" (4:37); "because the Lord loves
you, and is keeping the oath which he swore to your fathers" (7:8). The ideal
community is presented by the deuteronomic writer in this way.
But what happens to this ideal community that trusts and loves its God, to a
community that knows that her God loves her, when an attitude of unbelief and
rebellion arises? Deuteronomy 1:6-46 provides insight into what happened in
Israel when such a situation arose. Paul reminds us that all of the stories in the Old
Testament were written down so that we could learn from those lessons of faith.
The past history of Israel, her responses in thought and acts to Yahweh's words,
is narrated by Moses is Deut. 1:6-3:29. 4 These chapters present two paradigms
(models) of Israel's responses to Yahweh in the face of his persistent covenant
faithfulness. Chapter 1:6-46 is the locus classicus in Deuteronomy for Israel's
trajectory of failure, fueled by her incorrigible unbelief and rebellious ways. After
Yahweh's discipline of Israel (2:1, 14-15), verses 2:2-3:11 recorsi a paradigm of
Israel's success as she conquers the Transjordanian lands. As Yahweh led, she
followed and was successful. The structure and theology of Deuteronomy in the
paradigm of 1:6-46 will be examined in this study.
STRUCTURE AND THEOLOGY IN 1:6-46
The introductory verses (vv. 1-5) of Deuteronomy can be set out in the form of a
palistrophe 5 to illustrate how their literary structure underlies the theological
message of Deuteronomy:
A. What-Where: Words of Moses; in the Desert (1:1)
B. When: Fortieth year, first day, eleventh month (1:1-2)
C. Key theme: ALL THE LORD COMMANDED MOSES (1:3b)
B'. When: After Og and Sihon were defeated (1:4)
A'. Where-What: East of the Jordan; this Torah (1:5)
This brief chiastic structure focuses on the theme of the Book of Deuteronomy.
Its major purpose, goal and character is to communicate all the WORDS THAT
THE LORD COMMANDED MOSES. The concentric structure places this
theme at the center of the outline and highlights it. The words of Moses impart the
burden of the Lord, for they are the words that Yahweh commanded to Moses. In
a similar manner the literary structure of 1:6-46 serves to pinpoint the theological
leitmotif of the passage. The devastating factor that destroys Israel's hope, her
theology and corrupts her behavior is the lack of moral fortitude to trust Yahweh,
i.e. unbelief.
Our passage (1:6-46) reflects a symmetry that is suggestive of chiastic or
concentric structuring, although the detailed correspondences that would indicate
perfect chiasm or a perfect concentric symmetry are lacking. 6 However, the
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general feature of parallelism of thought found in Hebrew poetry and narrative is
clearly discernible. Certain key concepts occur in the central section of the passage
(vv. 26-28), such as rebelliousness, unbelief, murmuring. These terms indicate the
central theme of the passage. Similar ideas continue to be used throughout the
second half of the passage (32, 42, 45). Unbelief is the generic term employed, as
well as the key theological concept. After verses 26-28, the "hope" and the positive
thrust of verses 6-25 are transformed into frustration and failure. A reversal of
Israel's history occurs and thereafter her trajectory is downward.
The following arrangement of some of the parallel thought in the passage helps
to illustrate a few of these issues.' The major theological motif of the verses, and its
significance for the life and worldview of Israel, stands at the center of the
structure:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

go in and possess the land (vv. 6-8)
triumphs and multiplication of Israel (vv. 9-12)
wise leaders chosen (vv. 13-18)
go up and possess the land (vv. 19-21a)
do not fear the peoples (v. 21b)
request for spies (vv. 22-24)
good report of spies (v. 25)
H. BUT, you were not willing, you rebelled; you did not believe
(vv. 26-28)
(v, 26 weld' abitem la 'alot wattamrti 'et pi yhwh 'elohekem)
-G'. evil report of spies (v. 28)
-F'. rejection of the spies (v. 28)
-E'. expressed fear of the peoples (v. 28)
-D'. land is withheld, and given to others (vv. 34-40)
-C'. foolish choice by the leaders (v. 41)
-B'. defeats and decrease of Israel (vv. 42-44)
-A'. do not go in and possess the land (vv. 42, 45, 46)
The value of seeing the literary symmetry of the passage is that one can easily
locate the key issue of the passage. And, the character of scripture as literature,
with carefully constructed patterns to communicate its theological message, is
evident. A significant fact in the structure is that the specific parallel elements listed
after the crucial verses in 26-28 are reversals of the corresponding items in the first
half of the passage. The turn from hope, possibility and proffered blessing in the
first section to frustration, lost opportunities and cursing in the second half
because of Israel's response in unbelief (vv. 26-28) is instructive. Unbelief is such a
powerful factor in skewing Israel's perception of things that both her theology and
her behavior are affected. And, as goes theology, so goes behavior. The lens of
unbelief through which Israel sees the world clearly focuses both her theology and
her lifestyle.
As noted, the parallel elements in the passage are striking because the para!lels
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between the first and second parts of the passage are negative (reverse) parallels
(i.e. A=-A', etc.). The trajectory of Israel's mindset and hence her behavior is away
from blessing to cursing, from hope to frustration, from possession to loss of
inheritance, from increase in numbers to decrease in numbers, from being given
the land to having it violently withheld from them (1)=-D'). The extent to which
unbelief in Israel causes a grotesque perversion of her theology and relationship
with God is made clear in the central verses of the passage (26-27).
UNBELIEF AND BAD THEOLOGY
Moses charges Israel by asserting "you rebelled, you murmured, you did not
trust" (cf. vv. 26-27). And, bad faith produces corrupt theology. Corrupt theology
produces scenarios of despair and destructive behavior. The people's grotesque
representation of the character and nature of Yahweh in verses 27-28 illustrates the
claim. Because of adopting a perspective of unbelief, Israel concocts the following
theology about Yahweh.
Verse 27: "The Lord hates us" (besinat yhwh OtAnia). This is a charge that our
writer will correct shortly. The verse continues, "He brought us out of Egypt to
deliver us into the hands of the Amorites so that they could destroy us." According
to the people Yahweh's hatred finds its outlet in delivering his people to the
Amorites to be slain.
Verse 28: The words of the people in verses 27-28 are in direct speech, a device
used by biblical writers to emphasize the major issues in a passage. 8 This verse
completes a hideous transformation of Yahweh's true intentions for bringing his
people out of Egypt. This time the issue is the people's charge of maliciousness
against their brethren. According to the people, their brothers have "made our
hearts melt" (hUmagli et - lebabUrna) by the reports they have given. They have
implied, and even asserted, that the peoples in the land are awesome and are to be
feared. They are too mighty for Israel to conquer. But the writer will note three
ways in which this charge is false.
Israel has charged Yahweh falsely and maliciously. They have not only
forgotten his great words and deeds on their behalf (1:29-33); paradoxically, they
have proceeded to miscontrue them. The true intent of Yahweh's actions and
words are not discernible to them because they have refused to believe. Unbelief
has darkened their understanding. Yahweh's intent is now ambiguous to them.
They do not have ears to hear or eyes to see because of their unwillingness to
"read" Yahweh's plan correctly (Deut. 28:4). They have mocked him with his own
words. Even after a show of repentance (1:41), they do not perceive things
correctly because they will not yet seek his will rather than their own (v. 43). They
insist upon being hot-headed and stiff-necked (cf. Deut. 10:16). Only one person in
Israel is singled out for approval (1:36) and most readers want to identify with him.
Caleb is considered a man of faith who will receive his inheritance. His faith
produced action; he was ready to take the land.
The result of Israel's failure of faith was forty years of discipline in the desert
(2:1, 14-15). Only those could enter the land now who had not taken part in the
distrust of and rebellion against Yahweh. As Adam and Eve's rebellion had led to
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their violent expulsion from the promised land (Eden), now Israel's rebellion and
lack of trust keeps them from entering the promised land (the new Eden).
Humankind's "original" perversion of God's ways through unbelief and rebellion
is present in Israel. And, the primeval attempt to blame one's brother, or
companion, is repeated as well (1:28).
The extent of Israel's failure is revealed when verses 27-28 are analyzed and
contrasted with Yahweh's stated goals and purposes for Israel, to say nothing of
his character. The rest of the book of Deuteronomy in its present form is an
impassioned plea to Israel to establish themselves as God's people. The writer
directs and encourages them to think correctly and thereby to live acceptably
before Yahweh. Only then could they be God's people and he would be their God
(26:16-19).
A comparison of Israel's assertions about Yahweh and Yahweh's own claims
shows that the words of the people are a complete reversal of Yahweh's true
purposes and character. Chapter four sums up and comments upon the preceding
three chapters. The issues raised in 1:26-28 are addressed in 4:37-38. These verses
declare that Yahweh does not hate Israel (cf. 1:27); he loves them and their
forefathers (4:37). As a result of his love for them he has chosen them (v. 37,
wayyibha r). And, the writer drives this point home even more emphatically in
Deut. 7:7-8:
"It was not because you were more in number than any people that the
Lord set his love upon you and chose you, for you were the fewest of all
peoples; but it is because the Lord loves you, and is keeping the oath
which he swore to your fathers, that the Lord has brought you
out . ." (RSV).
The basis of Yahweh's choice is love, not hate as a disbelieving Israel perceives it.
Her perception was wrong.
Moreover, Yahweh did not bring Israel out of Egypt to give them over to the
Amorites (1:27); he brought them out to give the Amorites into the hands of Israel
(4:38), for the iniquity of the Amorites was complete (cf. Gen. 15:16). Chapter
7:17, 23, makes the point clear:
"If you say in your heart, 'These nations are greater than I; How can
dispossess them? . . ." (v. 17).
"But the Lord your God will give them over to you, and throw them into
great confusion, until they are destroyed:" (v. 23).
The people in the land are not too strong for Israel (1:28), the Lord will drive them
out (4:38).
Our writer instructs Israel not to lose heart because of their brethren (1:28), but
to take heart (4:34-35). They should respond to the good report of their brethren.
Israel's past already had shown that Yahweh was to be trusted (Exod. 1-15). But
following Yahweh demands a moral choice of whether to believe in his goodness
or to lose faith because of a negative or ambiguous reading of the evidence.
Our writer records two options that were placed before Israel. Verse 25 records
the spies' report as, "It is a good land which the Lord our God gives us." Verse 28
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includes another report by other spies: "The people are greater and taller than
we ... moreover, we have seen the sons of the Anakim there" (cf. Num. 13; 14:1-38;
14:39-45). Because of the Exodus and because of Sinai, Israel's decision to refuse
to take possession of the land is evaluated by our writer as a moral-religious
failure, a failure to believe Yahweh. Under these circumstances, Israel could not
inherit the land.
The brotherhood of Israel was to reflect solidarity. They were to be supportive
of one another, not against one another. The model of Cain and Abel comes to
mind as well as Adam's accusation against Eve. Yahweh's purpose from the time
of creation was for the unity of mankind to be expressed by caring for one's
brother (Gen. 4:8-10). The new community of God's people, Israel, was to
experience that reality. Yahweh's purpose was that they realize that they were one
in him, chosen for the same purpose (3:18-30; 4:38), to inherit the land and live in
it.
Deuteronomy illustrates theological concepts by projecting them into real
social settings. The brothers on one side of the Jordan are, therefore, urged to aid
those on the other side until they have received their inheritance (3:18-20). The
pattern of the spies who encouraged Israel to take the land is to be followed (1:25),
rather than the pattern of the spies who discouraged their brethren (1:28). It is clear
that Israel could not know Yahweh's ways and his theology unless they would trust
him. They were called to an intimate personal knowledge of God that depended
upon a hermeneutics of trust and obedience. 9 Yahweh was a God who could not be
manipulated by magic and put on display. He was a God who could be known
intimately dnd truly only when his people would make a moral commitment to
him. Otherwise, even his deeds and words on their behalf would be misinterpreted;
he could not be known correctly from a perspective of unbelief. His words and
deeds could become a stumbling block rather than a way that would guide them to
a fulfilling relationship with their God. For Israel, knowing God and interpreting
his words and deeds (hermeneutics) was a community affair that called for a life of
obedience. And a hermeneutics of obedience presupposes a commitment of trust,
not unbelief (vv. 27-28).
The misinterpretation of Yahweh's words and deeds follows Israel's decision not
to obey him. Hermeneutics, from a stance of unbelief and rebellion, cannot
discern the significance or the intent of Yahweh's words and deeds. There is,
according to this passage, a moral dimension to the knowledge of God; indeed its
major aspect is that it is a moral religious response of trust that produces an
accurate knowledge of God. And, faith is not merely intellectual assent, it is a
moral act. The stance of faith helps produce a meaningful reading of God's words
and deeds. It discerns a convincing coherence in disjunctive events, and sees
definiteness in what is otherwise ambiguous.
Goldingay helps us grasp the significance of the experience of the ancient people
of God in the past. He observes,
OT theology, then, has to hold together an involvement with the past,
with the present, and with the future, and the attitude toward God the
OT looks for thus embraces remembrance, faith and hope. The
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narrative books major on remembrance, and imply that God's
constitutive acts lie in the past; the prophetic books, von Rad suggested,
invite Israel to turn from what God has done to what he is going to do;
the psalms and the wisdom books express faith in (and uncertainty
about) him in the present. But the narratives do not speak of the past out
of antiquarian interest, but because of its relevance to the present and
future of their readers, a relevance which is written into the story as they
tell it; the Bible is a book thatm"though on a first level narrating the past,
on a deeper level was speaking of the future and for the future.""
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John Wesley and Liberation Theology:
A Closer Look
KENNETH COLLINS, Ph.D.
In many respects, the opening of Vatican II by Pope John XXIII in October,
1962, was the beginning of liberation theology. Indeed, the reforming energies of
that council, expressed in its openness to the modern world and its problems,
provided a favorable setting in which the frustrations of the poor and the
disinherited could be addressed. This impetus for reform — what many in the
Church were considering "a breath of fresh air" — continued in the call of Catholic
bishops for a general conference in Medellin, Columbia, in 1968 to explore the
poverty indigenous to Latin America. Medellin, in many ways the heir of Vatican
II, has been deemed the womb of liberation theology because of its concern to
evangelize the poor, to usher in a more just system of distribution of resources, and
to give preference to the most needy.
Even though the roots of liberation theology are largely Latin American, many
contemporary theologians, ranging from Allan Boesak to Kim Yong-Bok, insist
that this way of doing theology must not be viewed simply as the prerogative of
Latin America, but must be seen as a vital endeavor of the universal church. For
their part, many Methodist theologians and ministers, particularly in the United
States and Great Britain, have sought to appropriate the genius of the "new"
theology, and to incorporate it within the larger Wesleyan tradition. For some, this
task has been relatively easy, for others less so. But is the theology of John Wesley
really a useful resource for, and is it compatible with, liberation theology?
Moreover, are there any elements in this eighteenth-century theology that could
possibly issue in a critique of contemporary liberation theology and praxis?
Since these two major theologies under consideration are highly developed and
extensive, the method of this present essay will be to focus on a representative area
of liberation theology, namely its definition of liberation itself, in order to
determine whether or not Wesley's theological conceptions and practice are, in
fact, salutary.

Gustavo Gutierrez of Peru, whom many consider to be the principal Latin
American theologian, maintains that liberation must be understood in a threefold
sense. He writes:
First, liberation means freedom from oppressive economic, social and
political conditions. Secondly, liberation means that human beings take
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over control of their own historical destiny. Thirdly, liberation includes
emancipation from sin and the acceptance of new life in Christ. 1
In the first area of liberation from oppressive economic, social and political
conditions, the contribution of Wesley will be limited, chiefly due to the restrictive
parameters of eighteenth-century political thought. Leon Hynson has argued
cogently that the political thinking of the mature Wesley (1767-1782) revolved
around the crucial issues of liberty and human rights. "Wesley believed that
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of worship, right to property,
freedom of movement and of life were secured through the Glorious Revolution," 2
andpertiolEgsh.Aunveraplictofhsmergwalo
enunciated by Wesley in the specific relation he discerned between liberty, human
rights and natural law. Here human rights were seen as imbedded in the very
nature of things established by the Creator and were thus deemed inalienable. A
corollary of this was that humans must be allowed the liberty to enjoy these rights
guaranteed by God.
Moreover, although Wesley was an aggressive reformer, tackling the problems
of unemployment, slavery, poverty, ignorance and war, his thought was, after all,
more conducive to the liberal reform characteristic of his pre-Marxist age, for it
lacked the kind of racial critique of institutional structures that has become the
staple of liberation theology. In other words, although the father of Methodism
was clearly a reformer, he was no revolutionary, and those theologians like Juan
Segundo who closely identify Christianity and socialism will find little to feed
upon in Wesley's political thought. On the other hand, those theologians who
insist on arguing for compatibility in this area, can do so only by ignoring the
historical problem posed in the form of Marxist thought as a watershed in political
and economic analysis.
II
To insure that the fruits of the Methodist revival would not be squandered, and
to provide some structure which could channel reforming energies into English
society, Wesley followed in the wake of such pietists as Franke, Zinzendorf,
William Law and his own father in emphasizing the place of religious societies in
the discipline and renewal of Christian life. These small groups, these ecclesiola in
ecclesia, were ranked according to spiritual progress and maturity. Thus, the
United Societies consisted of all awakened persons; the Bands included those who
knew their sins were forgiven, and the Select Societies embraced only those who
appeared to walk in the light of God.
At first glance it may seem as if these eighteenth-century communities, created
for both personal and social reform, are quite similar to the communidades
eclesiales de base or Christian base communities which have arisen within the
context of Latin American liberation theology. But there are some important
differences to be noted. First, the whole structure of Wesley's United Societies is
reflective of the ordo salutis as seen in the spiritual progression from society to
band to select society. But the ordo salutis, and any framework which is based
upon it, is deemed a straitjacket by liberation theologian Jose Miguez Bonino.3

John Wesley and Liberation Theology

87

Second, the CBCs are decidely corporate in emphasis, often calling for the kinds
of broad structural changes in the social order of which Wesley was only dimly
aware.
To be sure, these differences between the CBCs and Wesley's societies are
significant, but the crucial distinction between them actually lies in their different
valuations of history and human activity as agents in the process of redemption.
Thus, if the CBCs are seen in the context of Gutierrez's second definition of
liberation, as oppressed peoples taking control of their own historical destiny, then
two important conclusions will follow. First, the CBCs become the locus of
salvation, but only because they are reflective of, and closely associated with, the
historical process which itself is deemed truly redemptive in much of liberation
thought. As Dennis McCann wryly notes, the poor are not the objects of
evangelism, but its subjects. 4 It is they alone who are on the very fault lines of
history which will usher in the next vigorous activity of God. To be close to them is
to be close to God.
John Wesley, on the other hand, as leader of the Methodist societies, viewed
God, not any historical process, as the efficient cause in salvation. In his sermon,
"On Divine Providence," for example, history is clearly an instrumental cause
utilized by the Divine agent. But in the writings of such Latin American liberation
theologians as Leonardo Boff, Hugo Assman and Jose Miranda, the line between
efficient and instrumental causation is sometimes blurred, and the historical
process takes on a much greater role than Wesley's thought can allow. No doubt,
this larger role for history in liberation theology is a function of its ongoing
dialogue with Marxism—a dialogue to which John Wesley, quite obviously, was
not privy.
Second, such language as "taking control over their own historical destiny" is
perhaps too anthropocentric for Wesley, since it appears to place the emphasis on
human activity and independence, rather than on Divine initiative and human
dependence. Certainly, Wesley did not deny the importance of human efforts in
the amelioration of poverty, disease and the like, but he simply insisted that such
undertakings be viewed as the faithful response of the Church to the ever-active
God. In this line of thought, it is God who acts by means of the instrumentalities of
history and human achievement. In other words, it is God who initiates and
empowers through grace, and it is humanity which responds and becomes one of
the principal channels for the Divine activity in the world. Wesley expressed the
point well in his sermon on "Working Out Our Own Salvation." He wrote: "God
works; therefore you can work ... God works, therefore you must work." 5
III
It should be apparent by now that the definition of liberation employed by
Gutierrez is multi-dimensional, and is attentive, not only to the social and political
aspects of human life, but to a personal dimension as well. Indeed, his third aspect
of liberation entails emancipation from sin and the acceptance of new life in
Christ. But Gutierrez's critics from the religious right have not always been
appreciative of the inclusiveness of such a definition, since they have charged that
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liberation theology repudiates the notion of personal redemption in favor of a
political one. Nevertheless, liberation theology does not deny the importance of
the individual, but believes that the extensiveness of salvation simply cannot be
limited to this area; the social and political life of humanity must be redeemed as
well.
Though Gutierrez posits a threefold sense of liberation, he does not indicate
clearly the structural relationship between the various dimensions. For example,
what is the justification and motivation for Christian social and political activity?
Does such concern arise from a personal sense of gratitude in response to the
liberating activity of God, or does it come from a sensitive reading of the Divine
activity in the world on behalf of the oppressed, and a desire to identify with such a
movement? It is perhaps here that Wesley can be most helpful, for although his
understanding of the extent of salvation was more limited than that of
contemporary liberation theologians, Wesley indicated quite distinctly the raison
d'etre for his reforming activity in the pithy phrase, "faith working by love." In
other words, those who are in a trusting relationship with God through Jesus
Christ are liberated enough from their own self-curvature to be able to love their
neighbors personally, and to move beyond this level to engage in social and
political renewal. Wesley's reforms in education, in easing the plight of the
indigent, in attacking slavery and oppression, all grew out of his profound sense of
gratitude to God, what Luther had referred to, in another context, as "quellende
Liebe ." Indeed, one of Wesley's favorite texts in this area was 1 John 4:19, "We love,
because he first loved us" (RSV).
But Wesley's theology is helpful in another way concerning the area of
emancipation from sin and acceptance of a new life in Christ. For although, as has
already been pointed out, liberation theology incorporates a personal realm in its
conception of liberation, one of its chief temptations is to focus on social and
political constructs in its consideration of sin and evil, an endeavor which
sometimes results in a vapid and confused doctrine of sin. For example, Elsa
Tamez, a liberation theologian, maintains that, "Being born again, we acquire the
ability to distinguish between life and death. We can identify those who produce
death, the principalities and powers that govern the earth, the anti-Christs." 6 The
danger here, of course, is that liberation theology, in its conversation with
socialism, will be tempted to define sin along class lines, so that the dividing line
between good and evil will be seen to run not through the center of the human
heart, but through various classes, the oppressors and the oppressed, with the
result that the oppressed will often fail to appreciate fully the extensiveness of their
own evil.
John Wesley's hamartiology, on the other hand, as expressed in his lengthy
treatise on original sin published in 1757, underscored the universality of sin in
language reminiscient of the continental reformers. To be sure, the Elizabethan
Articles of Religion, to which Wesley ascribed, were informed by both the
Augsburg and Wurtemberg Confessions with their incisive understandings of the
nature and extent of sin. But, interestingly enough, Gutierrez's principal work, A
Theology of Liberation, contains no discussion of the doctrine of original sin at all.
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Such an omission is clearly disturbing, and needs to be addressed, or else one can
easily slip into the notion that there is, after all, a privileged position untainted by
evil from which one can survey the sin of others and, in the words of Tamez,
"identify the anti-Christs." The problem, then, is not that evil is identified in the
public realm, as it should be, but rests in the failure to recognize also the evil
within.
IV
Even within the narrow focus of this present essay, it is obvious that there is
both similarity and divergence with respect to Wesleyan and liberation theology.
Therefore, all broad-stroke assessments which see an easy accommodation
between these two theologies are precluded in favor of more tightly nuanced and
historically-attentive treatments. Clearly, Wesley was a vital reformer, but he
could not discern that there are, at times, structural foundations to human evils
that are impervious to sincere preaching and expressions of goodwill. His thought
was pre-critical because he lived, moved and had his being in a pre-critical age. He
can neither be faulted for this, nor can his differences from a critical theology be
glossed over in an attempt to make his thought relevant. Nevertheless, some
Methodist scholars have largely ignored Wesley's historical context and have
transferred, without much ado, ideas from the eighteenth century into the
twentieth. One such scholar writes:
If he [Wesley] did not - attain to the purview of what we call the social
gospel or liberation theology, the founder of Methodism nevertheless
espoused some of their crucial principles so that when these developments appeared they could be readily drawn into alliance with the
Wesleyan tradition.'
The reasoning cited above is especially problematic because it begs the question;
it assumes what it should prove. No argumentation, either historical or
theological, is offered to substantiate its sweeping claim. The mere observation of
similar ideas, especially when they are extracted from their historical context, does
not constitute compatibility or relevance. Saying it is so, does not make it so.
Now there might yet be a profound dialogue, even an alliance, between
liberation and Wesleyan theology, but such claims must be substantiated by, and
must await, more of the kinds of historical studies conducted by both Frank Baker
and Leon Hynson. In addition, these studies should be supplemented by a
thoroughgoing examination of the historical context which undergirds liberation
theology. This latter task can be accomplished, in part, by an analysis of Latin
American history and culture, especially in terms of Iberian influence, and more
importantly, in terms of Roman Catholicism with its communitarian ideal, and its
different conception and evaluation of vocation in commerce and industry from
that of Protestantism.
To be as historically cognizant as possible is very much at the heart of what
Outler has called Phase III of Wesley studies. This means that Wesley's theology,
as well as liberation theology, must be understood on their own terms and in their
own times before any sort of comparison can be made. To fail in this endeavor is to
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allow Wesley's theology to be taken captive to contemporary ideologies and
interests, or to allow liberation theology to be forced unnecessarily into Wesleyan
molds. But first let liberation theology be liberation theology, and then let Wesley
be Wesley. Only then can fruitful dialogue begin.
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Savary, Louis M., Patricia H. Berne and Strephon Kaplan Williams. Dreams and
Spiritual Growth: A Christian Approach to Dreamwork. New York: Paulist
Press, 1984. 241 pp. No index. Paper, $8.95. ISBN 0-8091-2629-X.

The authors, specialists in spiritual formation, clinical psychology, and Jungian
therapy (in that order), combine their perspectives and gifts in an attempt to bring
dreams back into the repertoire of Judeo-Christian resources for spiritual growth.
Dreams begins where our twentieth century fears are: with the bad press dreams
have had in the modern age. The book establishes, then achieves four goals. The
authors intend to establish dreamwork psychologically as a holistic process which
contributes to continuing transformation of personality along lines of holiness and
maturity. They intend dreamwork to contribute spiritually, opening an additional
resource and access to the supernatural, connecting inner and outer life.
Furthermore the authors nicely connect historically, allowing us to see dreams in
historical and cultural perspective. Finally, they insist that the dream may serve us
theologically, especially as a contribution to the community of faith.
In establishing dreamwork as a useful tool for moderns in their search for
wholeness and holiness, the authors link up with the pioneering work of John
Sanford and Morton Kelsey, both Anglican priests and counselors. Kelsey's
Dreams: The Dark Speech of the Spirit, and Sanford's Dreams: God's Forgotten
Language, are laid over Karl Jung's Psychology and Religion: West and East, as
foundational works to the dreamwork technique in this book.
The authors not only ground their dream theory in history, but also present it in
the light of current dream research. They affirm that everyone dreams and
typically is involved in intensive dreaming four or fives times in a single night.
(Research indicates "at 90 minute intervals," typically). Building on Kelsey's
breakthrough when a friend suggested that he pay more attention to his dreams
when he was facing a particularly difficult time in his life, the present authors
suggest, but never demand, that any of us may find life enriched and helped if we
learn to use the content of our dreams.
Some of the key guidelines for dreamwork include paying more attention to the
most vivid, memorable dreams which linger in memory over several days, weeks or
years, and looking for the "meaning" of the dream which is usually quite beyond
the "literal" events which may have made up the dream. To assist in this more
global use of the dream, the authors offer a four-stage grid through which to lay
hold of the significance of a dream. They call the sequence TTAQ. (1) TITLE the
dream, often asking "What title would the dream want me to give it?" (2) THEME
analysis states the issues or urgent themes that might be seen in the dream. (3)
AFFECT asks what the dominant feeling or emotional energy was which occurred
during the dream or lingers with the dream memory. (4) QUESTION focuses on
the lingering probe the dream poses, having asked a question of the dreamer.
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Nearly one third of the book is devoted to thirty-six dreamwork strategies which
unfold in direct relation to most of the chapters. The pastor, therapist, spiritual
director, or confidant will encounter dreams as they listen to people's stories. Now,
with this book, they are likely to raise the issue of dreams and possible dreamwork
as a question when any major life decision or trauma is the occasion for
consultation.
The book will be useful to all faith traditions which regard the human being in
global, holistic terms. It will offend those religious traditions which follow the
Gnostic distinction between the mind which can be trusted, and the body with its
suprarational feelings, intuitions, and biology, which cannot.
The book would have been even more useful had the authors devoted a chapter
to dealing with the linkage between "Rapid Eye Movement" dream studies, and
sexual arousal which tends infallibly to accompany REM dreaming. While the
authors wisely suggest that erotic dreams or sexually explicit dreams should be
looked at for their larger than sexual meaning, they leave many people baffled at
the nocturnal dream-accompanied arousal patterns which are more than
common. They omit, too, the research-based discovery that dreaming is essential
to sanity and that sleep deprivation leads inevitably to disorientation and perhaps
to the mood-swing episode.
DONALD M. JOY, Ph.D.
Professor of Human Development and Christian Education
Asbury Theological Seminary

Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Gospel According to Luke. Anchor Bible, vols. 28, 28a.
Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1981, 1985. 1600 pp. ISBN 0-385-00515-6 (vol.
1), ISBN 0-385-15542-5 (vol. 2).
This review marks the appearance of the second volume of Fitzmyer's
majesterial commentary on the Gospel of Luke. This volume deserves careful
attention by pastors and teachers who work seriously with the New Testament.
Fitzmyer brings to his task a rich background in linguistic and historical aspects
of Semitic studies from his work at the Catholic University of America. This
commentary contains relevant background information. Fitzmyer has the rare
ability to use the results of a rigorous, thorogoing historical study to illumine the
theological meaning of the final text.
This commentary is primarily concerned with the theological meaning of the
text. All who regularly use biblical commentaries know the frustration of endless
discussions regarding sources, historical reconstructions, and the history of the
tradition. Of course, such issues should and must be addressed; but the value of a
commentary for use within the church is ultimately judged by its sensitivity to the
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theological and pastoral issues that face persons who work within the community
of faith. Fitzmyer's aim is to explain the meaning of the Gospel of Luke "for
twentieth-century readers." To this end he uses various methods at his disposal,
including form criticism and redaction criticism. But he is primarily concerned to
interpret individual passages in Luke's Gospel in terms of their contextual function
within Luke-Acts as a whole.
The value of Fitzmyer's work on Luke involves much more than simply his
commentary on the text. His discussions of the difficult critical issues surrounding
the Gospel of Luke are among the most thoughtful and thorough to be found
anywhere. Fitzmyer's analysis of these issues is both original and balanced, and
even the discussion of these critical issues is related to the meaning of the Gospel of
Luke for the church. Moreover, the bibliographies, both in the Introduction and
throughout the commentary, are thorough and represent various theological
perspectives (including the evangelical).
This work has its weaknesses. For instance, the literary dimensions of the text
which have recently been highlighted by the discipline of literary or narrative
criticism receive very little attention. Further, the reader senses that at certain
points much more could be done to relate individual passages to their function
within the whole of Luke-Acts. Yet these problems are relatively insignificant in
light of the tremendous values this commentary affords to those who use it.
DAVID R. BAUER, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of English Bible
Asbury Theological Seminary

Webber, Robert E. The Church in the World: Opposition, Tension, or
Transformation? Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1986.
333 p. $11.95. ISBN 0-310-36601-1
Robert E. Webber is associate professor of theology at Wheaton College and
the author of several books, including Common Roots, The Secular Saint, and
Secular Humanism. In The Church in the World, Webber provides a historical
analysis of relations between the church and the world from New Testament times
to the modern day. He then discusses theological strengths and weaknesses of the
various church-world models concerning the role Christians play in political and
social issues. As Christians progressively become aware of the church's social
responsibilities in the world, Webber provides a timely study of church and society
issues.
Like H. Richard Niebuhr's classic work entitled Christ and Culture, Webber
presents models or types representative of how Christians deal with the relationship between the church and the world. Although Webber draws upon Niebuhr's
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work, Webber undertakes a more comprehensive look at the church-world issue
than did Niebuhr. Webber places greater emphasis upon the biblical basis for
debate, and he includes contemporary attempts to remodel classic Roman
Catholic and Protestant traditions, for example, those which see the relationship
between the church and the world as one of "opposition," "tension," or
"transformation."
Webber takes an ecumenical approach in the assessment of contemporary
viewpoints concerning the role of the church in the world. For example, he
indicates elements from an evangelical background in the social gospel movement
as found in such men as John Wesley in England and Jonathan Blanchard in
America. Without diminishing significant differences between Christian groups,
Webber recognizes the contributions from and areas of agreement between the
Roman Catholic Church, the World Council of Churches, and the World
Evangelical Fellowship.
Webber warns that concrete "structures of existence," which are created by God,
may be the context through which adverse spiritual powers work to produce evil in
the world. Structural realities through which life is experienced include political,
economic, educational, intellectual, religious and moral structures. Christians
should concern themselves as much with these structures of existence of "principalities" as the diabolical influence of evil "powers." Webber draws upon Jacques
Ellul's book entitled The New Demons to describe four "new gods": secularism,
scientism, nationalism and political ideology, and economic utopianism. Webber
suggests that these four provide an adequate (although not exhaustive) background for the study of the church-world issue today.
Webber concludes by noting that in the twentieth century, with its "global
village," a new unanimity between the various Christian traditions is being formed.
This "convergence of thought" theoretically pertains to the primary role the church
must play in addressing social issues. However, Webber provides little practical
consensus as to how the church is to address those powers that exercise their
influence through the various structures of existence. Nevertheless, Webber's study
of the church-world issue challenges Christians to reevaluate their relationship to
the world and, correspondingly, to act responsibly in the world.
DONALD A. D. THORSEN, Ph.D.
Instructor in Theology
Asbury Theological Seminary
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Knight, Douglas A. and Gene M. Tucker, eds. The Hebrew Bible and Its Modern
Interpreters. Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1985. xxvii, 516 pp. $22.50
($14.95). ISBN 0-8006-0721-X
Douglas A. Knight is professor of Old Testament at the Divinity School,
Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee. Gene Tucker is professor of Old
Testament at Candler School of Theology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.
These two scholars serve as contributing editors of this volume.
Four series of books are planned to mark the 1980 centennial of the Society of
Biblical Literature. The preface to this volume indicates the ambitious nature of
these series (forty volumes are projected for the four series). "The Centennial
Publication Program aims to scrutinize the history of biblical scholarship as well
as the very diverse roles that the Bible has played in North American culture"(p. xi).
This book, edited by Knight and Tucker, is one volume of a trilogy in the series
The Bible and Its Modern Interpreters. The three contributions planned for the
Bible and Its Modern Interpreters examine the results of research on the Hebrew
Bible (present volume), early Judaism, and the New Testament since 1945. The
fifteen chapters of this first volume analyze the current state of biblical studies in all
of the standard areas and in the important subdisciplines and cognate studies. The
authors suggest future trends for research on the Hebrew Bible.
The explosion of cross-disciplinary approaches to and perspectives on the study
of the Old Testament and, likewise, the multiplication of methodologies and
hermeneutical viewpoints, make a volume like this one indispensable. The purpose
of the present collection of essays is to present a general, but comprehensive,
discussion of all of the major trends in Old Testament studies since 1945. These
contributors successfully complete their task by surveying the state of studies on
the Hebrew Bible from all of the relevant perspectives. The book does not intend to
break new ground, but does report on the new ground that has been broken.
Although the book does not examine current issues in great detail (Dever's chapter
on Syro-Palestinian and Biblical Archaeology comes close), the contours of
present approaches and methodologies toward the Old Testament are discernible.
The contributors present the following chapters: (1) Israelite History (Miller),
(2) Syro-Palestinian and Biblical Archaeology (Dever), (3) The Ancient Near
Eastern Environment (Roberts), (4) Criticism of Literary Features, Form,
Tradition, and Redaction (Knierim), (5) Exploring New Directions (Cully), (6)
Israelite Religion (Miller), (7) Theology of the Hebrew Bible (Coats), (8) The
Pentateuch (Knight), (9) The Historical Literature (Ackroyd), (10) Prophecy and
the Prophetic Literature (Tucker), (11) The Wisdom Literature (Crenshaw), (12)
The Lyrical Literature (Gerstenberger), (13) Legends of Wise Heroes and Heroines
(Niditch), (14) Apocalyptic Literature (Hanson), (15) The Hebrew Bible and
Modern Culture (Harrelson). Several maps and an index of modern authors
complete this study. A major contribution of this timely collection of essays is the
extensive bibliography located at the end of each chapter. The chapters help the
reader understand how the major bibliographical items have contributed to the
topics under discussion.
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All of the chapters are helpful and relatively well done. The strength of the
volume, however, lies in its treatment of recent methodologies and approaches to
interpreting the Old Testament that would not have appeared in a work such as
this fifteen to twenty years ago. Those topics worthy of special attention and
special mention deal with the "new directions" in the study of the Hebrew Bible.
Robert C. Culley (pp. 107-189) discusses many aspects of poetics, such as discourse
analysis, narrative analysis, structural analysis, symbol, forms of discourse, and
text; folklore, anthropology and sociology. Gerstenberger treats lyrical literature
and brings many interdisciplinary and integrative insights to bear on this genre of
literature. Susan Niditch deals with the genre of legends, heroes and heroines.
Harrelson discusses the influence of the Hebrew Bible on culture, and notes briefly
the modern self-consciousness of biblical studies of the cultural interplay between
the Old Testament and culture.
Rolf Knierim's attempt to bring all of the "new directions" of perspective and
method under the umbrella of "historical criticism" helps to relate the new
concepts of literary criticism, sociology and anthropology to the standard
historical-critical approach. But, at the same time, he fails to recognize the different
presuppositions held by some of the recent hermeneutical approaches. It appears
that he is trying to pour too much new wine into old wineskins. How can, for
example, new literary criticism be reconciled with redaction criticism? How can the
new stress on the unity of the text in narrative criticism be absorbed by a source
theory approach that threatens to atomize the text?
The book accomplishes its purpose; it does provide the reader with an informed
guide to the status questionis in the research of the Old Testament in 1985. At the
time of writing this review, the book is still on the cutting edge for reference works
of this kind. One could have hoped for a discussion of the impact of the use of
computer technology for the study of the Old Testament text. This new
development needs to be addressed.
The book is written for Old Testament scholars, but scholars from several cross
disciplines, such as sociology, literary criticism, anthropology, philosophy,
psychology and linguistics will find an entree into the Old Testament in these pages
relevant to their research. The many integrative cross references to other disciplines
and cognate studies indicate a positive move toward an integrative reading of the
biblical text. This work is an invaluable reference tool for anyone who wants to
know the development of Old Testament studies during the past forty years.
EUGENE E. CARPENTER, Ph.D.
Professor of Theology
Asbury Theological Seminary
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Kaiser, Walter C., Jr. Toward Old Testament Ethics. Grand Rapids: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1983. xii, 345 pp. $16.95, hardback. ISBN 0-310-37110-4.

One of the most neglected areas of Old Testament research during the past
century has been inclusive studies in Old Testament ethics. Only six such
monographs have appeared within the past one hundred years. Of these six, only
three have been in English. The three English titles were published between 1883
and 1912 and have become quite dated in the advance of Old Testament
scholarship. Since then the literature in the field has been largely piecemeal and is
scattered in numerous individual essays. An updated synthesis has been long
overdue.
This is the challenge to which the author committed himself in this book. It is the
third in a trilogy of books which includes the designation "toward" in the title
written by Walter Kaiser, acadernic dean and professor of Old Testament and
Semitic languages at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School. The author is aware of
the enormity of the task in undertaking a general treatment of the ethical content of
the Old Testament and he only claims for this work that it is a pioneering effort to
update the discussion and to point out the more important issues and the
fundamental structures of the theme.
The book is organized under five major sections. The opening section raises the
methodological problematic for an Old Testament ethic and proposes solutions
related to the revelatory character of the old covenant. The second section
discusses the major moral texts contained within the Pentateuch. The general
content of Old Testament ethics is then surveyed in part three. Common objections
to the alleged inferior level of Old Testament morality are answered in the fourth
section. The book closes with a final chapter on the significance of Old Testament
law and ethics for Christians under the new covenant.
Against those authors who insist that the Old Testament is marginal as a source
for Christian ethics because of its wide diversity of ethical values which are rooted
in the cultural situation of the ancient world, and contrary to other authors who
wish to make only indirect use of the ethical imagery and broad ethical witness of
the Old Testament for informing Christian conscience, Kaiser contends that the
ethical content of the Old Testament provides propositional norms for behavior
which are prescriptive for the church and transferable to the modern situation. He
is critical of a residual Marcionism which still affects Christians today, evidenced
by an all-too-ready willingness to minimize the significance of the Old Testament
for Christian faith. A thesis which permeates the book and which comes to fullest
expression in the final chapter is that the moral law of the Old Testament is the
foundation for New Testament ethics and that Christians have a continuing
obligation to that norm.
Readers who are less interested in questions of methodology and more
concerned to acquire a basic understanding of Old Testament ethics will find Part
III (pp. 139-247) of the book most helpful. Wesleyan readers in particular will
resonate with the author's premise that holiness is the controlling motif which
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provides the cohesive center for the variety of Old Testament ethical norms. This
central theme is shown to permeate the various dimensions of personal, marital
and social life.
Kaiser writes as an evangelical Protestant and generally comes down on the side
of conservative viewpoints on such contemporary issues as capital punishment,
just war and the expression of human sexuality. He is not unaware of problems
with these stances, however, and addresses biblical critiques to inappropriate and
sinful exercises of these functions.
This book is a welcome addition to evangelical scholarship in the area of Old
Testament studies in general and in Old Testament ethics in particular. It assists the
reader to grasp the more significant moral teachings and to view them within a
holistic context. Indexes of Hebrew words and scripture references, along with
extensive footnoting which documents classical and recent literature in the field,
are helpful for further study. Intended to be comprehensive rather than thorough,
it provides a doorway of entry into Old Testament ethical themes which can then
be pursued in more depth by reading the numerous individual essays which have
appeared over the years.
FRED D. LAYMAN, Ph.D.
Butler-Valade Professor of Biblical Theology
Asbury Theological Seminary

William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch. A Commentary on the Letters of
Ignatius of Antioch (Hermeneia - A Critical and Historical Commentary on the
Bible, ed. Helmut Koester; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985). xxii, 305 pp.
$34.95. ISBN 0-8006-6016-1.
Schoedel's commentary on the letters of Ignatius of Antioch in Hermeneia
continues the tradition of Handbuch zum Neuen Testaments (HNT) by including
commentaries on selected portions of the non-canonical literature of early Christianity in a commentary series on the Bible. With the publication of this volume,
Hermeneia has provided the scholar of Christian origins with the first full-scale
commentary on the Ignatian writings since that of Walter Bauer (Die Brieft des
Ignatius von Antiochia and der Polykarpbrief[Die Apostolischen Vdter, 2; HNT;
Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Siebeck, 1920]), recently revised by H. Paulsen as HNT,
18 (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr-Siebeck, 1985). In both scope and detail, Schoedel's
work surpasses not only that of Bauer/ Paulsen but also the only other English
language commentary of this century, that of Robert M. Grant, Ingatius of
Antioch (The Apostolic Fathers, 4; Camden: Nelson, 1966).
The method of the commentary is to begin with an extensive status quaestionis
which establishes the parameters within which the commentary is to be focused.
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William Schoedel, professor of religious studies at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign, demonstrates his scholarly acumen as he reexamines the
major critical questions of lgnatian scholarship. Beginning with the problem posed
by the three recensions, he reviews the consensus structured by Lightfoot and Zahn
in favor of the middle recension as well as the modern challenges to that consensus
by Weijenborg, Ruiz-Camps and Joly. Schoedel finds the work of the more recent
authors less than convincing and builds his commentary on the text of the middle
recension as edited by Karl Bihlmeyer, Die Apostolischen Voter: Neubearbeitung
der Funkschen Ausgabe, 2d ed. Wilhelm Schneemelcher (SAQ 2.1.1; Tubingen: J.
C. B. M oh r-Siebeck, 1956). Reservations about specific readings in the Bihlmeyer
text are discussed in detail in the notes.
In the review of recent studies, Schoedel takes a number of positions, supported
by his analysis in the commentary, which mark a departure from many earlier
studies of the letters. Three in particular are noteworthy. (1) Schoedel argues
convincingly that Ignatius is to be viewed not as a proto-martyr but as a bishop
(however defined) who had lost a power struggle within the church at Antioch and
had been delivered to the Romans by his own community. (2) The trip to Rome
was a major effort in public relations. Ignatius was accompanied„and/ or preceded
by messengers who alerted communities to his arrival and argued, apparently
successfully, for Ignatius' perspective on the situation at Antioch. (3) Schoedel
demonstrates that Ignatius is thoroughly party to the Hellenistic intellectual and
social synthesis and that his gnosticism is to be understood in that context. This is
made obvious by the number of allusions to and parallels with Classical and
Hellenistic-Jewish writers indicated in the commentary.
A cautious, judicious analysis of Ignatius' theological perspective (pp. 17-31)
concludes the introduction. Here Schoedel takes specific themes and traces them
through the letters (concept of God, eucharist, unity of the community, the nature
of ministry, flesh and spirit, flesh and blood, faith and love, hope, passion and
resurrection, eschatology, attaining God and imitation of Christ). These motifs are
developed as functions of controversies in which their author found himself
embroiled or interested.
At this point further elaboration of the socio-cultural significance of Ignatius'
method and developing perspective would have been helpful. The autobiographical tendency and corresponding minimal appeal to Scripture (either Old or
New Testament) for authentication of his assertions would suggest the fluid status
of Christian theology and theological method, as well as evolving group structures,
at the time of the composition of this corpus. Here a dialogue with the work of
Pierre de Labriolle, La Reaction paTenne, 2nd ed. (Paris: Artisan du livre, 1948)
and Robert Wilken, The Christians as the Romans Saw Them (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1984) could prove illuminating. Any analysis of Christian
structures and ideology which relies exclusively on Christian documents tends to
read later conditions back into the text. Schoedel can rarely be accused of
anachronistic reading of his documents. He is definitely aware of this material but
does not make explicit the implications of his analysis of Ignatius for the social and
intellectual configuration of Antiochene and western Anatolian Christianity.
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There is much here to correct the anachronistic and triumphalistic reading of
Ignatius promulgated by most handbooks of early Christian studies.
The commentary which follows is solidly philological and historical. Within the
structure of the Hermeneia series, every significant issue presented by the text is
discussed. Schoedel is always in dialogue with writers who have investigated facets
of Ignatius' writings and thus expands upon the status quaestionis of the
introduction. However, the commentary makes contributions beyond the mass of
grammatical and historical data presented to elucidate the text. Especially helpful
are the analysis of doctrinal and political issues in tension, the identification of
parallels with other authors and the significance of those parallels, the careful
attention to rhetorical devices, the examination of epistolographical techniques
and suggestion of their importance for understanding the text, and the continuous
awareness of the context in which Ignatius is writing.
Thus the scholar is provided with an essential reference point for all future
research on the letters of Ignatius, the enigmatic Bishop of Antioch, as well as a
model commentary on a patristic text.
DAVID BUNDY, Ph.D.
Ass't Professor of Christian Origins/
Collection Development Librarian
Asbury Theological Seminary

